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RESUMEN
De acuerdo con la teoría de la información desarrollada por Claude Shannon1, un
buen sistema de cifrado está basado en la transformación de la información mediante
operaciones de mezcla dependientes de un parámetro o conjunto de parámetros ex-
ternos, el cual hará las veces de clave secreta del sistema. En una situación ideal
dicho sistema presenta una gran dependencia respecto al texto cifrado y a la clave,
de modo que pequeños cambios en los mismos conducen a textos cifrados totalmente
distintos. El objetivo es que el texto obtenido en el proceso de cifrado sea estadís-
ticamente independiente tanto del texto en claro (o texto a cifrar) como de la clave
empleada. Según Shannon, una estrategia adecuada para lograr este objetivo sería
aquella fundamentada en la concatenación de un par de operaciones simples no con-
mutativas. De forma más precisa, Shannon alude a la necesidad de efectuar sucesivas
compresiones y expansiones del texto a cifrar, de forma análoga al comportamiento
analizado por Hopf2. De este modo, Shannon define las características esenciales
del cifrado de información aludiendo implícitamente a algunas de las propiedades
que identifican a los sistemas dinámicos caóticos. En efecto, el caos se caracteriza
por presentar un comportamiento con una alta divergencia local (expansión) y una
convergencia global (compresión) que, en último término, determinan una alta de-
pendencia respecto a las condiciones iniciales y el conjunto de parámetros de control.
Asimismo, esa paradójica asociación entre divergencia y convergencia hace que los
sistemas caóticos presenten una propiedad de mezcla de gran utilidad a la hora de
diseñar estrategias de cifrado de información. En este sentido, se pueden adoptar dos
posibles planteamientos. Una primera opción es diseñar mecanismos de cifrado basa-
dos en técnicas de sincronización de sistemas dinámicos definidos en tiempo continuo.
La otra posibilidad es trabajar en tiempo discreto. La técnicas de cifrado fundamen-
tadas en la sincronización de sistemas dinámicos se han mostrado intrínsicamente
inseguras y, por ello, en esta tesis nos centramos en el análisis de criptosistemas basa-
1C. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Sys. Tech. J., v. 28, pp. 656-715,
1949
2E. Hopf, “On Causality, Statistics and Probability,” Journal of Math. and Physics, v. 13, pp.
51-102, 1934.
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dos en sistemas dinámicos definidos en tiempo discreto, a los que nos referiremos en
lo que sigue como mapas.
Un sistema dinámico caótico está matemáticamente definido por un conjunto de
ecuaciones que, de forma genérica, dependen de un conjunto de parámetros externos.
Estos parámetros controlan la dinámica de los sistemas dinámicos involucrados, de
modo que es posible que para diversas configuraciones la dinámica generada no sea
caótica. Dicho de otra forma, cuando un sistema dinámico caótico está definido de
forma paramétrica no se puede asumir sin más el comportamiento caótico del sistema
para todas las configuraciones posibles. Dado que el uso de tales sistemas en el
contexto de la criptografía requiere su comportamiento caótico, el primer paso a llevar
cabo será el de establecer mecanismos verificadores del mismo. Para ello es necesario
en primer término clarificar en qué se fundamenta el uso de sistemas caóticos como
soporte de nuevos criptosistemas. Tal y como se ha mencionado anteriormente, uno de
los elementos que hace atractivo el caos para la criptografía es su alta sensibilidad a las
condiciones iniciales. En efecto, los sistemas caóticos se caracterizan por presentar una
tasa positiva de divergencia local, la cual se puede cuantificar mediante el exponente de
Lyapunov. Ahora bien, no basta que el sistema considerado presente un exponente de
Lyapunov positivo, además es preciso que el comportamiento estadístico de las órbitas
resultantes sea independiente del valor del parámetro o parámetros de control. En este
sentido el sistema dinámico considerado debe dar lugar a órbitas con una función de
distribución de probabilidad no dependiente del parámetro o parámetros de control.
Por último, un criptosistema caótico utiliza el caos fundamentalmente como fuente
de entropía y, en consecuencia, es necesario establecer el nivel de incertidumbre que
se puede obtener a partir de la iteración de un cierto sistema dinámico.
Hasta este punto se cuenta con suficientes criterios para constatar la capacidad de
un cierto sistema dinámico como mecanismo generador de complejidad que, en último
término, será utilizada para ocultar información. Ahora bien, no podemos olvidar que
la teoría del caos se desarrolló con el objetivo de modelar comportamientos caóticos
mediante ecuaciones matemáticas «simples». La teoría del caos marca una transición
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desde lo complejo (desde un punto de vista cualitativo) hacia lo «simple» (desde un
punto de vista cuantitativo). En este punto de la tesis corresponde establecer si es
viable realizar de nuevo esa transición, esto es, si la observación de las órbitas que
podemos obtener de un cierto criptosistema nos permite reconstruir de alguna forma
las ecuaciones que definen el sistema caótico subyacente. En el caso de la criptografía
caótica el conjunto de ecuaciones que definen el sistema empleado por la arquitectura
de cifrado es conocido y, por tanto, nuestro trabajo tendrá por meta el recuperar
total o parcialmente las condiciones iniciales y/o los parámetros de control asociados
a las órbitas consideradas. Hemos de establecer si es posible transformar de alguna
forma las órbitas de un sistema caótico de modo que se puedan construir aplicaciones
biyectivas con respecto a las condiciones iniciales y/o los parámetros de control. Lo
fundamental de esta tarea no es sólo construir tales aplicaciones biyectivas, sino tam-
bién encontrar las condiciones a satisfacer para conseguir una buena estimación de
los parámetros y/o condiciones iniciales. En efecto, no siempre las órbitas obtenidas
a partir de un criptosistema caótico son suficientemente «largas» como para obtener
una buena estimación de los parámetros, mientras que en otras ocasiones no se tiene
acceso a órbitas exactas, sino a versiones discretizadas o muestreadas de las mismas.
Es más, la aplicabilidad y el éxito de una cierta metodología es dependiente de las
características dinámicas del sistema considerado, por lo que no es posible establecer
un conjunto de procedimientos válidos en cualquier contexto y para cualquier sis-
tema dinámico. Es por ello que en esta tesis el trabajo se ha centrado en los mapas
más utilizados en criptografía, esto es, el mapa logístico y la familia de mapas uni-
modales topológicamente conjugados a él. En efecto, las características dinámicas
del mapa logístico permiten ilustrar con gran claridad la importancia de seleccionar
adecuadamente los parámetros de control, así como el peligro de que un sistema de
cifrado filtre demasiada información relativa a tales características. En este sentido,
las órbitas del mapa logístico han sido evaluadas desde el punto de vista estadístico y
desde la óptica del espacio de frecuencias. El objetivo ha sido poner de relieve cómo
afectan los cambios de valores del parámetro de control y de la condición inicial al
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nivel de entropía, a la función de distribución de probabilidad y al comportamiento
frecuencial del mapa logístico. En lo que respecta a la entropía, ha de llevarse a cabo
un análisis exhaustivo de la misma y, por ello, no nos podemos limitar al estudio de la
entropía en el sentido de Shannon, sino que también han de ser consideradas medidas
no extensivas como las propuestas por Tsallis3. Es de especial utilidad el estudio de
la entropía desde la óptica del examen en tiempo-frecuencia que lleva a cabo la trans-
formada wavelet, el cual permite definir el concepto de entropía wavelet. Otra medida
de entropía definida mediante la transformada wavelet es la entropía multiresolución.
Tal y como se muestra en esta tesis, esa manera de evaluar la entropía posibilita
localizar cambios en la dinámica propiciados por modificaciones en los parámetros
de control, lo cual puede hacer factible una estimación de los parámetros de control
y, por tanto, tiene que ser tenido en consideración al diseñar o al comprobar la se-
guridad de un criptosistema caótico. De la misma forma, es obligatorio un minucioso
estudio de la función de distribución de probabilidad de las órbitas del mapa caótico
considerado. En el caso del mapa logístico y de los mapas unimodales topológica-
mente conjugados a él existe una gran dependencia de dicha función con respecto al
parámetro de control. Dicha correlación queda claramente evidenciada mediante el
examen de las funciones de probabilidad utilizando medidas de distancia estadística.
Por último, el mapa logístico, como cualquier sistema dinámico caótico, se caracteriza
por presentar un conjunto denso de órbitas inestables. En el caso del mapa logístico
la densidad de tales órbitas crece a media que lo hace el nivel de entropía, detalle que
queda explicitado en su complejidad estadística. La complejidad estadística en el caso
del mapa logístico define una función biyectiva en la región caótica del mapa, esto
es, para el conjunto de valores del parámetro de control conducentes a un compor-
tamiento caótico. Esta circunstancia no sólo permite estimar el parámetro de control
a partir de la complejidad estadística de las órbitas, sino que también lo hace factible
cuando se trabaja sobre versiones binarias de las órbitas del mapa logístico. En esta
línea, se transformaron las órbitas del mapa logístico en secuencias de unos y ceros
3C. Tsallis, “Possible generalization of Boltzmann-Gibbs statistics,” Journal of Statistical Physics,
v. 5(1-2), pp. 479-487, 1998
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sin más que comparar cada valor de órbita con el punto crítico del mapa: un valor
menor que el punto crítico es sustituido por un cero, mientras que un valor igual o
mayor que el punto crítico da lugar a un uno. Las secuencias binarias así obtenidas
pueden ser ordenadas en relación a la condición inicial y al parámetro de control. En
esta tesis se demuestra que ese orden es correlato del orden de la condición inicial y
del parámetro de control en el dominio de los números reales, lo que implica que es
posible recuperar tanto la condición inicial como el parámetro de control del mapa
logístico a partir de estas secuencias binarias. Ahora bien, el método que permite la
estimación del parámetro de control requiere que se conozca de antemano el valor del
punto crítico. Esto es factible en el caso del mapa logístico, pues su punto crítico es
fijo e independiente del valor del parámetro de control. Sin embargo, éste no es el
caso de todos los mapas topológicamente conjugados al mapa logístico. Así, para el
caso del mapa tienda con punto crítico variable el parámetro de control determina el
valor del punto crítico. En consecuencia, es preciso buscar otra alternativa al método
propuesto para el mapa logístico. En esta tesis se demuestra que la solución viene
dada por los patrones de orden. Una manera distinta de interpretar la información
contenida en las órbitas de un mapa caótico es descomponiéndolas en subórbitas y
ordenando los valores contenidos en cada una de esas subórbitas. Las distintas or-
denaciones de los valores de cada subórbita se llaman patrones de orden, los cuales
constituyen la información con la que trabajaremos en lo que sigue con el objetivo de
estimar el parámetro de control de los mapas unimodales, cuando no se conoce el valor
de su punto crítico. En primer lugar, es necesario clarificar que los patrones de orden
de los mapas unimodales considerados en esta tesis pueden ser construidos también
a partir de las secuencias binarias obtenidas por comparación con el punto crítico.
Es más, el verdadero interés de nuestro trabajo reside precisamente en construir tales
patrones de orden partiendo de las secuencias binarias para estimar el parámetro de
control. La base de la metodología a emplear viene dada por la dependencia respecto
al parámetro de control de la anchura del intervalo de condiciones iniciales que dan
origen a un cierto patrón de orden. La ergodicidad de los mapas caóticos permite
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vincular tal anchura con la frecuencia de aparición del patrón de orden en una ór-
bita dada, factor que posibilita la estimación del parámetro de control a partir de las
órbitas, aun cuando el punto crítico no es conocido.
El enfoque utilizado en lo precedente permite definir un paradigma de referencia
a la hora de diseñar y analizar un criptosistema basado en caos. Las distintas herra-
mientas matemáticas que han sido introducidas, así como los procedimientos puestos
en liza con objeto de detectar posibles aplicaciones biyectivas respecto a condiciones
iniciales y/o parámetros de control, fueron empleados para detectar problemas de
seguridad en criptosistemas caóticos recientemente propuestos. En esta tesis se reco-
gen los principales resultados que hemos logrado en el criptoanálisis de criptosistemas
basados en sistemas caóticos definidos en tiempo discreto. La aplicación de las herra-
mientas y procedimientos explicitados en nuestros trabajos de criptoanálisis nos ha
permitido concretar un conjunto de recomendaciones de cara a evitar la aplicabilidad
de estas herramientas por parte de un criptoanalista o atacante. Dicho de otra forma,
un criptosistema en el que no se pueden aplicar las herramientas y procedimientos
definidos en esta tesis, es un criptosistema seguro con respecto a los principales pro-
blemas de seguridad detectados en el marco de la criptografía caótica. A modo de
conclusión en esta tesis se presentan una serie de recomendaciones con objeto de evi-
tar aquellos problemas de seguridad y, en consecuencia, conseguir diseñar un buen
sistema de cifrado basado en caos.
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ABSTRACT
Since 1990s chaotic dynamical systems have been widely used to design new strate-
gies to encrypt information. Indeed, the dependency to initial conditions and control
parameters, along with the ergodicity of their temporal evolution allow the establish-
ment of chaos as the base of new cryptosystems, i.e., of new schemes of confusion
and diffusion of information. However, an optimum design in the context of chaos-
based cryptography demands a thorough knowledge not only of the foundations of
cryptography, but also of the dynamics and inner structure of chaos. Therefore, any
proposal to use chaos in the context of cryptography must respect a series of design
rules, in order to avoid the reconstruction of the dynamics of the underlying chaotic
system, and to determine an optimum use of the virtues of the chaotic dynamics.
Although it is possible to use chaos to design analog cryptosystems based on
synchronization techniques, this Thesis is focused on the application of chaotic maps,
i.e., chaotic dynamical systems defined in discrete time to cryptography. In this sense,
a set of mathematical tools are defined to establish the adequacy of a chaotic map
as the base of a cryptosystem, and the requirements that an encryption architecture
must satisfy to avoid the dynamical reconstruction of the underlying chaotic map.
More precisely, this Thesis provides an extension and systematization of the results
derived from the cryptanalysis of chaos-based cryptosystems.
The above goal comprises three different stages:
1. Definition of a set of mathematical tools that allow the selection of the adequate
configurations of a dynamical system to implement strategies of confusion and
diffusion of information.
2. Study of the most popular chaotic maps in the field of chaos-based cryptography
to determine whether these maps can be used to design new cryptosystems
without incurring in security problems.
3. Summary and conclusions of the first two stages. The aim is to define a set of
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rules or recommendations as a guide for the design of chaos-based cryptosys-
tems.
Recalling the first stage, its main purpose is the search of procedures to infer
or estimate the initial conditions and/or the control parameters from the orbits of
a chaotic map. Different scenarios are considered depending on whether complete
orbits are accesible or it is only possible to work with sampled or discretized versions
of the orbits. In all scenarios the goal consist in building bijective functions with
respect to the initial conditions and/or the control parameters. The requirements to
build these bijective functions are clarified, along with the procedures to guide the
estimation of the initial conditions and/or the control parameters. In order to test
the set of mathematical tools and the estimation methods, the logistic map and its
associated topological conjugate maps are thoroughly studied, since these maps are
the most widely used in the design of new digital chaotic cryptosystems. Specially
relevant is the study of the symbolic dynamics and order patterns of unimodal maps.
The study of this family of chaotic maps leads to a series of very useful results to
define a set of recommendations for both the evaluation of the security of chaos-based
cryptosystems and the design of encryption schemes based on chaos.
ix
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation of this Thesis
From the seminal contribution of Lorenz [Lorenz63] chaos has captured the attention
of the scientific community. Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos Theory have been de-
veloped to model complex behavior using quite simple mathematical models. This
paradoxical and astonishing brotherhood is very appealing when trying to explain
and forecast the evolution of economical systems, biological populations, physical
processes. . . From this point of view, Chaos Theory is the way of understanding real
and complex processes, it is a methodology to simplify reality for the sake of its com-
prehension. But Chaos Theory is not just valid as a framework to understand the
complexity of real world, it is not just the end of a road but also the beginning of
a long route. Indeed, the mathematical models built by Chaos Theory can be also
used as source of information instead of as summary of given information. In this
sense, those models that were generated to explain and predict the behavior of sys-
tems in real world, can be used as simple and mere mathematical equations to be
further manipulated in the context of a given mathematical methodology. Modern
communications are very concerned with the virtues of Chaos Theory as origin of
new proposals, of new procedures to transform and to bear information. An specific
area of modern communications very related to Chaos Theory is cryptography, as
it is implicitly pointed out in Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory [Shannon49]. Cer-
tainly, the main properties of chaos are very connected to the the main properties
that a well designed encryption system must possess. Nevertheless, the application
of Chaos Theory to the design of new encryption schemes can not be done straight-
forwardly. Certainly, the “simple” mathematical models derived from Chaos Theory
were developed from the analysis of the complex chaotic behavior of real systems,
which implies that a similar procedure could be applied to elude the complexity of
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the encryption methodologies based on those mathematical models. This Thesis is
concerned with analyzing thoroughly the link between chaos and cryptography, and
establishing when it is possible to elude the security emanated from the use of chaos
as base of encryption systems. The concretion of both goals requires to establish
clear and rigorously what the main demands of cryptography are, and how they can
be fulfilled using chaotic systems. A first approximation to this concern is provided
along the rest of this Chapter, whereas an exhaustive and deep study of it is fulfilled
along the rest of this Thesis.
1.2 Cryptography: foundation and basic concepts
Almost from the beginning of writing language, there has been a necessity of finding
means to conceal valuable information [Singh00]. Cryptology is the science involved
in the transformation of information in such a way that it is not accessible for other
people different from the legitimate source and destination. This process requires two
steps:
1. Selection of the tools and the framework which guide the concealing of the
information.
2. Evaluation of the achieved encryption scheme.
These two stages are two different but complementary branches of cryptology, which
are cryptography and cryptoanalysis.
Cryptography derived from Greek krýpto “hidden” and the verb gráfo “to write‘”,
and it is referred to the conversion of ordinary information or plaintext into unin-
telligible gibberish or ciphertext (also known as cryptogram) and viceversa [Kahn96].
The transformation of the plaintext into the ciphertext is named encryption, whereas
the inverse operation is called decryption. In ancient times encryption was performed
by replacing a general understandable code into a code just known by a group of se-
lected people, which comprised the legitimate sender and receiver of the information.
This was the case of Egyptian hieroglyphic. Nevertheless, this kind of encryption
is impractical since it requires the code used in the exchange of information to be
changed for every new sender-receiver pair. For that reason, the primitive encryption
schemes were replaced by others where the code was generated using a transformation
procedure depending on an external parameter, the key. In this sense, the sender and
the receiver do not need to know the code conforming the ciphertext, they only need
to know the transformation procedure and the value of the key. With the industrial
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revolution, the encryption/decryption had to be changed to meet the requirements of
the new communications scope. Indeed, the former cryptography handled language
characters and produced language characters. However, communication through ra-
dio and telegraph requires the transformation of the language words into a new code
which is a series of zeroes and ones. This is the bit era and from now on cryptography
handles and transforms set of bits instead of words of a language. In this scenario,
the encryption and decryption procedures are mathematical algorithms dependant on
a secret key. Therefore, the encryption procedure is led by the function given by
Eke : P → C, (1.1)
where ke ∈ Ke, Ke is the encryption key space (i.e., the set of all possible values for the
secret key ke), P =
{
p0, p1, . . . , p|P|
}
is the plaintext space, and C = {c0, c1, . . . , c|C|}
is the ciphertext space. On the other hand, the recovery of the plaintext is determined
by the following function:
Dkd : C → P, (1.2)
where kd ∈ Kd, being Kd the decryption key space. If the encryption scheme is
symmetric, then kd = ke and the cryptographic system or cryptosystem is a secret
key cryptosystem. On the other hand, if the kd is different from ke, then the associated
cryptosystem is called asymmetric or public key cryptosystem. In this work all the
considered cryptosystems are symmetric, i.e., henceforth it is assumed that ke = kd =
k, and the key space is noted as K. The security of a cryptosystem is very dependant
on the cardinality |K| of the key space. Indeed, the decryption procedure is a bijective
function if the value of the secret key is known (see Fig. 1.1). Otherwise, the recovering
of the plaintext from the ciphertext requires to apply the decryption function for every
possible value of the secret key, i.e., to perform a brute force attack. Therefore, if the
brute force attack is the only way of eluding the security of a cryptosystem, then the
more possible keys, the more security.
Until this point the encryption and corresponding decryption procedures have
been reduced to some kind of mathematical function. The proper selection of en-
cryption/decryption functions must be done according to Shannon’s theory of perfect
secrecy [Shannon49]. This being the case, a secure cryptosystem must assure the sta-
tistical independency of the the output with respect to either the input and the secret
key. The verification of this independency is done from the perspective of the infor-
mation theory. In this context, either the plaintext or the ciphtertext are considered
as statistical variables by means of the amount of information contained in them.
The statistical figure involved is consequently the entropy. In information theory, the
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Figure 1.1: Transformation of the plaintext space P into the ciphertext space C
through the encryption function Ek(·). Every plaintext can be associated to |K|
images or ciphertexts. Bijective associations between plaintexts and ciphertexts are
established once the key is known.
index to quantify the information emanated from any process is given by the diffi-
culty of predicting the new events derived from the considered process. Certainly, the
future behavior of any process is more difficult to anticipate if it evolves randomly. In
other words, the more random is a process the more difficult is to anticipate its future
evolution. The randomness of a process is its entropy and is defined mathematically
as follows.
Definition 1.2.1 (Shannon’s entropy). The Shannon entropy for a source of infor-
mation defined by a discrete random variable S with possible values {s0, s1, . . . , sM−1}
is given by
H(S) =
M−1∑
i=0
Pr(si) log2
(
1
Pr(si)
)
, (1.3)
where Pr(si) is the probability that the symbol si is generated from the source of
information S.
The correlation or interdependency between two different sources of information
can be established by means of their entropy. Let us consider two sources of in-
formation R and S with N and M symbols respectively. These two sources are
independent if and only if Pr(R = Ri,S = rj) = Pr(R = Ri)Pr(S = sj) for all
i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, and all j ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}. This can be interpreted using the
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entropy through the concepts of joint entropy and conditional entropy. First, the
joint entropy is given the next definition.
Definition 1.2.2 (Joint entropy). The joint entropy of two sources of information
R = {r0, r1, . . . , rM−1} and S = {s0, s1, . . . , sN−1} is defined as
H(R,S) =
M−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
Pr(R = ri,S = sj) log2
1
Pr(R = ri,S = sj) . (1.4)
Based on the joint entropy, the conditional entropy of a source of information with
respect to other is defined as following.
Definition 1.2.3 (Conditional entropy). The conditional entropy of two sources of
information R = {r0, r1, . . . , rM−1} and S = {s0, s1, . . . , sN−1} is given by
H(R|S) =
M−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
Pr(R = ri,S = sj) log2
1
Pr(R = ri|S = sj) . (1.5)
According to the definition of the joint entropy, the conditional entropy can be
written as
H(R|S) = H(R,S)−H(S). (1.6)
Once the concept of entropy and conditional entropy have been introduced, the theory
of perfect secrecy can be expressed mathematically. If the encryption function is Ek(·),
and the decryption function Dk(·), then it is verified that ci = Ek(pi) and pi = Dk(ci).
In this context, perfect secrecy implies that H(C|P) = H(C) and H(C|K) = H(P|K)
for any value of the secret key k in K.
The only encryption system that satisfies perfect secrecy conditions is the Ver-
nam’s cipher [Vernam25] (see Fig. 1.2). In Vernam’s cipher a random sequence of
values is generated each time a plaintext is encrypted. This random sequence is of
length equal to the length of the plaintext and is used only one time. For this reason
Vernam’s cipher is also called one-time pad (OTP). Nevertheless, an encryption sys-
tem must not only be secure but also efficient. This is not the case of Vernam’s cryp-
tosystems. As a matter of fact, the OTP cryptosystem is high-bandwith demanding
as a consequence of creating and exchanging a secret key for every communication.
Therefore, it is necessary to find other alternatives to encrypt information in such a
way that perfect secrecy is not dramatically degraded. In the following section the
different ways of overcoming this matter are introduced, considering the context of
contemporary cryptography.
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Random binary
sequence or key:
k0k1k2 . . . kN−1
Plaintext:
p0p1p2 . . . pN−1
⊕ Ciphertext: c0c1 . . . cN−1ci = ki ⊕ pi, 0 ≤ i < N ⊕
Random binary
sequence or key:
k0k1k2 . . . kN−1
Plaintext:
p0p1p2 . . . pN−1
Figure 1.2: Vernam cipher.
1.2.1 Types of symmetric cryptosystems
Although Vernam’s cipher provides total security, from a practical point of view
its use must be discarded. Indeed, if every time a plaintext is encrypted a new
key (of length equal to the length of the plaintext) has to be generated, then a
key exchange must be performed before every communication, which further implies
the saturation of the communication. To overcome this inner problem of Vernam’s
cipher, in modern cryptography two different strategies are proposed: stream ciphers
(see Fig. 1.3) and block ciphers (see Fig. 1.4). As it occurs in Vernam’s cipher, in
Deterministic
algorithm
SECRET
KEY
⊕
PLAINTEXT
⊕
PLAINTEXT
Deterministic
algorithm
SECRET
KEY
KEYSTREAM
Figure 1.3: Stream cipher. The keystream is generated from the secret key according
to a deterministic algorithm known by both sides of communication.
stream ciphers the transformation of the plaintext into the ciphertext is done upon
every unit of information. In modern communications the unit of information is the
bit, and thus the plaintext is a binary sequence or sequence of bits. Every bit of
the plaintext is transformed into a bit of the cihpertext using a bit from a random
(in the case of Vernam’s cipher) or pseudorandom (in the case of stream ciphers)
sequence of bits. This binary sequence is the secret key of Vernam’s cipher, whereas
in the context of contemporary stream ciphers is named as keystream. The keystream
of a stream cipher is generated from the secret key using a deterministic algorithm,
which avoids the key exchange before every single communication. Finally, the unit of
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ciphertext is determined as the XOR between the bit of plaintext to encrypt and the
corresponding bit of the keystream. The encryption strategy used in Vernam’s and
p0 p1 p2 · · · pNb
B0
EK
C0
pN−Nb+1 pN−Nb+2 · · · pN−1
BN/Nb
EK
CN/Nb
Figure 1.4: Block cipher.
stream cihpers is inherited from classical cryptography. Indeed, in both encryption
schemes a unit of information is substituted by another unit of information according
to the key or the keystream. This procedure is equivalently to classical encryption
systems such as Caesar’s [Kahn96, p. 73] or Vigenére’s cipher [Kahn96, p. 94].
Certainly, the key of Vernam’s cipher or the keystream of stream ciphers plays the
same role as the pre-established displacement in Caesar’s cipher or the look-up table
in Vigenére’s cihper. Nevertheless, substitution techniques are not the only proposals
in the field of classical cryptography. Indeed, from ancient times information has been
also concealed by rearranging the units of information according to the secret key. In
this sense, the key of the cryptosystem leads a transposition of the plaintext [Kahn96,
p.71]. In Shannon’s work, substitution and transposition techniques are reinterpreted
by means of information theory, and concludes that the security of a cryptosystem
can be achieved by interleaving both techniques conveniently. This represents the
fundamentals of the encryption architecture associated to block ciphers. However,
this is not the only difference between block ciphers and stream ciphers. As a matter
fact, the main divergence between these major families of encryption architectures
comes from the minimum unit of information considered as input of the encryption
procedure. In stream ciphers this minimum input unit of information is the bit,
whereas in block ciphers is the block, being a block a set of bits. Therefore, in block
ciphers the encryption is performed block by block and not bit by bit, as in stream
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ciphers. Finally, the encryption is done combining substitution and transposition
techniques, which results in an encryption procedure more complex that the one
associated to stream ciphers.
Neither stream ciphers nor block ciphers meet perfect secrecy totally but just
partially. Therefore, a main question arises about how to certify that the selection
of encryption procedures is valid in order to avoid the access of information from
non-authorized users (i.e., users that do not have the secret key). This is the main
aspect covered in the following subsection.
1.2.2 Cryptanalysis: types of attacks on a cryptosystem
The perfect secrecy theory is an standard to consider, to have as a reference when de-
signing a cryptosystem. It remarks that it is possible to achieve a complete protection
of information, but it does not prove its feasibility. Indeed, modern cryptography is
more concerned with the implementation of cryptosystems that assure a level of se-
curity sufficiently high to prevent any intent to subvert the protection of information.
In this sense, the design of a cryptosystem must assure that the inversion of either the
encryption or the decryption function can only be done if the key is known. These
requirements are the core of Kerckhoffs’ principle [Menezes97, p. 14] and they mean
that the encryption and decryption functions are one-way functions [Goldreich01,
p. 32]. Indeed, for a cryptosystem with a high level of security it is easy to obtain
ci = Ek(pi) but the recovery of the plaintext as pi = E
−1
k (ci) is a difficult problem
from the point of view of computational complexity, unless the secret key is known.
If this requirement is satisfied, an attacker should perform a brute force attack, i.e.,
she should try all the values of the key to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext.
The feasibility of the brute force attack depends on the size of the key space and the
computational power of attackers. Furthermore, sometimes the attacker is able to
use some strategies to reduce the set of keys inside the key space and used to encrypt
certain plaintexts. In this situation the computational demands for an attacker are
lighter and it could result in a cryptosytem’s security break. The same situation is
depicted with respect to the decryption function and, consequently, both the encryp-
tion and decryption functions are bijective functions if and only if the key is known.
As a conclusion, the success of the intents to circumvent the security of a cryptosys-
tem depends on the computation technology and the assessment of the security of a
cryptosystem must be performed from a practical instead of theoretical point of view.
Once the plaintext has been encrypted it is sent through the public channel of
information (see Fig. 1.5). The aim of cryptanalysis is to discern if it is possible
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Figure 1.5: Encryption/decryption scheme.
to elude the security derived from a certain scheme. Indeed, from the cryptanalyst’s
point of view, the goal is either to guess the value of the secret key or to find a method
to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext without knowledge of the secret key. In
other words, the cryptanalyst looks for correlations between the ciphertext and the
key or between the ciphertext and the plaintext. This search can be carried out from
different assumptions which lead to four different cryptanalysis scenarios [Stinson95,
p. 95]:
1. Ciphertext-only scenario. This is the most demanding situation from the point
of view of the cryptanalyst. The attacker has only access to the ciphertext
and tries to find any information from that to infer the key, part of the key, or
something equivalent to the key.
2. Known-plaintext scenario. The attacker possesses one or more plaintexts and
the corresponding ciphertexts. The success is based on the possibility of infer-
ring the value of the key or the key-equivalent information from the ciphertext-
plaintext pairs.
3. Chosen-plaintext scenario. In this context, the opponent has access to the
encryption machinery and can choose some plaintexts and get the corresponding
ciphertexts. As in the case of the known-plaintext attack, the attacker will
success only if there exits a correlation between the selected pairs of plaintext-
ciphertext and the key, subkey, or key-equivalent set or subset.
4. Chosen-ciphertext scenario. The attacker has access to the decryption machi-
nery and can select ciphertexts and get the corresponding plaintexts. Again,
the opponent tries to put in clear and later to exploit the correlation between
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a group of selected pairs of plaintext and ciphertext and the key, subkey, or
key-equivalent set or subset.
These four types of cryptographic attacks are the basic skeleton of any cryptana-
lysis work and, as a result, any cryptosystem must be tested in each of these scenarios
in order to achieve rigorous conclusions about its security.
1.3 Chaotic cryptography
As it has been emphasized through the previous sections, the main point of cryptogra-
phy is the selection of a function that transforms the plaintext space into a ciphertext
space. This function must be non bijective unless additional and mandatory informa-
tion is supplied. The auxiliary information that allows the inversion of the function
that performs the transformation of the plaintext into the ciphertext is what it is usu-
ally called key. Therefore, cryptography deals with the searching of functions defined
as
y = f(x, k), (1.7)
where y is the ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext x for a given value k of the
key. Deterministic dynamical systems are defined by a evolution rule that transforms
the state of the system into a new state. If Eq. (1.7) is the evolution rule associated
to a dynamical system, then it is possible to establish a connection between the
theory of dynamical systems and cryptography. In other words, it is reasonable to
question ourselves about the possibility of using dynamical systems as base of new
cryptosystems. In this sense, dynamical systems should be analyzed thoroughly by
means of their dynamics in order to clarify if these dynamics meet the requirements of
perfect secrecy. In the following section, the concept of dynamical system is analyzed
to further establish the link between the needs of cryptography and the virtues of
some special type of dynamical systems.
1.3.1 Dynamical systems
A dynamical system is a model describing the temporal evolution of certain physical
process from a certain initial state. The state of a dynamical system at a certain
time is a vector containing m variables and is called state vector. The temporal
evolution of the state vector determines the dynamics of the system. If there is a
unique subsequent state vector to every state, then the underlying dynamical system
is deterministic. On the other hand, if there is a probability distribution of possible
subsequent state vectors, then the dynamical systems is stochastic or random. In this
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work only deterministic dynamical system are considered. From a general point of
view, the rule of evolution of a dynamical system not only depends on the state and
time, but also on an external vector containing d variables called control parameters.
Therefore, the rule of evolution of a deterministic dynamical system is the map
ϕ : Λ× T× U → U , (1.8)
where Λ ⊂ Rd is the set of values for the control parameters, T is the set of times,
and U is the set of all possible states of the dynamical system, i.e, the state space of
the system. Often, the state space is called phase space, following a tradition from
classical mechanics [Kuznetsov98, p. 2]. The set of times T can be either R or Z.
If T = R, then the dynamical system is a continuous-time dynamical system or a
flow. On the other hand, if the set of times is Z, then the dynamical system is a
discrete-time dynamical system or map [Hirsch74, p. 140].
The considerations about the linearity of the function ϕ are crucial for the theory
of systems dynamics. If ϕ is a linear function, the underlying dynamical system is
called linear, whereas nonlinear dynamical systems are those associated to a function
ϕ nonlinear. Although linear dynamical systems can be easily analyzed through an
analytical procedure [Devaney89, pp. 161-172], the examination of the dynamical
properties of nonlinear dynamical systems should be performed in a qualitative way.
Indeed, the main properties of dynamical systems can be extracted by observing the
temporal evolution determined by the rule of evolution ϕ for any x ∈ U and any
λ ∈ Λ. The rule of evolution plus the set of times are linked to every set (x, λ) by a
function called orbit or trajectory :
Definition 1.3.1 (Orbit or trajectory). Let us assume a dynamical system given by
(ϕ,U ,T,Λ). For any x ∈ U and any λ ∈ Λ, it is defined the map ϕ(x,λ) : T → U as
ϕ(x,λ)(t) = ϕ(λ, t, x), t ∈ T. The image set of ϕ(x,λ) is γϕ(x, λ) =
{
ϕ(x,λ)(t); t ∈ T} ⊂
U , i.e., the orbit or trajectory associated to x, for a given λ ∈ Λ.
Assuming we are working with non-conservative dynamical systems, the next point
is to examine what happens in the long term with each orbit in the set of orbits
associated to a dynamical system. This long term or asymptotic behavior leads to
the concept of invariant set, which is the core of the qualitative theory of dynamical
systems:
Definition 1.3.2 (Invariant set). Let Γλ be a subset of the phase space U of a non-
conservative dynamical system given by (ϕ,U ,T,Λ). The subset Γλ is an invariant
set of (ϕ,U ,T,Λ) if Γλ = ϕ(Γλ). In other words, the image given by the long term
temporal evolution of all the points in Γλ is the subset Γλ itself.
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There are three types of invariants:
• Fixed point. In this case the invariant set is given by Γλ = x∗, where x∗ ∈ U ,
λ ∈ Λ, and ϕ(x∗,λ)(t) = x∗ for all t ∈ T.
• Periodic orbit. A periodic orbit of period tp ∈ T is an invariant set defined as
Γλ =
{
ϕ(x,λ)(t)|ϕ(x,λ)(j · tp) = x
}
, where j ∈ N, x ∈ U , λ ∈ Λ, and t ∈ T .
• Strange attractor. This kind of invariant cannot be defined as the previous ones
through a closed mathematical formulation and its main characteristic is the
random-like behavior of all the orbits derived from it. Actually for any point
inside an strange attractor the orbit that contains this point is always inside
the invariant but it is neither periodic or a fixed point but chaotic.
Although it is generally assumed that strange attractors possess a fractal struc-
ture, the notion of strangeness is referred to the dynamics on the strange attractor
(and not just to its geometry) [Eckmann85]. Strange attractors are the letter of
presentation of chaos, since the properties of chaotic systems can be established by
means of the study of the dynamics of strange attractors. According to [Devaney89,
p. 50], those properties are:
1. Sensitivity to initial conditions. This property implies that orbits inside an
strange attractor would only separate, they never meet again.
2. Topological mixing. Although locally nearby orbits inside an strange attractor
tend to diverge one from the other, the dynamics of the set of orbits inside an
strange attractor is globally confined to a finite region of the phase space. In
this sense, orbits must fold back and may approach each other to diverge again
in a similar way as a baker kneads dough [Peitgen92, p. 536]. This behavior
also informs that the average long term evolution of orbits does not depend on
the initial condition [Peitgen92, p. 554] and thus chaotic orbits are ergodic.
3. Dense periodic points. This is the paradox of chaos since a complex behavior,
a random-like evolution in time is based on the existence of a dense distribu-
tion of periodic points, which are unstable and determine the skeleton of the
dynamics of chaotic dynamical systems. Furthermore, strange attractors can
be characterized by means of periodic orbits [Hilborn00, p.413].
4. Sensitivity to control parameter. This property points out that close values of
λ are associated to totally different orbits.
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1.3.2 Chaos and cryptography
In his milestone contribution to cryptography, Shannon points out two characteristics
that any secure cipher, i.e., any well designed cryptosytem must possess [Shannon49].
Those properties are confusion and diffusion. The confusion property of a well de-
signed cryptosytem guarantees that the ciphertext is statistically independent of the
plaintext and of key. In other words, the confusion property implies the elimination
from the ciphertext of any possible track or leakage of information related to either
the plaintext or the key. On the other hand, the diffusion property implies that a
small change in either the plaintext or the key leads to a large change in the cipher-
text. As a result, two plaintexts showing a negligible difference must lead to two
totally different ciphertexts and, simultaneously, very close keys transform the same
plaintext into totally different ciphertexts.
The confusion and diffusion properties possess a counterpart in the domain of
dynamical systems. The first and last properties of a chaotic system imply that
either the initial condition or the control parameter are diffused through the orbits
generated from a chaotic system. In other words, every single value contained in any
orbit depends on the initial condition and the control parameter. This dependency
is so hard that a negligible modification in either the value of the initial condition or
in the value of the control parameter or both leads to an orbit completely different.
As a result, chaotic systems possess a diffusion property of the initial condition and
the control parameter with respect to the orbits. On the other hand, the mixing
Sensitivity
Initial condition
Control parameter
Diffusion
Mixing Ergodicity Confusion
Figure 1.6: Relationship between chaos and cryptography.
property and the subsequent ergodic behavior of chaotic systems inform that the
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long term evolution of chaotic orbits is independent of either the initial condition or
the control parameters. At first sight it means that it is not possible to recover the
exact value of either the initial condition or the control parameter or both from any
statistic built upon the set of orbits generated from a chaotic system. Consequently,
chaotic systems show a confusion property of the initial condition and the control
parameters with respect to the generated orbits. Summarizing, dynamical systems
can be used to implement new cryptosystems if they are chaotic, i.e., if they possess
the confusion and diffusion properties with respect to the initial condition and the
control parameter (see Fig. 1.6). Nevertheless, the wandering and erratic behavior
of chaotic systems is sustained by an underlying periodic behavior. In other words,
chaos is achieved by means of regularity, and the thorough analysis of this regularity
can be used to estimate the initial condition or the control parameter. Therefore, if
a chaotic system is selected for the design of a cryptosystem, it is necessary to verify
that the underlying regularity of the chaotic system is concealed and not revealed
by the encryption architecture. Consequently, the achievement of a good encryption
scheme based on chaos requires:
1. A chaotic system with good confusion and diffusion properties.
2. An encryption architecture that makes use of the dynamics of the chaotic sys-
tem to enforce the protection of the information instead of leaking the inner
regularity of the chaotic system.
This Thesis is concerned with the first requirement. Digital chaos-based cryptography
defines encryption procedures driven by the dynamic of one or several chaotic maps,
and conditioned by a certain encryption architecture. Although some architectures
are by themselves inadequate for encryption, this Thesis is focused on those whose
reliability and efficiency is eroded by the dynamics of the selected map(s).
1.3.3 Selection of the chaotic system
Concerning the selection of the chaotic system, the first point is to decide between a
continuous or discrete domain for the space of times T. If T = R, it is possible to build
encryption schemes based on chaos using the synchronization property of chaotic sys-
tems [Pecora90]. In this case, the designed chaotic cryptosystems are called analog
chaos-based cryptosystems. On the other hand, if T = Z the resulting cryptosystems
are called digital chaos-based cryptosystems. This classification entailing two types of
chaos-based cryptosystems is not a mere taxonomy, since it encloses very important
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Figure 1.7: Subclass of dynamical systems possessing a chaotic attractor.
consequences for the security and efficiency of the final encryption strategies. Con-
cerning the efficiency of a chaos-based cryptosystem, the complexity of the underlying
chaotic systems must been evaluated. This complexity depends on two factors: their
dimensionality and their physical implementation. First of all, the dimensionality of
the chaotic system must be taken into account. According to Poincaré-Bendixson
theorem [Hilborn00, p. 101], chaotic dynamical systems in continuous time have a
phase space of dimension greater than 2 (see Fig. 1.7). On the other hand, dynamical
systems in discrete time can be chaotic even when the phase space is of dimension
m = 1, if the rule of evolution is a non-invertible function. On the other hand,
chaotic systems can be implemented in analog (i.e., upon some circuitry) or digital
form. The first option is generally associated to the use of synchronization tech-
niques, what is not the case of the second option. The digital alternative demands
an analytical description of the chaotic system. If the chaotic system is described
in continuos time, then its analytical definition is a set of differential equations, and
the determination of its temporal evolution requires the use of numerical methods.
The use of such methods informs about an extra charge (by means of computation)
in the derivation of the orbits of the chaotic systems. Moreover, it incorporates an
extra problem, since numerical methods are defined in dependence of configuration
parameters. These parameters must be selected carefully, otherwise the dynamics of
the resulting orbits can be modified resulting in a non-chaotic behavior (this is the
case of the cryptosystem that we have analyized in [Arroyo09h]). Conversely, chaotic
systems in discrete time are given by a set of difference equations, and their orbits
can be derived straightforwardly.
Regarding the security of chaos based cryptography, the synchronization tech-
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nique entails some critical problems. The conditions required for the synchronization
of different chaotic systems are too demanding and determine a divergence between
them and the security requirements of an encryption scheme. Certainly, if synchro-
nization is used as the bearer of an encryption procedure, then the chaotic systems
at both sides of the communication channel are supposed to be identical. In practice,
the perfect matching is not possible which forces to use not all the range of values of
the control parameters, but only a subset of them. Assuming that the control para-
meters are the key or part of the key of a chaos-based cryptosystem, that matching
sensitivity leads to a narrowing of the key space and a lessen of the computational
complexity of a brute force attack, i.e., an attack where the cryptanalyst tries all the
possible values of the secret key (see [Alvarez04b; Alvarez04e; Alvarez04c; Alvarez04d;
Alvarez04a; Alvarez05b; Li05a; Alvarez05a; Li07b; Orúe07; Orúe08a; Orúe08b]). As
a result, chaotic systems in discrete time are better choice when designing new en-
cryption procedures, since they possess less computational complexity and do not
need synchronization.
1.3.4 Chaotic systems considered in this Thesis
In the previous section it has been emphasized the convenience of considering chaotic
systems in discrete time as base of new cryptosystems. Nevertheless, this is not the
end of the road. Indeed, the family of chaotic systems in discrete time is very broad
and some criterion must be established to select the best chaotic maps. In this sense,
the criterion adopted in this Thesis is the Ockham razor’s principle: the simplest,
the best. First of all, the simplicity of a chaotic map is a first step to increase
the efficiency of the cryptosystem. Indeed, if the iteration of the chaotic map does
not involve complex mathematical operations, then the orbit can be calculated in
short time. Taking into account that the orbits of the chaotic map are connected
to the generation of the ciphertext, the less time to calculate the orbits, the faster
the ciphertext is determined. But this is not the only one advantage of choosing
simplicity as criterion for the selection of the chaotic map. As a matter of fact, a
simple chaotic map can be easily understood and their dynamics can be modeled
more accurately. In other words, spurious behavior is more avoidable when working
on simple and well understood chaotic maps, and thus it is also easier to reduce the
possibilities of successful attacks.
A simple map that has been broadly used in the context of chaos-based crypto-
graphy is the logistic map [May76]. The logistic map is defined as
x 7→ fλ(x) = f(λ, x) = λx(1− x), (1.9)
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Figure 1.8: Iteration function associated to the logistic map.
where ϕ : U × Λ → U , U = [0, 1] ⊂ R, λ ∈ Λ = [0, 4] and x ∈ U . The previ-
ous equation can be used to derive an orbit from an initial condition x0 ∈ U as
the set of values {x0, fλ(x0), fλ(fλ(x0)), fλ(fλ(fλ(x0))), . . .}. Figure 1.8 illustrates the
iteration process to generate the orbit of the logistic map when the initial condition
x0 is equal to 0.2 and λ = 3.9. Actually, the logistic map is the map most widely
used in the design of new digital chaotic cryptosystems [Baptista98; Kocarev01b;
Jakimoski01b; Wong01; Wong02; Wong03; Tang03; Pareek03; Huang05; Pareek05;
Pareek06a; Wei06a; Wei06b; Pisarchik06; Xiang06; Gao08a; Gao08b; Wang07; Ling07;
Mi07; Yang08; Xiang07; Wang08b]. Some of these proposals have been totally or
partially cryptanalyzed as a consequence of not fully considering the dynamical cha-
racteristics of the logistic map [Jakimoski01a; Alvarez03b; Alvarez03a; Alvarez04f;
Alvarez04g; Li04b; Li07a; Arroyo09g; Alvarez07b; Skrobek08]. These cryptanalytical
works are the reason of selecting the logistic map as main reference in this Thesis.
Indeed, the analysis of the dynamical properties of the logistic map and their rela-
tionship with the problems pinpointed in the above cryptanalysis is very useful for
the design of a general framework of cryptanalyisis work. Nevertheless, a better illus-
tration and clarification of the concepts proposed in this Thesis can be achieved using
more than one simple chaotic map. In this sense, it is considered not just the logistic
map but the class of unimodal maps, hereafter denoted as F .
Definition 1.3.3 (Class of maps F). A map φ : U → U , where U = [a, b] ⊂ R, a < b,
is unimodal if it is continuous, has a single turning point (usually called the critical
point) xc in U , and is monotone increasing on the left of xc and decreasing on the
right. The class F includes maps defined in a parametric way, say, fλ(x) = f(λ, x),
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where x ∈ U = [a, b], λ ∈ Λ ⊂ R is called the control parameter, and f is a map on
U × Λ.
Two different situations are considered in this Thesis:
1. The control parameter determines the maximum value of the map. In this case,
the parametric function fλ is given by
fλ(x) = λF (x), (1.10)
where F ∈ F and F (xc) = Fmax. The subclass of maps fλ ∈ F complying with
this description will be denoted by F1.
2. The control parameter is the value of the critical point, i.e., xc = λ. This leads
to a new subclass of maps F2.
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Figure 1.9: Skew tent map for different values of λ.
Among all the maps in F , another important and relevant map is the skew tent map.
The skew tent map is defined as
fλ(x) =
{
x/λ, if 0 ≤ x < λ
(1− x)/(1− λ), if λ ≤ x ≤ 1 (1.11)
for x ∈ [0, 1] and λ ∈ Λ = (0, 1) (see Fig. 1.9). The logistic map is the representative
of F1, whereas the skew tent map represents F2. In Chapter 3 the consequences of the
minimal differences between F1 and F2 are shown. More precisely, it will be shown
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how the results of some cryptanalysis on cryptosystems based on the logistic map can
not be applied straightforward to those based on the skew tent map.
Summing up, the study of the connection between the dynamic of the maps in F
and the problems detected in the cryptosystems built upon them, is used to achieve
very useful conclusions for cryptanalysis and design of new chaos-based cryptosys-
tems. In this Thesis the interest is on establishing a set of mathematical tools that
allow the identification of the properties sustaining the link between problems of
chaos-based cryptosystems and dynamics of chaotic maps. In this sense, the class of
maps F is used to define, clarify and illustrate the use of this set of mathematical
tools.
1.4 Organization of this Thesis
Once the requirements of cryptography has been made explicit, and the capacity of
chaos to satisfy them has been settled, the next stage is to develop a methodology to
assess if the inclusion of a given chaotic system(s) in a given encryption architecture
really determines a secure encryption procedure. This analysis is performed in Chap-
ter 2 using the class of maps in F as reference. Chapter 2, first of all, is concerned
with the establishment of a set of mathematical tools to conclude if the properties of
chaos required by cryptography are really satisfied by the selected chaotic system(s).
Secondly, it is also focused on confirming if the treatment of an encryption system
by means of Chaos Theory can lead to some methodology to elude the level of se-
curity that a cryptosystem should guarantee. In this sense, the theory of Symbolic
Dynamics is specially useful. Symbolic Dynamics is an area in the Theory of Dy-
namical Systems that is focused on the study of discretized versions of the orbits of
chaotic systems. In Chapter 3 the Theory of Symbolic Dynamics is explained for
the chaotic maps in F , pointing out that the estimation of the control parameter
and the initial condition can be performed from the discretized versions of the orbits
of those maps. However, it will be shown in Chapter 3 that this estimation can be
accomplished only if the critical point of the map does not depend on the control
parameter. In Chapter 4 it is shown how to overcome this limitation by studying
the order patterns of the maps in F . Either the estimation methods proposed in
Chapters 3 and 4 or the mathematical tools have to be considered when designing
a chaos-based cryptosystem, otherwise the final cryptosystem could present security
flaws. In Chapter 5 the main problems of a negligent design are shown, and some
recommendations to overcome those problems are proposed based on the theoretical
framework developed in the previous Chapters. This theoretical framework, indeed,
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can be used to guide the design and cryptanalysis of chaos-based cryptosystems, but
it is not a closed framework. The main contributions of this Thesis are summarized
in Chapter 6, which also discusses the focus of future work.
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Chapter 2
Study of chaotic maps as base of
digital chaos-based cryptosystems
2.1 Introduction
Chaos-based cryptography uses chaotic systems to lead the encryption procedure in-
side an encryption architecture. The examination of the adequacy of a chaotic map for
an encryption architecture is a very complex problem, and a closed and explicit pro-
cedure cannot be provided. Certainly, even for non chaos-based encryption systems,
it is not possible to establish a general security evaluation procedure. In other words,
the evaluation of the security of a cryptosystem is generally an ad hoc procedure,
and the start point must always be the set of strategies used by other cryptanalysts
in other cryptanalysis. It is very important to take into account that cryptanalysis
generally is focused on some aspects of a cryptosystem or set of cryptosystems. In
this sense, if one can identify the properties or aspects involved in a cryptanalysis
of a cryptosystem, then one is able to generalize the application of the considered
cryptanalysis to other cryptosystems. Therefore, the first step in either the design
or the cryptanalysis of a cryptosystem is to detect the components which could be
examined or studied using previous cryptanalysis techniques. In other words, it is
necessary to identify the controversial components of a cryptosystem before starting
its cryptanalysis or design. In the case of chaos-based cryptosystems, the identifica-
tion of critical components must be focused, in a first approximation in three points:
the selection of the encryption architecture, the selection of the chaotic system(s) and
the procedure that determines the association between the chaotic system(s) and the
encryption architecture. With respect to the selection of the encryption architecture,
if we assume symmetric cryptography, it is necessary to discern between stream ci-
phers and block ciphers. In [Stamp07, Chapters 3 and 4] it can be found a detailed
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analysis of the main attacks on conventional stream and block ciphers. Those attacks
must be considered in the context of chaos-based cryptography, but it is also nece-
ssary to remind that the encryption procedure is driven by chaotic systems. In this
sense, the cryptanalysis of chaos-based cryptosystems uses the techniques inherited
from conventional cryptography [Stamp07], but also the tools derived from the the-
ory of dynamical systems. These tools lead the analysis of the orbits derived from
a dynamical system and, consequently, the first thing to do is to clarify and con-
crete mathematically the context under evaluation in this Thesis. In this sense, a
mathematical description of the orbits derived from discrete-time dynamical systems
is provided in coherence with the terminology used in Chapter 1, Sec. 1.3.1. Accor-
dingly, a discrete-time dynamical system is defined by the map ϕ : Λ× Z × U → U ,
where U ⊂ Rm, Λ ⊂ Rd. For every t ∈ Z, it is defined a map ϕt : Λ×U → U given by
ϕt = ϕ(λ, x), with x ∈ U , and λ ∈ Λ. Let us define the map f = ϕ1 : Λ×U → U and
fλ(x) = f(λ, x) for x ∈ U , and λ ∈ Λ. Upon the previous definitions, the rule that
transforms an state xn ∈ U into an state xn+1 ∈ U is given by a difference equation
as
xn+1 = f(λ, xn) = fλ(xn), (2.1)
for λ ∈ Λ. Therefore, the forward orbit generated from an initial condition x0 ∈ U is
γ+fλ(x0) =
{
f
(0)
λ (x0), f
(1)
λ (x0), . . . , f
(i)
λ (x0), . . .
}
, (2.2)
where
f
(i)
λ (x0) =
{
x0, if i = 0
fλ(f
(i−1)
λ (x0)), if i > 0
(2.3)
A finite part of length M of the total trajectory of x0 is given by
γMfλ (x0) = {x0, x1, . . . , xM−1} . (2.4)
The use of a dynamical system as base of new encryption procedure is based
on the assumption that it possesses a chaotic behavior. As it is shown in Fig. 1.6,
chaos can be used as the skeleton sustaining the confusion and diffusion properties
required by any encryption system. Therefore, before using a dynamical system for
cryptographical applications, it is mandatory to verify that it really has a chaotic
behavior. In the context of digital chaos-based cryptography, it means that the orbits
derived from the iteration of the selected map must be evaluated in order to confirm
the properties that characterize and define chaos. This evaluation is performed on the
long-term behavior of chaotic maps. As it is pointed out in [Eckmann85], the physical
long-term behavior is on attractors and, consequently, in the rest of this Thesis it is
assumed that the considered chaotic maps are non-conservative dynamical systems.
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In this Chapter a collection of mathematical tools useful for that assessment is
defined. First, in Sec. 2.2 it is shown how to compute the dependency on the initial
conditions of the orbits of a dynamical system. This local divergence is characteristic
of chaos, but it paradoxically determines a global convergence that makes up the
mixing property of chaos. In Sec. 2.3 the topological mixing of chaos is studied and
some mathematical figures are introduced for assessment. The analysis performed
in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 is specially important for dynamical systems defined in a
parametric way. Indeed, for these dynamical systems it is necessary to examine
the values of the parameter controls that guarantee local divergence and ergodicity.
Furthermore, it is also necessary to study how the orbits of chaotic maps can be
manipulated in order to build up a secure cryptosystem. This being the case, we
have to quantify the amount of information contained in a orbit, i.e., the entropy
of orbits must be analyzed. Section 2.4 presents different methods to quantify the
amount of information, but also to establish the kind of dependency of that amount
of information with respect to the control parameters. This is a constant in all
the work enclosed in this Chapter. The different measures here defined allow to
achieve conclusions about the behavior and the adequacy of chaotic maps for chaos.
Nevertheless, they are also highlights to reconstruct the dynamics of chaotic maps
sustaining encryption, which could further imply the feasibility of eluding chaos-based
encryption. In Sec. 2.5 another of those highlights is introduced by analyzing chaotic
maps in the frequency domain using the Wavelet Transform. The Wavelet Transform
is a very useful tool to define new measures of entropy and to detect changes in the
dynamics of a chaotic map as a result of changes in the control parameters. Certainly,
the dynamics of a chaotic map shows a high sensitivity to control parameters, which
is very useful for cryptography since, apparently, it makes difficult to infer the value
of the control parameters from the ciphertext. Nevertheless, if the ciphertext leaks
too much information about the dynamics of the underlying chaotic map, it could be
possible to estimate the value of the control parameters. In Sec. 2.6 this possibility
is analysed by means of the statistical distance between probability distributions
generated from chaotic maps. As a matter of fact, the analysis of orbits from an
statistical point of view also allows to quantify the effect of the underlying order of any
chaotic system, as it is pointed out in Sec. 2.7. This section analysed possible problems
derived from the dense set of periodic points sustaining any chaotic behavior. Those
problems are just pointed out in this Chapter, being a thorough analysis of them the
main focus of the following chapters. Finally, Sec. 2.8 comments the degradation of
chaotic dynamics in finite precision machines.
27
2.2 Measuring the sensitivity to initial conditions
As it was explained in Sec. 1.3.1, the definition of chaos implies a behavior with a
high level of dependency with respect to the initial state of the system. This means
that the orbits generated from very close initial conditions will separate as the time
evolves, i.e., there exists a local divergence of orbits. Therefore, the sensitivity with
respect to the initial state can be measured by means of the rate of divergence of
orbits. The Lyapunov Exponent or LE is the figure that informs about this rate of
divergence. When discrete chaotic systems or chaotic maps are considered, the LE is
defined as follows [Guckenheimer83].
Definition 2.2.1. (Lyapunov exponent) Let (f,U ,Z,Λ) be a dyamical system defined
in discrete time with state space U being an open subset of Rm, Λ ⊂ Rd and fλ(x) =
f(λ, x), ∀λ ∈ Λ, and x ∈ Rm. Suppose that there are subspaces V (1)i ⊃ V (2)i · · · ⊃ V (m)i
in the tangent space at f (i)(x) and numbers LE1(λ) ≥ LE2(λ) ≥ · · ·LEm(λ) with the
properties that
1. Dfλ(V
(j)
i ) = V
(j)
i+1.
2. The dimension of V
(j)
i is m+ 1− j.
3. LEj(λ) = lim
N→∞
ln ||
√
(Df
(N)
λ )
T · (Df (N)λ ) · v|| for all v ∈ V (j)0 − V (j+1)0 ,
where (Df
(N)
λ )
T is the transpose of Df
(N)
λ . The Lyapunov exponent or LE is defined
as the function LE : Λ→ U , and is given by
LE(λ) = [LE1(λ) LE2(λ) · · ·LEm(λ)]T . (2.5)
The LE informs about the rate of divergence of fλ with respect to the vector of
control parameters. LE(λ) is a vector of m components. If fλ(x) evolves in a chaotic
way, then the largest component of LE(λ) is positive. The reciprocal implication is
also valid, i.e., a positive maximal LE implies the existence of chaos.
According to the previous definition, the criterion to establish the chaoticity of
a dynamical system is based on the maximal Lyapunov exponent and, consequently,
it is not required to obtain the whole vector of Lyapunov exponents. However, the
determination of the LE using Eq. (2.5) requires the knowledge of the analytical des-
cription of the dynamical system, whereas in the general case only orbits from the
dynamical system are accesible. Therefore, it is necessary to establish some practi-
cal procedure to calculate the maximal LE. Among all the different proposals, the
most efficient and accurate are those based on the computation of distances between
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orbits and their further manipulation through Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization. In
[Kantz94] it is explained how to compute the maximal LE upon the previous ideas.
In this Thesis the maximal LE is computed according to that methodology and using
the implementation included in the TISEAN package [Hegger99].
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Figure 2.1: Lyapunov exponent of (a) the logistic map (b) and the skew tent map.
From the perspective of chaos-based cryptography, the LE is a very useful tool
for either the cryptologist or the cryptanalyst. In the first case, the design of any
encryption scheme requires to establish explicitly and thoroughly what the secret key
of the cryptosystem is and what its definition space is. In other words, the key space
has to be totally explained. In chaos-based cryptosystems if the control parameters
are part of the secret key, the values of the control parameters inside the key space
are those implying the chaotic behavior of the underlying dynamical system. The
identification of those values is performed with the assistance of the LE, which is
done for the logistic map and for the skew tent map in Fig. 2.1. A first evaluation
of the just mentioned figure emphasizes an important difference between the logistic
map and the skew tent map. Indeed, the skew tent map possesses a positive LE for
all the values of λ, whereas in the case of the logistic map the intervals of λ implying
chaos are disjoint. A first consequence of this fact is that a cryptosystem based on
the skew tent map allows a better and easier selection of keys upon the values of the
control parameter. Moreover, loss of chaoticity is excluded in the case of the skew tent
map, whereas in the case of the logistic map it is a critical problem that must be faced
and handled by the cryptosystem’s designer. However, a well designed cryptosystem
is characterized by the fact that two very similar plaintexts lead to very different
ciphertexts. Moreover, if the same plaintext is encrypted using two very close keys,
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then the encryption procedure results in two totally different ciphertexts. For that
reason, it is very convenient for the design of a chaos-based cryptosystem to use a
chaotic map with a large enough Lyapunov exponent. The skew tent map fails in this
requirement (see Fig. 2.1(b)). Nevertheless, it is possible to overcome this problem
through the discretization of the phase space based on the following function upon
fλ(x):
fˆλ(x) = b2α · fλ(x)c mod Θ, (2.6)
where α ∈ N and Θ ∈ N. In Fig. 2.2 it is shown that the Lyapunov exponent of
the generated sequences using Eq. (1.11) and Eq. (2.6) for α = 33, 43, 50, is greater
than the one associated to the original skew tent map for all the values of λ. In
[Arroyo08c; Rhouma09] we have used the discretized version of the skew tent map to
design a chaos-based cryptosystem implementing a good diffusion procedure.
Another map that shares with the logistic map the LE’s flaw is the Hénon map
[Hénon76]. The state space of the Hénon map is defined in R2 and possesses two
control parameters δ, β ∈ R. The analytical definition of the Hénon map is:
xk+1 =
[
uk+1
vk+1
]
=
[
1− δ · u2k + vk
β · vk
]
. (2.7)
Case study 2.2.1 ([Arroyo08b]). Cryptanalyis of the cryptosystem proposed in [Chee06]
In [Chee06] the Hénon map is used as the heart of a chaos-based cryptosystem,
which entails a security problem that we have highlighted in [Arroyo08b]. In the
cryptosystem defined in [Chee06] the plaintext is divided into blocks {pk}N−1k=0 , where
each block has M bits. The encryption of the plain-blocks is carried out for k = 0 ∼
N − 1 in turn. For the k-th plain-block pk, the corresponding cipher-block is xk+1,
which is calculated through Eq. (2.7) by setting
δ = ψ (pk) · µ1 (vk) , (2.8)
β = µ2 (vk) , (2.9)
where ψ(x) is a bijective function assuring that δ is a valid parameter of Eq. (2.7)
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Figure 2.2: Lyapunov exponent for the discretized version of the skew tent map for
different values of the paramenter α.
and µi(x), i ∈ {1, 2}, are piecewise linear functions defined as
µi(x) =

βi,1(x), if δi,1(x) < |x| ≤ δi,2(x)
· · · · · ·
βi,j(x), if δi,j(x) < |x| ≤ δi,j+1(x)
· · · · · ·
βi,J(x), if δi,J(x) < |x| ≤ δi,J+1(x)
(2.10)
where δi,j(x) is any function making one and only one condition on the right hand of
Eq. (2.10) satisfied for any x, and βi,j(x) is any function making δ and β valid control
parameters of Eq. (2.7). Based on the general form of the proposed cryptosystem,
the authors of [Chee06] present a concrete configuration: M = 48, ψ(x), µ1(x) and
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µ2(x) are set in Eqs. (2.11), (2.12), (2.13) respectively.
ψ (x) = 1.77 · 10−2 + 1.39 · 10−15 · x, (2.11)
µ1(x) =

1.27 + x
10.2
, if |x| ≤ 0.1 + x
1.3
1.28 + x
10.2
, if 0.1 + x
1.3
< |x| ≤ 0.2 + x
1.3
1.29 + x
10.2
, if 0.2 + x
1.3
< |x| ≤ 0.3 + x
1.3
1.30 + x
10.2
, otherwise
(2.12)
µ2(x) =

0.29 + x
10
, if |x| ≤ 0.1 + x
1.1
0.30 + x
10
, if 0.1 + x
1.1
< |x| ≤ 0.2 + x
1.1
0.31 + x
10
, if 0.2 + x
1.1
< |x| ≤ 0.3 + x
1.1
0.32 + x
10
, otherwise
(2.13)
This configuration does not allow the cryptosystem to work in the chaotic region of
the Hénon map, as it was verified through the computation of the maximum LE of
the Hénon map. Figure 2.3 depicts the set of points (δ, β) for which the maximal
Lyapunov exponent of the Hénon map is positive.
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Figure 2.3: Chaotic region for the Hénon map.
When a random plaintext generated by the rand() function of Matlab is encrypted
with Eqs. (2.7), (2.11), (2.12), (2.13), M = 48, u0 = 0.4 and v0 = 0.5, the product
ψ (pk) · µ1(vk) is always out of the chaotic region (see Fig. 2.4). Figure 2.5 shows
that, after a number of transient values, the ciphertext reaches a constant value or a
pair of constant values. This is a clear violation of Shannon’s requirements for perfect
secrecy, since it implies a high value of the conditional entropy (Definition 1.2.3) of the
ciphertext with respect to the plaintext. This degradation of the security performance
is a result of the cryptosystem being always working in periodic windows of the Hénon
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.4: Pseudo-random switching key analysis for the cryptosytem defined in
[Chee06]: (a) δ values for random plaintext; (b) β values for random plaintext.
map. The condition for other definitions of ψ(x), µ1(x) and µ2(x) may be better, but
it is difficult to make the system remain always in the chaotic region of the Hénon
map. The best solution would be to use other maps with a broader chaotic region.
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Figure 2.5: Ciphertext values for plaintext blocks with a fixed value when working
with the cryptosystem described in [Chee06].
This analysis based on the examination of the LE, must be also done even when the
control parameters are design parameters and not part of the key. Indeed, if it is not
guaranteed a positive LE for the underlying chaotic system, then a reduction of the
level of entropy at the output of the cryptosystem can be observed. For example, in
some chaos-based cryptosystems a chaotic map is used as Random Number Generator
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(RNG) to select values of the secret key in a random way. If the values of the control
parameters do not lead to a positive LE, then a degradation of the chaotic map
as RNG is verified, and thus a reduction of the key space (which further implies a
decreasing of the conditioned entropy of the output of the cryptosystem with respect
to the secret key).
2.3 Analyzing the ergodicity
The ergodic property is a basic requirement for the use of a dynamical system as base
of an encryption scheme. Indeed, if a dynamical system is ergodic, the long term
behavior of its orbits is independent from the initial condition and can be studied using
statistical analysis. This statistical analysis of the long-time behavior is based on the
possibility of defining an invariant measure for non-conservative ergodic dynamical
systems. Given a map f : U → U and B being σ-algebra over U , µ is an invariant
measure of the map if, for each B ∈ B, it is satisfied
µ(f−1(B)) = µ(B), (2.14)
where f−1(B) is the set of preimages of B defined by
f−1(B) = {x ∈ U|f(x) ∈ B} . (2.15)
According to the ergodic theorem [Walters82, p. 34], if f is ergodic with respect
to the invariant measure µ, then the orbit of x0 ∈ U visits the interval B ⊆ U with
relative frequency µ(B) for almost all x0 ∈ U .
For non-conservative ergodic dynamical systems defined in discrete time, the in-
variant measure of a map is experimentally approximated through the histogram of a
long orbit. Let (f,U ,Λ) be a discrete-time dynamical system, λ ∈ Λ ⊂ Rd and γMfλ (x0)
the firstM elements of the orbit derived from the initial condition x0 ∈ U ⊂ Rm. The
histogram associated to γMfλ (x0) is calculated upon the partition of U into N -mutually
disjoint subintervals of equal measure. Let HN = {Is}Ns=1 the considered partition of
U satisfying U = I0 ∪ I1 ∪ . . . ∪ IN , Ii ∩ Ij = ∅ for all i 6= j, and N << M . The
histogram function is piecewise constant on the partition HN , and on each subinter-
val Is equal to the number of points of γMfλ(x0) which fall into Is. At first sight, the
calculated histogram depends on N , λ, and x0. Upon the assumption of ergodicity
the dependence on the initial condition does not exist, whereas the dependency on
N is eliminated increasing the value of N . Nevertheless, the dependency on λ lies on
the dynamical properties of the considered map. In this sense, for some ergodic maps
there exists a clear relationship between the shape of the computed histograms and
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the value of the control parameters. Considering the case of chaos-based cryptogra-
phy, this feature must be carefully handled since it could be used by a cryptanalyst to
infer the value of the control parameter just analyzing, if possible, the chaotic orbits
leading the encryption of information.
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Figure 2.6: Histograms of the logistic map forM = 100000, N = 10000, and (a)λ = 4;
(b)λ = 3.89472.
As it is shown in Fig. 2.6, the histogram of the logistic map is dependent on the
value of the control parameter. As a matter of fact, the shape and the width of
the histogram changes with λ. This is a consequence of logistic map possessing an
invariant set depending on the value of λ. Certainly, the function fλ(x) defined by
Eq. (1.9) reaches its maximum for xc = 1/2 and, consequently, that function cannot
attain a value greater than λ/4. Furthermore, if λ is such that LE(λ) > 0, then the
minimum value contained in the orbit obtained from xc is fλ(λ/4) = λ
2
4
(1−λ/4). On
the other hand, if λ is selected in such a way that the logistic map does not possess
periodic stable orbits, then the set of preimages of xc is dense, i.e., the set
{x|fλ(x) = xc for some n ≥ 0}
is dense in U = [0, 1] [Guckenheimer79]. In other words, for any value x in U , and
λ such that LE(λ) > 0, after a transient number of iterations the orbit derived from
x reach the critical point xc, and all the successive iteration values are inside the
interval [
λ2
4
(1− λ/4), λ/4
]
. (2.16)
35
Case study 2.3.1 ([Arroyo08d]). Cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem defined in
[Pisarchik06]
A chaos-based image encryption algorithm is defined in [Pisarchik06] using the
logistic map. We have cryptanalyzed this cryptosystem in [Arroyo08d], being part of
the cryptanalysis based on the property of the logistic map commented just above.
In order to explain how that cryptanalysis works, next the cryptosystem defined in
[Pisarchik06] is succinctly described. Given an M × N color image with R, G, B
color components, an initialization process is performed to convert the integer values
of each pixel to real numbers that can be encrypted using Eq. (2.1), and Eq. (1.9).
First, the 2-D image is scanned in the raster order (i.e., from left to right and from
top to bottom) to form three 1-D integer sequences {P ic}Ji=1 (c = R, G and B), where
P ic ∈ {0, · · · , 255} denotes the color component c of the i-th pixel and J =M×N (see
Fig. 2.7). Then, the integer sequences are converted to three real-number sequences
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Figure 2.7: Transformation of the color image into three vectors.
each of which corresponds to a different color component: {xic(0)}Ji=1, where
xic(0) = xmin + (xmax − xmin) · P ic/255, (2.17)
with xmin = λ
2
4
(1− λ/4), and xmax = λ/4. After the above initialization process, the
following encryption procedure is carried out separately for each color component to
obtain the ciphertext:
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1. Set r = 1.
2. Set the initial condition of the logistic map as follows:
x0 =
{
xJc (r − 1), if i = 1
xi−1c (r), if 2 ≤ i ≤ J
3. Iterate the chaotic logistic map (Eq. 1.9) from x0 for n times to obtain xn.
4. Set xic(r) = xn + x
i
c(r − 1). If xic(r) > xmax, then subtract (xmax − xmin) from
xic(r) to ensure x
i
c(r) ∈ [xmin, xmax].
5. Set r = r + 1. If r < j, go to Step 2; otherwise the encryption procedure stops
for the current color component.
After performing the above encryption procedure for all three color components, the
three sequences {xiR(j)}Ji=1, {xiG(j)}Ji=1 and {xiB(j)}Ji=1 make up the ciphertext.
As claimed in [Pisarchik06], the secret key is composed of the following four sub-
keys:
1. The control parameter of the logistic map, i.e., λ.
2. The image height and the image width, i.e., M and N respectively.
3. The number of chaotic iterations in Step 3, i.e., n.
4. The number of cycles, i.e., j.
The decryption procedure is similar to the above description, but in an reverse
order, and the following inverse map
P ic = round[(x
i
c(0)− xmin) · 255/(xmax − xmin)] (2.18)
is used in the last step to recover the plain-image by converting real numbers back to
integer pixel values.
The ciphertext of the cryptosystem proposed in [Pisarchik06] is composed of 3 · J
real values, each of which is in the range [xmin, xmax]. This means that it is possible
to approximate xmax as the maximum value of all the real values in the ciphertext,
i.e.,
xˆmax = max
1≤i≤J
c=R, G, B
xic(j). (2.19)
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Figure 2.8: The plain-image “Lena”.
Then, from xmax ≈ λ/4, one can estimate the secret value of the control parameter λ
as
λ ≈ λˆ = 4 · xˆmax. (2.20)
Consequently, if we have a ciphertext, we can estimate the value of the sub-key
λ. In other words, a ciphertext-only attack allows us to estimate the sub-key λ.
To verify this issue, the image “Lena” (Fig. 2.8) was encrypted for n = 20, j = 1,
and different values of λ ∈ [3.8, 4]. These values of λ were then estimated from
the ciphertexts by applying Eqs. (2.19) and (2.20). The parameter estimation error
(PEE) was calculated as
PEE = |λ− λˆ|, (2.21)
for different values of λ that were considered. The PEEs are shown in Fig. 2.9(a). The
average estimation error was 5.236228× 10−6, whereas the maximum and minimum
errors were 3.481322×10−5 and 2.758853×10−8, respectively. By increasing the value
of j from 1 to 3 and keeping the other sub-keys unchanged, the PEEs are shown in
Fig. 2.9(b), being the mean estimation error 4.721420 × 10−6, the minimum error
1.212016× 10−8 and the maximum error 3.355227× 10−5.
The main conclusion of this analysis is that the ciphertext of a cryptosystem
cannot be made up through a sampling process on the orbits of the logistic map. As
a matter fact, if the ciphertext is built according to that procedure, then it should be
used a chaotic map with invariant set being independent with respect to the control
parameters.
The previous analysis does not fully accomplish the evaluation of the “quality” of
the ergodicity of chaotic maps in the context of chaos-based cryptography. Indeed,
the performance of some encryption architectures requires orbits associated to fixed-
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Figure 2.9: Parameter estimation errors corresponding to the image “Lena”, when
n = 20 and (a) j = 1; (b) j = 3.
width and flat histograms. This is the case of the searching based chaotic digital
ciphers, as the celebrated Baptista’s cryptosytem [Baptista98]. In this type of chaos-
based cryptosystem the state space is divided into a number of disjoint intervals given
by the cardinality of the alphabet of the plaintext. Upon this setting, the encryption
is performed by locating each unit of plaintext in the orbit associated to a certain
initial condition. Certainly, each value of the orbit is associated to one of the intervals
obtained after partitioning the state space. Starting from last visited interval, we
record the number of iterations needed to land into the interval associated to the next
unit of plaintext. The number of iterations is the ciphertext corresponding to each
unit of plaintext. As a result, the efficiency and security of this kind of cryptosystems
demands orbits visiting the different intervals with equal probability. Indeed, if some
intervals are visited more frequently than others, then there exists a high correlation
between small values of ciphertext and the values of plaintext corresponding to those
intervals. In [Baptista98] the logistic map is selected as base of the searching based
algorithm. The logistic map possesses a non-flat histogram even when the invariant
set occupies the whole space. Indeed, in [Schuster95, p. 68] it is shown that for λ = 4
the invariant measure of the logistic map is given by
µ(x) =
1
pi
√
x(1− x) , (2.22)
which corresponds to the histogram in Fig. 2.6. A further analysis Fig. 2.6 allows
to distinguish an interval of the state space of the logistic map where the histogram
is almost flat. Therefore, if it possible to have a flat histogram by locating the
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intervals corresponding to the plaintext in a subset of the state space of the logistic
map, instead of using the whole state space. Nevertheless, this remedy results in a
reduction of the encryption speed. Indeed, most values in the orbits of the logistic map
belong to the intervals no associated to plaintext and, consequently, a high number of
iterations is necessary to encrypt each unit of plaintext. From this point of view, it is
advisable to use maps with a flat histogram, otherwise the efficiency of the designed
cryptosystem could be degraded. In this sense, the skew tent map is better option
than the logistic map. Certainly, the skew tent map has an invariant measure equal
to 1, and thus its associated histogram is flat for any value of the control parameter.
Nevertheless, this is a theoretical result that is not confirmed in practice when the
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Figure 2.10: Histograms of the skew tent map for M = 100000, N = 10000, and
(a)λ = 0.01; (b)λ = 0.4.
skew tent is implemented using finite precision arithmetics (see Fig. 2.10). As it
is explained in [Li03, Chapter 3], finite precision computations cause a degradation
of the invariant measure of the skew tent map, which leads to a histogram with a
non-flat shape. Consequently, it is not only necessary to use maps with a uniform
invariant measure, but also to take into account the consequences of working with
finite precision machines.
Up to this point we have shown that the ergodicity of chaotic maps must be
evaluated by a deep analysis of the histograms of their orbits. Nevertheless, it is also
necessary to perform an additional examination by plotting xk+1 versus xk from a
given orbit. This plotting is called return map. In Fig. 2.11 the upper and lower
bounds of the invariant set of the logistic map are identified through the return map.
Either the histogram and return map dependency on the control parameter could
imply serious problems when designing a chaos-based cryptosystem. This is case
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Figure 2.11: Return map of the logistic map for λ = 3.9384739.
of Baptista’s cryptosystem, as it is shown in [Skrobek08]. In that cryptanalytical
work the return map of the logistic map is reconstructed through a chosen-ciphertext
attack. Once the return map is obtained, the estimation of the control parameter can
be done straightforwardly, as Fig. 2.11 informs.
2.4 Measures of entropy
The main reason of the appealing of chaos for cryptographic applications is based on
its random-like behavior. Indeed, cryptography is concerned about the concealing of
information through its embedding inside of sources of entropy. Chaos is a source of
entropy. Nevertheless, this source of entropy is conditioned by the dynamics of the
specific chaotic system under consideration. In order to establish the limitations and
the characteristics of this conditioning, it is necessary to supply a set of mathematical
figures.
Assume that (f,Λ,U) is a dynamical system in discrete time, with control para-
meters space Λ ⊂ Rd, state space U ⊂ Rm, evolution rule fλ(x) = f(λ, x), ∀λ ∈ Λ,
and A = A0∪A1∪. . .∪AN−1 a finite partition of U . An observation made after k iter-
ations of the map is modeled by the partition f−kλ (A) =
{
f−kλ (A0), . . . , f
−k
λ (AN−1)
}
,
where the kth preimage of A ⊂ U is
f−kλ =
{
x ∈ U|fkλ (x) ∈ A
}
.
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If fλ has µ as invariant measure, then the probability of visiting the interval Ai is
pri = µ(Ai), i = 1, . . . , N, (2.23)
and the Shannon entropy of the partition A is
H(A) = −
N∑
i=0
pri log pri. (2.24)
The joint distribution of M successive observations is performed by the mutual
refinement
AM = A∨ f−1λ (A) ∨ . . . ∨ f−M+1λ (A). (2.25)
If A is built properly, then the upper bound of the entropy of the successive
refinements leads to the actual entropy of the chaotic map. This happens when A is
a generating partition.
Definition 2.4.1 (Generating partition). Let (f,Λ,U) a discrete-time dynamical sys-
tem, with control parameters space Λ ⊂ Rd, state space U ⊂ Rm, evolution rule
fλ(x) = f(λ, x), ∀λ ∈ Λ, and A a partition of its state space. If it is satisfied the
following equation
H(fλ,A) = lim
M→∞
1
M
H(AM), (2.26)
then A is a generating partition of the considered dynamical system.
Shannon entropy is also known as Shannon-Boltzmann-Gibbs measure of entropy,
and it provides a good characterization of the entropy of systems involving correla-
tions of short distance, markovian systems, and, in general, systems that possess a
robust chaotic microscopic dynamic, i.e., a dynamic with strictly positive Lyapunov
exponent and full ergodic behavior through the complete phase space. However,
Shannon-Boltzmann-Gibbs’ characterization fails in the description of those systems
with a weak chaotic behaviour in a microscopic scale, which implies a Lyapunov spec-
trum with zero-crossings. The temporal evolution of these systems does not cover the
complete phase space but a subregion of it with (multi)fractal or hierarchical struc-
ture. Therefore, it is necessary to use a non-extensive examination of the dynamics to
achieve a more accurate characterization of those kind of dynamical systems. Taking
into account these needs, in 1988 Tsallis proposed a generalization of the Shannon-
Boltzmann-Gibbs measure of entropy [Tsallis88]. According to Tsallis’ criterion, the
entropy of a partition A can be calculated as
HTS(A, q) = 1
q − 1
N∑
j=1
(prj − (prj)q) , (2.27)
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where q ∈ R.
Independently of the specific method to calculate the entropy, a crucial stage of
the entropy analysis is to find a generating partition. Different methods have been
proposed based on the Fourier analysis [Powell79], the Wavelet transform [Rosso02],
histograms [Martin06] or the permutation entropy [Bandt02]. A very useful tool for
either the determination of generating partition or the computation of different figures
of entropy is the theory of symbolic dynamics.
Definition 2.4.2 (Symbolic dynamics). Let A = {A0, A1, . . . , An−1} a partition of
U ⊂ R satisfying that U = ∪n−1i=0 Ai and Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for i 6= j. If n = 1 the partition
is called trivial. For a partition A, a unique symbol i = θ(Ai) is assigned to every
region Ai ∈ A. The process of partitioning U , assigning symbols to every region of
the partition, and the resulting macroscopic dynamics are called symbolic dynamics.
For the class of maps in F , the theory of symbolic dynamics leads straightforwardly
to a generating partition. Indeed, when considering unimodal maps, the value of the
critical point xc divides U into two subintervals, which further determines a generating
partition. In this sense, any orbit of a unimodal map can be translated into a sequence
of 0-bits and 1-bits (a value xi of an orbit is assigned to a 0-bit/1-bit if xi < xc/xi ≥
xc). The analysis of the dynamics of unimodal maps by means of their symbolic
dynamics is very fruitful, as will be explained in Chapter 3, and it also allows the
determination of measures of entropy.
As it is pointed out in [Ebeling92], symbolic sequences can be used to build an
approximation of the entropy of the underlying dynamical system. However, this
approximation is not done on the symbols included in symbolic sequences, but on
groups of those symbols. Indeed, subgroups of n symbols or letters are determined
from any symbolic sequence, and the number of occurrences of each of the possible
n-words are computed. If the considered dynamical system is chaotic, then it can
be assumed stationarity. In this situation, pr(n)i is the probability of occurrence of
the word i, among the Jn possible words, being J the cardinality of the alphabet
used in the symbolic dynamics of the dynamical system. Following Shannon, n-gram
entropies are given by
Hn = −
Jn∑
i=1
pr
(n)
i log pr
(n)
i . (2.28)
Furthermore, the entropy Hn can be later used to calculate the average information
necessary to predict the next symbol given the preceding n symbols. This measure is
called n-gram conditional entropy, noted as hn, and defined mathematically as
hn = Hn+1 −Hn, (2.29)
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where h0 = H1. The previous definition implies that
hn+1 ≤ hn, (2.30)
and that the entropy of the considered generating partition A is given by the limit of
the conditional entropies, i.e.,
H(A) = lim
n→∞
hn = lim
n→∞
Hn
n
. (2.31)
In Fig. 2.12 it is shown the varying of the n-gram conditional entropy with respect
to the word length for the logistic and skew tent map. Simulation results confirm
what was expected from theory, i.e., the n-gram conditional entropy can be used to
establish the chaoticity of a symbolic sequence and as alternative to the Lyapunov
exponent. Indeed, Fig. 2.12 and Fig. 2.1 spell out that it is possible to establish a
threshold for the n-gram conditional entropy such that a larger value implies chaos.
Furthermore, in the case of the skew tent map the conditional entropy pinpoints
a two-to-one relation with respect to the control parameter. This relation is also
present in the Lyapunov exponent, but the computation of the conditional entropy
is less computationally demanding, and also can be calculated from both the exact
orbits and the symbolic sequences.
3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
λ
h n
n=4
n=6
n=8
n=10
n=12
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
λ
h n
n=4
n=6
n=8
n=10
n=12
(b)
Figure 2.12: n-gram conditional entropy of the logistic map (a) and skew tent map
(b) for different values of the word length.
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2.5 Time-frequency characterization of chaotic se-
quences
In information theory the standard methodology when dealing with the temporal
evolution of systems is mostly based on the Fourier transform. Indeed, the projection
of a signal or sequence on the frequencies domain can lead to meaningful conclusions
about its periodical or non-periodical behavior. In the case of a system defined in
discrete time the tool to use is the Discrete Fourier Transform or DFT . However,
the DFT determines a total characterization of a sequence of values if it is the coun-
terpart of the temporal evolution of a system with a stationary behavior. This is not
the case of chaotic systems. Certainly, the counterpart of a chaotic system in the
frequencies domain is not constant, it is time dependant. In this sense, if a given
chaotic sequence is split into several disjoint chaotic subsequences, the DFT of each
of those subsequences are sensibly different from each other. Therefore, it is necessary
to establish another way of registering both the behavior in the frequencies domain
and the modification with time of this behavior. In other words, it is necessary to per-
form a time-frequency characterization of chaotic systems. The Wavelet Transform
or WT is the tool leading the analysis of the time-frequency description of systems
with non-stationary temporal evolution.
The Continuous Wavelet Transform (CWT ) of a continuous signal x(t) is
Wx(u, s) = 〈x, ψu,s〉 =
∫ +∞
−∞
x(t)
1√
s
ψ∗
(
t− u
s
)
dt, (2.32)
where ψu,s(t) = ψ( t−us ). If s = 2
−j, u = k · 2−j for j, k ∈ N, then we have a Dyadic
Wavelet Transform or DWT. The DWT employs a set of windows whose size is vari-
able and proportional to 2−j in order to extract information about the data structure
for different scales. This transform can be inverted and the original signal recovered
if ψ(t) satisfies certain properties [Mallat99]. There is an special type of DWTs that
can be implemented using very efficient algorithms [Mallat89]. Those algorithms are
based on mathematical structures called multiresolution approximations of L2(R) (the
space of real square summable functions). A sequence {Vj}j∈Z of closed subspaces of
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L2(R) is a multiresolution approximation if the following properties are satisfied:
∀(j, k) ∈ Z2, f(t) ∈ Vj ⇔ f(t− 2jk) ∈ Vj , (2.33)
∀j ∈ Z,Vj+1 ⊂ Vj , (2.34)
∀j ∈ Z, f(t) ∈ V ⇔ f
(
t
2
)
∈ Vj+1, (2.35)
lim
j→+∞
Vj =
+∞⋂
j=−∞
Vj = {0}, (2.36)
lim
j→−∞
Vj = Closure
(
+∞⋃
j=−∞
Vj
)
= L2(R). (2.37)
The goal is to obtain a sequence of successive approximations of the original signal
through its reiterative projections on subspaces Vj of L2(R). These subspaces are
generated by the scaling function φ(t):
Vj =
{∑
k∈Z
cj(k)φj,k(t)
}
, (2.38)
where φj,k(t) = 2j/2φ(2jt−k) are dilations (or reductions) and translations in time of
the function φ(t). It is also necessary that {φj,k(t), k ∈ Z} is an unconditional base of
Vj. Consequently, the multiresolution approximation can be interpreted as an “stair”
of spaces embedded one into another. As conditions (2.33)-(2.37) inform, the scaling
function φ(t) can not be selected arbitrarily. Since V1 ⊂ V0, 21/2φ(t/2) ∈ V1 and
φ(t) ∈ V0, and having under consideration that {φ(t−n)}n∈Z is an orthonormal base
of V0, it is possible to express
1√
2
φ
(
t
2
)
=
+∞∑
n=−∞
h[n]φ(t− n), (2.39)
with
h[n] =
〈
1√
2
φ
(
t
2
)
, φ(t− n)
〉
. (2.40)
Applying the Fourier transform in both sides of Eq.(2.39), we have
Φ(2ω) =
1√
2
H(ω)Φ(ω). (2.41)
For p ≥ 0, the previous equation can be generalized as
Φ(2−p+1ω) =
1√
2
H(2−pω)Φ(2−pω), (2.42)
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which further leads to
Φ(ω) =
(
P∏
p=1
H(2−pω)√
2
)
Φ(2−Pω). (2.43)
If Φ(ω) is continuous for ω = 0, the lim
P→+∞
Φ(2−Pω) = Φ(0), and consequently it is
satisfied the following equation:
Φ(ω) =
+∞∏
p=1
H(2−pω)√
2
Φ(0). (2.44)
The next theorem gives the necessary and sufficient conditions that H(ω)must satisfy
to make Eq.(2.44) the Fourier transform of the scaling function.
Theorem 2.5.1 ([Mallat89]). Let φ ∈ L2(R) be an integrable scaling function. The
Fourier transform of h[n] =
〈
2−1/2φ(t(2), φ(t− n)〉 satisfies
∀ω ∈ R, |H(ω)|2 + |H(ω + pi)|2 = 2, (2.45)
and
H(0) =
√
2. (2.46)
On the other hand, if H(ω) is 2pi-periodic and continuous differentiable in a neigh-
borhood of ω = 0, and Eq.(2.45) and Eq.(2.46) are satisfied along with the following
condition
inf
ω∈[−pi/2,pi/2]
|H(ω)| > 0, (2.47)
then the Fourier transform of the scaling function φ ∈ L2(R) is
Φ(ω) =
+∞∏
p=1
H(2−pω)√
2
. (2.48)
The discrete filters satisfying Eq.(2.45) are called conjugate filters. The approxi-
mations of x(t) in the scales 2j and 2j−1 are, respectively, its orthogonal projection
over Vj and Vj−1. Let us call Wj the orthogonal complement of Vj in Vj−1:
Vj−1 = Vj ⊕Wj . (2.49)
The orthogonal projection of x(t) on Vj−1 can be expressed as the sum of the orthog-
onal projections over Vj and Wj :
PVj−1x = PVjx+ PWjx (2.50)
Since the projection onto Vj represents the approximation at the scale 2j , the pro-
jection onto the complementary subspace Wj entails the details of the signal x(t) at
the scale 2j, but not at the scale 2j−1. The next theorem shows that it is possible to
build a base of Wj by scaling and translating the wavelet function ψ.
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Theorem 2.5.2 ([Mallat89]). Let φ be an scaling function and h[n] the associated
conjugate mirror filter. Let ψ be the function with Fourier transform given by
Ψ(ω) =
1√
2
G
(ω
2
)
Φ
(
ω√
2
)
, (2.51)
where G(ω) is defined as:
G(ω) = eiωH∗(ω + pi). (2.52)
Let us defined the set of functions ψj,k(t) as
ψj,k(t) =
1√
2j
ψ
(
t− 2jk
2j
)
. (2.53)
For any scale 2j, {ψj,k}k∈Z is an orthonormal basis ofWj. For all the scales, {ψj,k}(j,k)∈Z2
is an orthonormal base of L2(R).
The proof of Theorem 2.5.1 and Theorem 2.5.2 can be found in [Mallat99], where
it is also shown that G(ω) is the Fourier transform of
g[n] =
〈
1√
2
ψ
(
t
2
)
, φ(t− k)
〉
, (2.54)
which are the decomposition coefficients of
1√
2
ψ
(
t
2
)
=
+∞∑
k=−∞
g[k]φ(t− k). (2.55)
The orthogonal projections of a signal x(t) on the consecutive “detail” subspaces
Wj are obtained with a partial expansion in its wavelet basis
PWjx =
+∞∑
k=−∞
〈x, ψj,k〉ψj,k. (2.56)
The expansion of a signal in an orthogonal wavelet basis can be interpreted as a
multiresolution approximation at the different scales 2j, i.e.,
x =
+∞∑
j=−∞
PWjx =
+∞∑
j=−∞
+∞∑
k=−∞
〈x, ψj,k〉ψj,k. (2.57)
Finally, and before continuing with the application of the multiresolution analysis
of chaos, it is necessary to make an observation with respect to the selection of the
orthonormal basis {ψj,k}(j,k). Although Theorem 2.5.2 makes explicit the conditions
that φ(ω) must satisfy to determine {ψj,k}(j,k) as an orthonormal basis in L2(R), it
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does not prove that an orthonormal basis is the sustain of a multiresolution approx-
imation. Nevertheless, in [Lemarié90] it is proved that ψ(ω) with compact support
and satisfying Theorem 2.5.2 leads to multiresolution approximations of signals. In
[Gamero97; Rosso01] it is used a function Ψ(ω) with the requirements pointed out in
[Lemarié90]. Precisely, in those works a Battle-Lemarié wavelet function of order 3 is
used. Henceforth, it is assumed that all the analysis are performed with this wavelet
function.
2.5.1 Wavelet entropy
The decomposition of a signal into the different resolution levels defined by the or-
thonormal basis ψj,k is a multiresolution analysis or MRA. The MRA of a signal
allows a discretization of the original signal by means of the energy associated to
each resolution level. Let S be a set ofM elements obtained by sampling a signal s(t)
at a sample rate of Ts seconds (S = {s(0), s(Ts), . . . , s((M − 1)Ts)}). If the wavelet
coefficients of S are
Cj(k) = 〈S, ψj,k〉 , (2.58)
the energy associated to each resolution level Ej is
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Figure 2.13: RWE of the logistic map for different values of the control parameter.
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Ej =
1
Nj
∑
k
|Cj(k)|2, (2.59)
being Nj the number of coefficients at scale j (j = 1, 2, . . . , N and N = log2(M)).
The total energy is determined as
Etot = ||S||2 =
∑
j<0
∑
k
|Cj(k)|2 =
∑
j<0
Ej, (2.60)
whereas the Relative Wavelet Energy or of each resolution level is defined as the ratio
between the energy associated to each scale and the total energy, i.e.,
RWEj =
Ej
Etot
, (2.61)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , N . The RWE is a very useful to conclude if a given sequence of
values can be considered as a good source of entropy. Certainly, the RWE satisfies∑
j
RWEj = 1 and can be interpreted as the probability distribution function of the
energy. Based on this concept, the Wavelet Entropy or WE is defined as
WE = −
∑
j<0
RWEj lnRWEj . (2.62)
A dynamical system is a good source of entropy if all the resolution levels of the
multiresolution analysis possess the same energy. In this case, the WE is maximum
and the associated dynamical system can be considered chaotic in the strict sense. In
Figs. 2.13 and 2.14 the RWE is depicted for different values of the control parameter
of the logistic and the skew tent map, respectively.
Both figures show how the WE increases as the differences between the energy of
resolution levels decreases. In the case of the logistic map the values of λ determining
periodic behavior are easily identified by means of low values of WE and a RWE with
most components equal to zero, with the exception of those components associated
to one or several resolution levels. The skew tent map, in turn, possesses a RWE with
a better distribution of energy among the different levels. Nevertheless, even in the
case of the skew tent map the WE is not maximum, since the distribution of energy
between resolution levels in not strictly equitable. Certainly, there always exists
outstanding resolution levels in the “sharing”, being specially relevant the situation
defined by values of λ close to either 0 or 1.
In [Torres00; Rosso01; Rosso02] the WE is not only introduced as a measure of
order in a signal, but as an alternative to other features as the Lyapunov exponent,
correlation dimensions and the Hurst exponent. In Fig. 2.15 the WE of the logistic
map is shown, whereas the WE of the skew tent map is shown in Fig. 2.16. In both
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Figure 2.14: RWE of the skew tent map for different values of the control parameter.
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Figure 2.15: WE of the logistic map for different values of the control parameter.
cases the WE can be interpreted as a criterium to establish the chaoticity of a given
time series, although it has to be handled carefully since its value fluctuates with the
initial condition. Nevertheless, the WE offers a parameter free method to measure
order with a lower computational burden and a higher immunity against noise, due to
the filtering made by the wavelet transform. In this sense, the WE must be considered
as a basic tool for cryptanalysis of chaos-based cryptosystems.
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Figure 2.16: WE of the skew tent map for different values of the control parameter.
2.5.2 Multiresolution entropy
In the previous section the Battle-Lemarié wavelet function of order 3 has been pro-
posed as the sustain of a method to compute the entropy of a giving sequence of
values. Nevertheless, not only that type of wavelet function is useful in the analysis
of chaotic systems. In [Gamero97] cubic spline wavelet functions are used to build
another measure of entropy. In this case, the DWT coefficients of a given sequence S,
i.e., Cj(k) = 〈S, ψj,k〉 are transformed using an sliding window. The sliding window
of the resolution level j is given by
Wj(u, w,∆) = {Cj(k), k = 1 + u ·∆, 2 + u ·∆, . . . , w + u ·∆} , (2.63)
where w ≤ Kj is the width of the sliding window and ∆ is selected satisfying (Kj −
w)/∆ ∈ N, being Kj the number of wavelet coefficients at the resolution level j. Next
the sliding window is used to define the MultiResolution Entropy or MRE.
Definition 2.5.1 (MRE). Let Cmin,j and Cmax,j be the minimum and maximum
values of the coefficients Cj(k) included in Wj(u, w,∆). The interval [Cmix, j , Cmax, j ]
is divided into the following J ∈ N subintervals of size t = b[Cmix, j, Cmax, j]/Jc:
Iu,j,1 = [Cmin, Cmin + t) ,
Iu,j,2 = [Cmin + t, Cmin + 2 · t) ,
· · ·
Iu,j,J = [Cmin + (J − 1) · t, Cmax] . (2.64)
These subintervals are used to calculate a probability distribution function. In this
sense, pr(Iu, j,l) is the probability of finding a wavelet coefficient in the interval Iu, j,l.
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According to this distribution function, the MRE can be calculated. If the MRE is
determined accordingly, then it is noted as MRESj (MRE in the sense of Shannon
at the resolution level j), whereas in case of choosing Tsallis’ criterium it is noted as
MRETj .
As it is emphasized in [Gamero97] the main application of the MRE is the detec-
tion of changes in the entropy of temporal series. In the context of chaos-based crypto-
graphy this detection could be useful to infer some information about the plaintext
or to build some mechanism to estimate either the control parameters or the initial
condition. As a result, the MRE should be considered as another auxiliary tool in
either the design or the cryptanalysis of a chaos-based cryptosystem. As an example
of the virtues of the MRE, let us consider the logistic map with control parameter
λ = 3.8123 and with control parameter changing according to the rule
λn =

λ1, if n < n1
λ1 + [(n− n1)(λ2 − λ1)/(n2 − n1)], if n1 ≤ n ≤ n2
λ2, if n > n2
(2.65)
where λ1 = 3.5, λ2 = 3.8123, n1 = 1182, and n2 = 1634.
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Figure 2.17: Entropy analysis of the logistic map for constant and variable control
parameter. The entropy has been computed with w = 82, ∆ = 2, J = 5, and q = 5
for Tsallis’ entropy.
In Fig. 2.17 the entropy is analyzed just using the sliding window, whereas in
Figs. 2.18 and 2.19 the sliding window and the DWT are combined to examine
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Figure 2.18: Mutiresolution entropy analysis by in the sense of Shannon for the logistic
map with constant and variable control parameter. The entropy has been computed
with w = 82, ∆ = 2, and J = 5.
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Figure 2.19: Mutiresolution entropy analysis by in the sense of Tsallis for the logistic
map with constant and variable control parameter. The entropy has been computed
with w = 82, ∆ = 2, J = 5, and q = 5.
the entropy according to Shannon’s and Tsallis’ measures, respectively. In all the
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situations it is clearly established the possibility of locating in time the change in the
entropy of the system. Nevertheless, it is also possible to locate that change in the
frequencies domain by means of the MRE, as Figs. 2.18 and 2.19 shown.
From the point of view of chaos-based cryptography, the possibility of the analysis
performed by the MRE is useful when deciding how to use the entropy derived from
chaos to conceal information. Indeed, if we want to encrypt information with an spec-
tral behavior clearly located at a certain range of frequency scales, then it is advisable
to use a chaotic map with a high level of entropy at those scales. Furthermore, the
possibility of locating in time and in frequency the changes of entropy could represent
a security flaw. Certainly, if it is possible to establish a relation between values of the
control parameters and levels of entropy at the different scales, then the MRE could
be used to reduce the key space for a further brute force attack. Another security
flaw arises when the entropy of the ciphertext at any frequency scale is influenced by
the plaintext. In this case, the MRE of a given ciphertext could lead to a subgroup of
plaintexts, which could also be used to reduce the complexity of a brute force attack.
2.6 Study of the sensitivity to control parameter
One characteristic of chaotic systems is that their evolution in time is very dependent
on the vector of control parameters. In this sense, two very close values of λ lead
to very different instant values of orbits (after a transient number of iterations).
Nevertheless, this difference can be also present when comparing orbits as a whole,
i.e, from an statistical point of view. In the context of chaos-based cryptography, it
is highly advisable to avoid any kind of dependence of the statistics of the orbits with
respect to the control parameters. Certainly, if some of the statistics of the orbits can
be expressed as a function of λ, then an estimation of the control parameters could
be performed. For the sake of clarity, the problem is formulated mathematically. For
a chaotic map fλ : U → U and a generating partition A = A0 ∪ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ AN−1,
the probability pri of visiting the interval Ai is determined for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. If
the statistical behavior of the map is influenced by the value of λ, then pri = pri(λ)
and the dependency of pri with respect to λ can be computed using some kind of
statistical distance. In this Thesis the Wootters’ distance is considered [Majtey05].
Definition 2.6.1 (Wootters’ distance). Let us assume two probability distributions
Pri =
{
pr
(i)
j , j = 1, . . . , N
}
with i = 1, 2. The Wootters’ statistical distance is given
by
DW (Pr1, P r2) = cos−1
(
N∑
j=1
√
pr
(1)
j · pr(2)j
)
. (2.66)
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If fλ : U → U is unimodal (see Definition 1.3.3) with U = [0, 1], then orbit of
length M generated from x0 ∈ U can be encoded into a binary sequence,
BM(fλ, x0) = {Bi(fλ, x0)}M−1i=0 = θ(f (0)λ (x0))θ(f 1λ(x0)) . . . θ(f (M−1)λ (x0)), (2.67)
where θ(·) is the step function
θ(y) =
{
0, if y < xc
1, if y ≥ xc (2.68)
A probability distribution can be obtained from BM(fλ, x0) just by grouping all bits
in a sliding window of length w. As a result, a binary sequence of length M is
transformed into a sequence of M −w+ 1 integers (or words), taking some of the 2w
possible values. The probability distribution associated to BM(fλ, x0) is determined
by counting the number of occurrences of each word and dividing the result by (M −
w−1). Wootter’s distance can be used, for example, to estimate the control parameter
of the logistic map. This task is carried out by computing Wootter’s distance from
the binary sequence BM(fλˆ, x0) (generated with an unknown value λˆ of the control
parameter) to the binary sequences generated with λ ranging in an interval. These
distances are computed in Fig. 2.20 for two values of λˆ with M = 104 and w = 10;
the corresponding symbolic sequences were generated with different initial conditions.
Figure 2.20 shows that around the right value of λ there exists a basin of attraction,
which leads immediately to an estimation of λˆ.
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Figure 2.20: Wootter’s distance of the logistic map with respect to the logistic map.
The length of the symbolic sequences is M = 104, whereas the words are of width
w = 10.
The Wootters’ distance can also be used to discriminate between different proba-
bility distribution functions.
56
Case study 2.6.1 ([Arroyo09c]). Cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem described in
[Kurian08]
As as example, let us consider the encryption system described in [Kurian08],
whose structure is depicted in Fig. 2.21, and which has been cryptanalyzed by us
[Arroyo09c]. In that encryption scheme the stochastic behavior of the symbolic se-
Logistic map
Skew tent map
≥ xc
⊕
Shuffler
Plaintext
Ciphertext
B
ks
B
init
Figure 2.21: Stream cipher based on the binary sequences generated from the logistic
map and skew tent map.
quences of the logistic map and skew tent map are used to build up a stream cipher.
The plaintext is encrypted through the symbolic dynamics of either the logistic map
or the tent map, with fixed control parameter λ and initial condition x0. If the plain-
text is M bit long, then γM+Qfλ (x0) is computed with the selected map according to
Eq. (2.4), and Eq. (2.67) is used to produce a binary sequence. The scheme proposed
in [Kurian08] divides the finite binary sequence
BM+Q(fλ, x0) = {Bi(fλ, x0)}M+Q−1k=0 = θ(f (0)λ (x))θ(f (1)λ (x)) . . . θ(f (M+Q−1)λ (x))
into two segments: Binit = {Biniti }Q−1i=0 with Biniti = Bi(fλ, x0), and Bks = {Bksi }M−1i=0
with Bksi = BQ+i(fλ, x0). The initial segment B
init encodes x0 as it is done in
[Stojanovski97]. The final segment Bks is the keystream of the cipher, i.e., the plain-
text P = {Pi}M−1i=0 is transformed into the pre-ciphertext C = {Ci}M−1i=0 according to
Ci = Pi ⊕ Bksi = Pi ⊕ BQ+i(fλ, x0), (2.69)
where i = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, and 0 ⊕ 0 = 1 ⊕ 1 = 0, 0 ⊕ 1 = 1 ⊕ 0 = 1. Finally, the
pre-ciphertext C and Binit are combined into the ciphertext or encrypted message
C = {Ci}M+Q−1i=0 which is sent to the receiver through an insecure channel. The
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generation of C is driven by a shuﬄer block, implementing an injective map pi :
{0, 1, · · · , Q − 1} 7→ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1,M}, which inserts the Q bits of Binit into the
pre-ciphertext C .
The secret key of the cryptosystem just defined includes the map to use in the
generation of the keystream. In this sense, the authors of [Kurian08] assume that it
is not possible to infer the map used in the generation of a given symbolic sequence.
However, this is a wrong assumption, since the Wootters’ distance can be used to
identify the map employed in the generation of the keystream of the cryptosystem
given in [Kurian08]. In a chosen-plaintext attack, a cryptanalyst has access to the
encryption device and thus can obtain the output corresponding to any input. If Pi =
0 for 0 ≤ i ≤M−1, i.e., all the bits of the plaintext P are chosen to be zero, then C =
0⊕Bks = Bks, and the corresponding ciphertext is Bshuﬄed = pi (Binit∥∥Bks), where ‖
stands for “yuxtaposition”. If we consider now that Bshuﬄed has been generated using
the tent map with control parameter λˆ, then Wootters’ distance from Bshuﬄed to the
logistic map produces a picture with no basin of attraction (see Fig. 2.22(a), where
the Wootters’ distance is always upper 0.9) or with a basin of attraction around λ = 4
(see Fig. 2.22(b)). In this case, we conclude that the chosen map is the logistic map
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Figure 2.22: Wootter’s distance of the skew tent map with respect to the logistic map.
with λˆ = 4, or the tent map with an unknown value for the control parameter. A
further analysis of Wootters’ distance to the tent map makes possible to discard the
logistic map in this situation. Figure 2.23 depicts Wootters’ distance to the tent map
when Bshuﬄed is generated using the tent map with two different values for λˆ. Again,
it is possible to discern a basin of attraction around λˆ, which has been verified for
different random configurations of the interleaving of Binit and Bks.
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Figure 2.23: Wootter’s distance of the skew tent map with respect to the skew tent
map for N = 104 and w = 10.
2.7 Analysis of the dense periodic points of chaos
Chaos is the result of the paradoxical association between a local divergence and a
global convergence. As a result of this peculiar relationship, the wandering behavior of
chaos is sustained by a set of dense Unstable Periodic Orbits or UPOs. Furthermore,
the thorough knowledge of the distribution of the UPOs of a chaotic system allows
the reconstruction of its dynamics [Cvitanović91]. In other words, UPOs can be
interpreted as the skeleton of chaos. In this sense, the level of randomness of chaos
is a consequence of the complexity of the distribution of UPOs, which could imply
that a high value of entropy entails a large set of UPOs. Therefore, the randomness
of chaos could leak the underlying regularity, which results in a reduction of the
complexity of the behavior of the chaotic system. Consequently, mathematical tools to
analyze the complexity of a chaotic system should be defined. Maximum complexity
is achieved only for a pure random process, i.e., a process with maximum entropy
and which does not contain any structural correlation. In other words, maximum
complexity is assure only for a uniform probability distribution function. As a result,
the degree of complexity of a given probability distribution can be calculated through
its statistical divergence from the uniform probability distribution. A very useful
measure of statistical divergence is the one defined by Jensen [Martin06].
Definition 2.7.1 (Jensen’s divergence). Consider two discrete distributions Pri ={
pr
(i)
1 , . . . , pr
(i)
N
}
, for i = 1, 2. Let H be a functional entropic form of both probability
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distributions. The associated Jensen’s divergence is defined by
JβH (Pr1, P r2) = H (βPr1 + (1− β)Pr2)− βH (Pr1)− (1− β)H (Pr2) , (2.70)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
If β = 1/2 and pr(2)j = 1/N for j = 1, . . . , N , then the Jensen’s divergence
is a measure of the statistical complexity of the probability distribution Pr1. The
structural complexity of chaos lies on the underlying UPOs. If the distribution of
UPOs changes as the control parameters do, then the statistical complexity could
bring to light a hint to infer the values of the control parameters. For instance,
let us consider the case of the logistic map and skew tent map. For both maps
the statistical complexity was determined using the Tsallis’ entropy with q = 0.9
(Eq. (2.27)). In Fig. 2.24(a) appears the Jensen-Tsallis statistical complexity of the
logistic map versus the control parameter. It shows that the statistical complexity
is very related to the value of the control parameter in the chaotic region. In fact,
the complexity is almost a bijective function of the control parameter in the chaotic
region, and thus it could be used to estimate the value of the control parameter.
On the other hand, the statistical complexity of the skew tent map is a two-to-one
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Figure 2.24: Statistical complexity Jensen-Tsallis of (a) the logistic; (b) and the skew
tent map for different values of λ and q = 0.9.
function of the control parameter. The skew tent map has an uniform probability
distribution function, which could make us to consider it as a total random process.
Nevertheless, we must not forget that the apparently disorder of chaos is sustained
by an underlying regularity. In the case of the skew tent map this regularity can
be extracted by analyzing its associated symbolic sequences. Indeed, the skew tent
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map has a Lebesgue measure on [0, 1], which is an ergodic invariant measure of the
tent map for all λ ∈ (0, 1). In [Li05b] it is shown that the invariant measure of the
skew tent map implies that the ratio between the number of 1-bits and 0-bits in a
typical orbit coincides with the ratio between the lengths of the intervals [λ, 1] and
[0, λ), namely, 1−λ
λ
. For the sake of illustration, the control parameter of the skew
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Figure 2.25: Error in the estimation of the control parameter of the tent map from
the ratio between 1-bits and 0-bits in a given symbolic sequence.
tent map was estimated from the ratio 0-bits and 1-bits of the symbolic sequences
generated for different values of the control parameter and the initial condition (see
Fig. 2.25). As it is expected, the larger the symbolic sequences, the smaller the error
in the estimation.
The approximation of the underlying regularity of chaos is the base of many
techniques used in the analysis of chaotic time series. As matter of fact, the re-
construction of the dynamics of a chaotic system from the associated time series is
well known from the milestone work of Takens [Takens81]. Taken’s theorem is the
base of a great variety of methods used in the analysis of time series [Farmer87;
Tsonis07; Letellier08], but it is also possible to perform that analysis using tech-
niques based on different theoretical backgrounds, as the analysis of recurrence plots
[Marwan07], the wavelet transform [Cao95; Billings05; Masuda01] or neural networks
[Bakker00; Al-Assaf04; Gholipour06]. Specially interesting are the methodologies
based on symbolic dynamics [Wu04; Piccardi06; Buhl07; Wang08a] and analysis of
order patterns [Bandt05; Amigó06; Bandt07]. Certainly, for some chaotic systems
those tools are a very useful help in the discovering of bijective or quasi-bijective
functions that guide the estimation of the control parameter and, maybe, the initial
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condition associated to a chaotic orbit. Unimodal maps are an example of chaotic
systems allowing that estimation. In the following two Chapters it is studied the
symbolic dynamics of unimodal maps, and second the distribution of their order pat-
terns. The goal of both Chapters is to illustrate how to use either symbolic dynamics
or order patterns to estimate the control parameters of a chaotic map.
2.8 Digital degradation
A major problem when dealing with chaotic maps is their implementation. If the
chaotic maps are implemented digitally, then a degradation of their dynamics is in-
duced by finite precision arithmetics. Certainly, for a precision of N bits, the number
of possible states is 2N and thus the iteration of a chaotic system will eventually be
periodic. For that reason, the orbits generated by iteration of the digital implemen-
tation of a chaotic map are called pseudo orbits instead of chaotic orbits. According
to the Anosov’s shadowing theorem [Brin03, p. 113], there always exists an exact
chaotic orbit close to a given pseudo orbit with only an small error. Nevertheless,
Anosov’s theorem is useless for digital chaos, since the shadowing orbits are generally
of measure zero. As a result, the digital implementation of chaos could imply a loss of
ergodicity, a deviation from the theoretical invariant measure, or a positive Lyapunov
exponent. An extreme example of digital degradation is the skew tent map. As it has
been pinpointed in Sec. 2.7, the ergodicity of the skew tent map allows to estimate
the control parameter just analyzing the rate between 0-bits and 1-bits in its symbolic
sequences. It was emphasized that the precision in the estimation can be improved by
increasing the length of the symbolic sequences. However, that precision is bounded
in a practical context as a result of the deviation of the invariant measure from its
theoretical value. Another proof of the dynamical degradation of the skew tent map
can be found using the Wootters’ distance. Indeed, the peaks appearing in Fig. 2.22
are a consequence of low period orbits for some values of the control parameter and
the initial condition of the digital skew tent map. Moreover, digital degradation also
destroys the topological conjugacy between the logistic map and symmetric tent map
(the skew tent map with λ = 1/2) [Hao98, p. 68]. According to the topological
conjugacy, the Wootters’ distance of the logistic map with λ = 4 to the skew tent
map should be identical to the Wootters’ distance of the symmetric tent to the skew
tent map. However, Fig. 2.26 spells out a clear difference between them, since digital
degradation causes “peaks” for the logistic map but “shafts” for the symmetric tent
map. As a result, from a practical point of view it is possible to discern between both
maps even when there exists topological conjugacy, since when working with finite
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Figure 2.26: Wootters’ distance of the (a) logistic map for λˆ = 4 and x0 = 0.593563;
and (b) the skew tent map for λˆ = 1/2 and x0 = 0.213988 respect to the skew tent
map for N = 104 and w = 10. The quantization steps of x- and y-axis are 2−6 and
2−4 respectively.
precision arithmetics the symmetric tent map possesses a “digitally stable” 1 fixed
point at x = 0. As a result, the main conclusion of this section is that the use of a
chaotic map in the context of chaos-based cryptography requires a full and thorough
analysis of all its dynamical properties. It has to be determined the effect of digital
degradation as it is done in [Li03, Chapter 3].
2.9 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter we have shown that, although chaotic systems possess a behavior
very useful for the design of encryption procedures, we cannot assume that a chaotic
system fulfills the needs of cryptography just because it evolves chaotically. Indeed,
it is necessary to test and verify that the properties of the dynamical systems used
as based of cryptosystems do really meet the standard requirements of cryptogra-
phy. With this regard, we have defined a set of mathematical indicators to guide
the assessment of the adequacy of orbits of dynamical systems for cryptographical
applications. The Lyapunov exponent is the figure to conclude the potentiality of
orbits as sources of diffusion of information, whereas different measures of entropy
1The term “digitally stable” means that the fixed point is stable under finite computing precision.
That is, any chaotic orbit will finally lead to x = 0 after a limited number of iterations. The
number of iterations has an upper bound determined by the finite precision. Some discussions on
this phenomenon with floating-point arithmetic can be found in [Li04a].
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have been introduced in order to evaluate the performance of orbits as generators of
confusion of information. Since in the context of chaos-based cryptography confusion
is done by embedding the information into the chaotic orbits in different ways, the
entropy should be analyzed from many points of view as possible. Therefore, entropy
must be calculated not only through the partition of the state space, but also by
the analysis of energy in the frequency domain. However, confusion property does
not only lie on the level of entropy of orbits. Certainly, it is also required orbits
with a probability distribution non-depending on the control parameters, and thus
the histograms of orbits must be calculated and analyzed using measures of statisti-
cal distance to confirm this need. Finally, the fulfillment of confusion property also
requires that mathematical indicators extracted from chaotic orbits do not allow the
estimation of either the control parameters, or the initial condition, or both. In this
sense, we must establish if and how the orbits can be transformed to later compute
a mathematical indicator revealing a one-to-one or few-to-one relation to the control
parameters and/or the initial condition. This assessment allows a series of context
where the orbits leaks the parameters controlling their dynamics. This is crucial for
the design of secure chaos-based cryptosystems. Indeed, the design of a chaos-based
cryptosystem must define the use of chaotic orbits taking into account those critical
contexts. More precisely, it must guarantee the impossibility of reproducing any of
those contexts in any of the situations defined by the four cryptanalysis scenarios
defined in Sec. 1.2.2. The consequences of a neglected design have been shown in this
Chapter through a series of cryptanalysis works of our own. In the next Chapter we
show that the theory of symbolic dynamics also reveals another critical context and,
consequently, it should be handled during the design of a chaos-based cryptosystem.
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Chapter 3
Symbolic dynamics of unimodal maps
3.1 Introduction
In the spirit of the previous Chapter, we continue on the characterization of chaotic
maps focusing now the attention on “coarse-grained” versions of their orbits. Recall-
ing Chaos Theory, the first step when studying some special type of complex temporal
evolution (i.e., chaotic temporal evolution) was simplification by means of mathemati-
cal concretion. A complementary strategy is based on the partition of the phase space
of chaotic maps. As a matter of fact, chaotic maps are continuous-state discrete-time
systems that can be converted into discrete-state discrete-time systems, which im-
plies that the further study is done on sequences of symbols or symbolic sequences
instead of sequences of real numbers. The result of such transformation defines an
special area in the Theory of Dynamical Systems which is symbolic dynamics. As
it is pointed out in [Kitchens97, p. V], Jacques Hadamard was the first to use infi-
nite sequence of symbols to analyze dynamics. In 1930’s and 40’s symbolic dynamics
were the basis of the work of Hedlund and Morse, and also of Shannon’s descrip-
tion of information channels. Later, symbolic dynamics has been broadly used in the
study of dynamical systems [Metropolis73; Hansen92; Hao98; Pastor06; Pastor07a;
Pastor07b; Pastor07c; Pastor07d; Pastor08; Pastor09; Romera08; Wang08a] , Markov
shifts [Lind95; Kitchens97], time-series [Daw03], and also in the cryptanalysis of
chaos-based cryptosystems [Wang05; Alvarez07a; Alvarez07b; Arroyo09f].
A crucial step in symbolic dynamics is to partition the phase space conveniently.
The criterion in this regarding is based on the analysis of entropy, as it was explained
in Sec. 2.4. In Definition 2.4.1 it was defined the concept of generating partition,
i.e., the partition adequate to lead the discretization of orbits. The existence of a
generating partition is guaranteed for any ergodic chaotic system [Krieger70], but its
determination is generally very difficult (different methods can be found in [Steuer01;
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Figure 3.1: Skew tent map for λ = 1/2 also known as symmetric tent map.
Kennel03; Buhl05; Rajagopalan06]). Nevertheless, in the context under consideration,
generating partitions are obtained directly. Certainly, for the class of maps in F a
generating partition is given by {[0, xc), [xc, 1]}, which determines the transformation
of orbits into sequences of two symbols.
A symbolic sequence for an unimodal map is a transformation of a sequence of
real numbers into a sequence consisting of a pair of symbols. These two symbols
represent the relative position of a real-value iterate with respect to the critical point
of the underlying iteration function of a unimodal discrete-time chaotic system. The
existence of an inner order of the symbolic sequences of maps in F and the relation-
ship between this order and the initial condition and the control parameter of the
underlying chaotic system are pointed out in [Metropolis73]. The considerations and
results of [Metropolis73] were later improved and enlarged through different contri-
butions, being the most important [Beyer86] and [Wang87]. In [Alvarez98] it was
remarked that the order of the symbolic sequences can be interpreted using the con-
cept of Gray codes. In this novel approach to the problem, the symbolic sequences
are finally converted into a figure which is a real number between 0 and 1 called Gray
Ordering Number or simply GON. Afterwards, [Cusick99] drew the bridge between
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Figure 3.2: Symbolic intervals for different iterations of the tent map.
the ideas of [Alvarez98] and the main theory of applied symbolic dynamics as ex-
pressed in [Wang87]. Finally, some theorems are suggested in [Wu04], which enlarge
the theoretical framework of the GON of unimodal maps. In [Wu04] it is explained
that the dynamical properties of unimodal maps by means of the GON are a transla-
tion of the theoretical framework inherited from [Metropolis73]. Nevertheless, there
is no direct and explicit proof of this equivalence. Since the main application of the
concept of the GON is the estimation of the control parameter of unimodal maps for
cryptanalysis [Alvarez03b], a rigorous and concrete theoretical framework is required.
This Chapter presents this concretion and also shows that some of the theorems in
[Wu04] are not totally accurate. In this sense, those theorems are not only criticized
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but also rewritten.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 remarks the existence
of an inner order for the symbolic sequences of a certain class of unimodal maps and
a relationship between that order and the order of the initial conditions employed in
their generation. In Sec. 3.3 the order of the symbolic sequences is rewritten in terms
of Gray codes and the concept of Gray Ordering Number is introduced. After that,
Sec. 3.4 introduces a subclass of the class of considered unimodal maps. This subclass
of unimodal maps is defined in a parametric way, i.e., their dynamics depend on a
control parameter. This dependency is analyzed by means of the GON. This study
will lead to the revision and proof of all theorems in [Wu04]. In Sec. 3.5 the previous
theoretical framework is applied to the estimation of the initial condition and the
control parameter of unimodal maps, which is linked between symbolic dynamics and
cryptanalysis of chaos-based cryptosystems. The main consequences of the theoretical
work and its application are recapitulated in Sec. 3.6.
3.2 Relationship between the symbolic sequences and
the initial condition used in their generation
Let us consider the case of the symmetric tent map (i.e., the skew tent map for
λ = 1/2) shown in Fig. 3.1. The symmetric tent map satisfies Definition 1.3.3, which
implies that a certain value xi+1 6= xc can be derived from two different values of xi,
as Fig. 3.1 informs. In other words, it is satisfied that xi+1 = f(xLi ) = f(x
R
i ), where
xLi 6= xRi , xLi < xc and xRi > xc. This is a common characteristic of all the functions
of the class F . It means that the initial condition used in the generation of {xi}
using f(x) ∈ F can be recovered from the last number of the sequence only if the
relative position of every xi with respect to xc is known. Therefore, the recovering of
the initial condition demands recording those relative positions. This is achieved by
transforming {xi} into a symbolic sequence or pattern according to the next criterium:
xi ≡ L if xi ∈ [a, xc), (3.1)
xi ≡ C if xi = xc, (3.2)
xi ≡ R if xi ∈ (xc, b]. (3.3)
Consequently, {xi} is associated to the symbolic sequence S = s0s1 . . . where
si ∈ {L,R}. Using S and the last element of {xi} one can recover the initial condition
x0.
Let us call Sf(x0) to the symbolic sequence of length M generated from x0 using
the function f(x), which is included in the class F . The value of the i−th symbol
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of the symbolic sequence Sf(x0) is determined by f (i)(x0), i.e., the i−th iteration of
f(x) from x0 for i ∈ [0,M − 1]. If Si is the i−th symbol of the symbolic sequence,
Si is equal to L if and only if f (i)(x0) < xc. In the same way, pi is equal to R if and
only if f (i)(x0) > xc. As a consequence, the definition interval U is divided into 2i+1
symbolic subintervals. Indeed, if x(i,j)c is the j-th solution of the equation
f (i)(x) = xc, (3.4)
the set
{
x
(i,j)
c
}
for 0 ≤ j < 2i divide the definition interval into 2i+1 subintervals,
where x(0,0)c = xc. All the values included in one of these intervals generate the same
symbolic sequence of length i + 1. In Fig. 3.2 the symbolic intervals of the tent
map for zero, one and two iterations are depicted. The main result of the previous
proposition is that, for a certain number of iterations, the different subintervals are so
that two neighboring subintervals lead to the same symbolic sequence except for one
symbol. On the other hand, for i ∈ N ∪ {0} and j ∈ [0, 2i− 1], the set of points x(i,j)c
determine periodic symbolic sequences of period i + 1 when they are considered as
initial conditions. If the symbol C is assigned to xc and only one period is regarded,
the symbolic sequences generated from
{
x
(i,j)
c
}
end with a C. In this sense, if the
iteration process associated to the generation of a symbolic sequence stops just when
a C is obtained, only the symbolic sequences derived from the set of initial conditions
solution of Eq. (3.4) have finite length.
If S is the set of all sequences derived from the iteration of the functions included
in F , then it is possible to derive a complete ordered set (S, <S) where the referred
order is defined according to [Beyer86, p. 309] as follows:
Lema 3.2.1 ([Beyer86]). Assuming L <S C <S R, S = {si} and T = {ti} ∈ S, and
j is the first index so that sj 6= tj, it is said that S <S T if one of the next conditions
is satisfied:
1. j = 0 and s0 <S t0.
2. j > 0, s0s1 . . . sj−1 = t0t1 . . . tj−1 contains an even number of R’s and sj <S tj.
3. j > 0, s0s1 . . . sj−1 = t0t1 . . . tj−1 contains an odd number of R’s and sj >S tj.
The inner order of S is directly linked to the order on R of the real numbers in
U used to generate the symbolic sequences from any f in F . This is informed and
proved in [Beyer86, Lemma 4.1] and in [Wang87, Theorem 2]. For the sake of clarity,
the relationship between the order of the kneading sequences and the order of the
initial conditions is rewritten as a theorem:
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Theorem 3.2.1 ([Beyer86; Wang87]). For f(x) belonging to the class of functions
F and x, y included in the interval of definition of f(x) so that x < y, it is verified
that Sf(x) ≤S Sf (y).
3.3 Gray codes and symbolic sequences
In the previous section it was remarked that f (i)(x) can be divided into 2i+1 intervals
such that all the values included in one of those intervals lead to the same symbolic
sequence of length i+1. In this sense, those intervals were referred as symbolic inter-
vals, since a certain interval can be named through the symbolic sequence generated
from any value inside it. It was also observed that two contiguous symbolic sequences
differed in just one symbol. Finally, if the first symbol of the symbolic sequences
is discarded, the 2i+1 symbolic subintervals generated by the i−th iteration of the
map f(x) are symmetric with respect to x = xc. In communication theory it is very
well known a family of codes distinguished by the fact that two successive codes only
differ in one bit. This family of codes is the Gray codes family, which also presents
the above cited mirroring property. Table 3.1 shows the Gray codes of length 4. As a
result, it is immediate the translation of the symbolic sequences of the class of func-
tions F into binary sequences just changing the symbol L into 0 and the symbols R
and C into 1 [Alvarez98]. In this sense, the Gray code associated to a certain pattern
Sf(x) is given by the next definition.
Definition 3.3.1. The Gray code corresponding to Sf(x) = s0s1 · · · si−1 · · · is defined
as G(Sf(x)) = g0g1 · · · gi−1 · · · where
gi =
{
1, if si = R
0, if si = L
for i ∈ N ∪ {0}. If sj = C for any j in N ∪ {0}, then the Gray code associated to
Sf(x) is g0g1 · · · gj−1.
As Table 3.1 informs, it is possible to translate a Gray code into a binary code.
The equivalent binary code of a given Gray code can be easily obtained using the
next definition:
Definition 3.3.2. If the Gray code of a symbolic sequence Sf (x) = s0s1 · · · si−1 · · ·
is given by G(Sf(x)) = g0g1 · · · gi−1 · · · , then the binary code related to Sf (x) is
U(Sf (x)) = u0u1 · · ·ui · · · where
ui = ui−1 ⊕ gi,
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for i ∈ N and u0 = g0. If Sf(x) is of length j, i.e., if Sj = C, then the binary code
related to Sf(x) is U(Sf (x)) = u0u1 · · ·uj where u0 = g0, and
ui =
{
ui−1 ⊕ gi, for 0 < i ≤ j − 1
1, for i = j
Since a binary code can be interpreted as a decimal number just changing the base,
it is possible to associate a number to a symbolic sequence. However, the canonical
base changing makes the first symbol modify its weight as the length of the symbolic
sequence increases. In order to avoid the changing of the symbol weights as the
length of the symbolic sequences increases, the Gray code associated to a symbolic
sequence is interpreted as a decimal number with integer part equal to zero. The next
definition introduces how to carry out the transformation of a symbolic sequence into
a real number between 0 and 1.
Table 3.1: Correspondence between Gray codes and binary codes for four bits.
Rank Binary code Gray code
0 0000 0000
1 0001 0001
2 0010 0011
3 0011 0010
4 0100 0110
5 0101 0111
6 0110 0101
7 0111 0100
8 1000 1100
9 1001 1101
10 1010 1111
11 1011 1110
12 1100 1010
13 1101 1011
14 1110 1001
15 1111 1000
Definition 3.3.3. Let G(S) = g0g1 · · · gM−1 be a set of bits representing a Gray code
of length M . Let U(S) = u0u1 · · ·uM−1 be the binary code corresponding to G(S).
The Gray Ordering Number or GON of S is defined as the real number given by
GON(S) = 2−1 · u0 + 2−2 · u1 + · · ·+ 2−M · uM−1.
The definition of the GON also implies the definition of an order <GON upon
the set of symbolic sequences S. In other words, according to the definition of the
71
GON, it is possible to build the complete ordered set (S, <GON). This ordered set is
equivalent to (S, <S), i.e., the order defined using the GON is equivalent to the order
<S .
Proposition 3.3.1. The orders <S and <GON are equivalent on S.
Proof. Let S = s0s1 . . . sj−1sj . . . be a certain symbolic sequence which can be of
finite or infinite length. If U(S) = u0u1 . . . uj−1uj . . . is the binary code linked to the
kneading sequence S, uj is equal to 1 if one of the next situations occurs:
1. sj = R and s0s1 . . . sj−1 contains an even number of R’s.
2. sj = L and s0s1 . . . sj−1 contains an odd number of R’s.
Let Q = q0q1 . . . qk−1qk . . . be another kneading sequence of finite or infinite length.
Let U(Q) = t0t1 . . . tk−1tk . . . be its associated binary code. According to Theorem
3.2.1, if the first different symbol between S and Q is the i−th one, then S <S Q if
and only if one of the next cases happens:
1. si = R, qi = L and s0s1 . . . si−1 contains an odd number of R’s. As a conse-
quence, it is verified that ui = 0 and ti = 1, which implies that GON(S) <
GON(Q), i.e., S <GON Q.
2. si = R, Q of length i and s0s1 . . . si−1 contains an odd number of R’s. Since Q
is of finite length, its final symbol is C. Therefore, ti = 1 and ui = 0 implying
that GON(S) < GON(Q), i.e., S <GON Q.
3. si = L, qi = R and s0s1 . . . si−1 contains an even number of R’s. For this
configuration, ui = 0 and ti = 1, which informs GON(S) < GON(Q) and
subsequently S <GON Q.
4. S of length i, qi−1 = R and s0s1 . . . si−2 contains an even number of R’s. Since
S has i symbols, it means ui−1 = 1. On the other hand, ti−1 = 1 and three
possible situations are
(a) Q is of length j for j > i. Then tj−1 = 1 implies GON(S) < GON(Q.
(b) Q is infinite-length and qi = L, implying ti = 1 and GON(S) < GON(Q).
(c) Q is infinite-length and qi = R. In this case there exists j > i such that
qj = R. Otherwise, the condition S <S Q implies that S is of length 1
and Q = RLLLL . . .. In each of these situations it is satisfied GON(S) <
GON(Q).
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On the other hand, let us assume S <GON Q and i the first index such that ui 6= ti.
1. ui = 0, ti = 1 and s0s1 . . . si−1 contains an odd number of R’s. Since GON(S) <
GON(Q), then pi = R and qi = L, which further implies that S <S Q.
2. ui = 0, ti = 1 and s0s1 . . . si−1 contains an even number of R’s. In this situation
the assumption GON(S) < GON(Q) forces si = L and qi = R, which informs
that S <S Q.
3. S is of length i, ti−1 = 1. This implies that s0s1 . . . si−2 contains an even number
of R’s, qi−1 = R and thus S <S Q.
4. ui−1 = 0 and Q of length i and s0s1 . . . si−1 contains an odd number of R’s.
Therefore, si−1 = R, qi−1 = C and S <S Q.
As a result, S <S Q if and only if S <GON Q and the proof is complete.
The previous proposition and Theorem 3.2.1 lead to the next theorem, which
represents the extension of Theorem 1 in [Wu04].
Theorem 3.3.1 ([Wu04]). For f ∈ F and x, y ∈ U , it is satisfied that GON(Sf(x)) ≤
GON(Sf(y)) if and only if x ≤ y. In other words, the GON of the symbolic sequences
in S is an increasing function with respect to the initial condition.
According to this theorem, the GON is an increasing function with respect to
the initial condition, as it is shown in Fig 3.3 for the logistic map. That figure has
been calculated working with symbolic sequences obtained by iterating M times the
logistic map. Hereafter those symbolic sequences are denoted as SMfλ (x). The symbolic
sequences given by SMfλ (x) are implicitly ended by C, all of them are of length M ,
and dependent on the iteration of a map defined in a parametric way.
3.4 Gray codes and parametric unimodal maps
A special case of interest is the study of unimodal maps defined in a parametric way.
In this sense, this section is focused on the analysis of the class of functions fλ(x) ∈ F
for all λ in [0, 1]. Let F (x) ∈ F and F (xc) = Fmax ≤ b. The parametric function fλ
can be expressed as follows:
fλ(x) = λF (x),
which implies fλ(xc) = λFmax, which is the maximum value of fλ(x). A first conse-
quence of this is Theorem 3 in [Wu04], which is a corollary of Theorem 3.3.1.
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Figure 3.3: GON of the logistic map as a function of the initial condition for different
values of λ and symbolic sequences of length M = 16.
Corollary 3.4.1 ([Wu04]). For fλ(x) = λF (x) with F (x) ∈ F and λ ∈ [0, 1], it is
satisfied that GON(Sfλ(fλ(x))) ≤ GON(Sfλ(fλ(xc))), ∀x ∈ [a, b].
Moreover, the maximum value of fλ(x), i.e., λFmax depends on λ in such a way
that an increment of the control parameter forces an increment of the maximum value.
As a consequence, the GON of the kneading sequences derived from x = fλ(xc) is an
increasing function with respect to the control parameter [Wu04, Theorem 4].
Corollary 3.4.2 ([Wu04]). For fλ(x) = λF (x) with F (x) ∈ F and λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1]
with λ1 < λ2, it is satisfied that GON(Sfλ1 (fλ1(xc))) ≤ GON(Sfλ2 (fλ2(xc))).
For the sake of clarity, the GON of the image of the critical point of the logistic
map was calculated for different values of the control parameter. In Fig. 3.4 the
results are depicted, confirming Corollary 3.4.2.
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Figure 3.4: Maximum GON for the logistic map with respect to λ. The length of the
symbolic sequences is M = 16.
On the other hand, after a certain number of transient iterations, all the values
obtained from any initial condition through the iteration of any function in F are in-
side the interval [xmin, xmax]. Therefore, once all the values derived from the iteration
of the considered function are inside [xmin, xmax], it is verified that GON(Sfλ(x)) ≥
GON(Sfλ(f
(2)
λ (xc)). This was wrongly interpreted in [Wu04, Theorem 5], since this
theorem is only satisfied if f (2)λ (x) ≥ xmin for any x ∈ [a, b]. Nevertheless, the previous
comments point out that this inequality is verified only for x ∈ [f−1λ (f−1λ (xmin)), b],
i.e., Theorem 5 in [Wu04] is not fulfilled for x ∈ [a, f−1λ (f−1λ (xmin))]. Consequently, it
is necessary to modify Theorem 5 in [Wu04] according to the preceding considerations.
In this sense, the next corollary rewrites Theorem 5 in [Wu04] in a more accurate way
and, at the same time, extends its application domain to all the functions in F .
Corollary 3.4.3. Let F (x) be a function in F that leads to fλ(x) = λF (x) for
x ∈ [a, b] and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let xi be defined as xi = x for i = 0 and xi = fλ(xi−1) for
i > 0, i ∈ N. There exists n1 ∈ N such that xi is in [xmin, xmax] for i > n1 and it is
satisfied that GON(Sfλ(xi)) ≥ GON(Sfλ(f (2)λ (xc)), ∀x ∈ [a, b] for i > n1.
Finally, the value xmin is given by f
(2)
λ (xc) = fλ(fλ(xc)) = λF (λFmax). If xmin is a
monotonic function of λ, then it is possible to extract a new corollary from Theorem
3.3.1. In [Wu04, Theorem 6] it is assumed without proof that f (2)λ (xc) is a monotonic
decreasing function with respect to λ. This assumption implies that
∂xmin
∂λ
= F (λFmax) + λFmax
∂F (x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=λFmax
< 0. (3.5)
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This condition is not satisfied for all the possible values λ and for all the functions in F .
In [Wu04] the dependency of xmin on λ is studied using the logistic map (see Eq. (1.9)).
It is easy to verify that for the logistic map the condition given by Eq. (3.5) is fulfilled
if and only if λ > 8/3. Therefore, Theorem 6 in [Wu04] must be rewritten in such a
way that the discussed inaccuracy is overcome and, simultaneously, the application
domain of its variant affects not only to the logistic map but to all the functions in
F . Again, this aim is completed through a series of additional assumptions on the
scope defined in Theorem 3.3.1.
Corollary 3.4.4. Let us suppose that fλ(x) = λF (x) with F (x) ∈ F , λ ∈ [0, 1]
and x ∈ [a, b]. For λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1] with λ1 < λ2 and satisfying ∂f (2)λ (xc)/∂λ < 0 for
λ = {λ1, λ2}, it is verified that GON(Sfλ1 (f
(2)
λ1
(xc))) ≥ GON(Sfλ2 (f
(2)
λ2
(xc))).
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Figure 3.5: Minimum value of the GON of the logistic map. The length of the
symbolic sequences is M = 16.
In order to illustrate the last two corollaries, the corresponding simulations were
done on the logistic map. In Fig. 3.5 it is shown the GON of the symbolic sequences
obtained by iterating the logistic map from the image of its critical point. Addi-
tionally, the bifurcation diagram of the GON of the logistic map was computed and
the result is shown in Fig. 3.6. A first sight of this figure informs about the existence
of two bounds, an upper and lower bound of the bifurcation diagram. It can be
straightforwardly verified that the upper bound corresponds to Fig. 3.4 (which con-
firms Corollary 3.4.1), whereas the lower bound is given by Fig. 3.5 (which confirms
Corollary 3.4.4).
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Figure 3.6: Bifurcation diagram of the GON of the logistic map. The length of the
symbolic sequences is M = 16.
3.5 Application of Gray codes to initial condition
and control parameter estimation
As it has been pointed out in the previous section, the symbolic sequences of the
maps in F can be ordered according to either the control parameter or the initial
condition, which can be further used to estimate either the control parameter or
the initial condition attained to a given symbolic sequence. First, according to Co-
rollary 3.4.1, the maximum symbolic sequence of a map in F is obtained from an
initial condition equal to the image of the critical point. In the case of maps defined
in a parametric way, the maximum symbolic sequence increases as λ does. Conse-
quently, it is possible to establish a method to estimate the control parameter from
a given symbolic sequence [Wu04]. In this regarding, it is assumed that the symbolic
sequence is given by the first M symbols of the symbolic sequence generated from
x0 ∈ U through the iteration of a unimodal map fλ : U → U included in F . Let us
define GM(x0, λˆ) = g0g1 · · · gM−1, gi ∈ {0, 1} as the Gray code generated from initial
condition x0, and control parameter λˆ. The estimation of λˆ and x0 from GM(x0, λˆ)
comprises three stages:
1. Estimation of the maximum GON contained in GM(x0, λˆ) (see Fig. 3.7).
According to [Guckenheimer79], if λˆ is selected implying chaotic behavior, then
the probability density of the critical point xc in the orbit generated from x0
is nonzero. Therefore, if M is a large value, the maximum GON included
in GM(x0, λˆ) is the one obtained for initial condition equal to fλˆ(xc) (Coro-
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Input: GM (x0, λˆ) = g0g1 · · · gM−1, N
GONmax = GON(g0g1 . . . gN−1), i = 1
i ≤M −N
Gi = gigi+1 . . . gi+N−1
GON(Gi) > GONmax i = i + 1
GONmax = GON(Gi)
Output: GONmax
yes
yes
no
no
Figure 3.7: Estimation of the maximum GON contained in a Gray code associated
to an unimodal map.
llary 3.4.1). As a result, the maximum GON can be calculated as the maximum
GON of the M − N + 1 Gray codes obtained from GM(x0, λˆ) using a sliding
window of length N .
2. Recovering of the control parameter from the maximum GON.
The GON of the Gray codes derived from the iteration of fλ ∈ F with initial
condition given by fλ(xc) is an increasing function with respect to λ (Coro-
llary 3.4.2). It means that it is possible to infer an estimation λest of λˆ from
the GONmax obtained from GM(x0, λˆ). Certainly, if λL and λR are the bounds
of the interval containing λˆ, then a dichotomic search of λˆ can be performed
according to the monotony of GON(GN(fλ(xc), λ)) (see Fig. 3.8).
3. Recovering of the initial condition x0 using the value of the control parameter
obtained in the previous stage.
Gray codes of unimodal maps divide the state space U into a number of finite
intervals. If Gray codes of length M are considered, the state space is split into
2M+1 different intervals. Therefore, given  > 0, any real number x0 ∈ U can be
represented with precision  as a Gray code of fλ ∈ F , with initial condition x0
and length above certain threshold [Stojanovski97]. Moreover, the Gray code
assigned to any possible x0 ∈ U increases as x0 does. Accordingly, a dichotomic
search of x0 can be performed from GM(x0, λˆ) as it is shown in Fig. 3.9. If one
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Input: GONmax, xc, λL, λR, N
λest =
λR+λL
2
GN (fλ(xc), λest)
GON(GN ) = GONmax
GON(GN ) < GONmax
λL = λest
λR = λest λest =
λR+λL
2
GN (fλ(xc), λest)Output: λest
no
no
yes
yes
Figure 3.8: Algorithm for the estimation of the control parameter of an unimodal
map from the maximum GON contained in a Gray code.
knows the exact value of λˆ, then x0 can be recovered up to a certain precision
determined by M . On the other hand, if one has only access to an estimated
value λest of λˆ, then the estimated initial condition x0est does not matched the
actual value of x0.
The precision in the estimation of both λˆ and x0 depends critically on the first
stage of the method. As it has been mentioned above, from a theoretical point
of view the critical point xc is included in almost every orbit when λˆ implies that
LE(λˆ) > 0 [Jensen85]. Nevertheless, in the context of finite precision computa-
tion this property is not satisfied, due to the digital degradation of the dynamics of
chaotic systems. Therefore, the value GONmax obtained in the first step diverge from
GON(GN(fλˆ(xc), λˆ)), and thus the value λest obtained in second stage is not equal
to λˆ. As a matter fact, even for M very large, there exists an error that cannot be
overcome. However, the value λest can be considered as a good estimation of λˆ, which
has to be later improved. Furthermore, in the context of chaos-based cryptography,
it has serious consequences if the control parameter is part of the key.
Case study 3.5.1 ([Arroyo09f]). Cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem introduced in
[Wang08c]
As an example, let us consider the cryptosystem defined in [Wang08c] and crypta-
nalyzed by us in [Arroyo09f]. This cryptosystem is a searching based digital chaotic
cipher, i.e., it splits the plaintext into blocks that are further located in a binary
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Input: GM (x0, λˆ), λest, a, b
GONref = GON(GM (x0, λˆ))
x0L = a, x0R = b,
x0est =
x0R+x0L
2
GONest = GON(GM (x0est , λest))
GONest = GONref
GONest < GONref
x0L = x0est
x0R = x0est x0est =
x0R+x0L
2
GONest = GON(GM (x0est , λest))
Output:
x0est
no
no
yes
yes
Figure 3.9: Algorithm for the estimation of the initial condition of an unimodal map
from a given symbolic sequence when the control parameter is known.
sequence generated using a chaotic map. The authors of [Wang08c] claim that most
chaotic systems can be used to generate the binary sequences required by the search
based encryption procedure. Among all the possible options, the symbolic sequences
of the logistic map were chosen in [Wang08c] to prove the reliability of the cryptosys-
tem. In this sense, the secret of the cryptosystem is composed of the initial condition
x0 and the control parameter λˆ, and the Gray code GM(x0, λˆ) = g0g1 · · · gM−1 is used
to encrypt the plaintext P as follows:
• Step 1) Initialize i = 0, j = 0.
• Step 2) For the i-th plain block Pi formed by wi = w bits, try to find the first
wi-bit segment of {gn}Nmax+win=j which is equal to Pi; in case a segment is not
found, let wi = wi − 1 and repeat this step. The parameter Nmax indicates the
maximum number of trials in the searching of Pi through the binary sequence.
• Step 3) Denoting by ni the number of iterations needed to locate the distin-
guished wi-bit segment from gj, output (wi, ni) as the i-th cipher-block.
• Step 4) Set i = i + 1 and j = j + ni + wi, then go to Step 2 until the whole
plaintext is exhausted.
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According to the theory of symbolic dynamics of maps in F , as long as one can
reconstruct the sequence GM(x0, λˆ), one can estimate the secret key of the cryptosys-
tem. This is used to build an attack with three different stages:
1. Reconstruction of the Gray code derived from the logistic map.
If one has access to the decryption machine, then one can perform a chosen-
ciphertext attack to reconstruct GM(x0, λˆ), i.e., the Gray code associated to the
values of x0 and λˆ that make up the secret key of the cryptosystem under consi-
deration. To do so, L ciphertexts are generated as (w,w · i) for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , L.
As an example, let us assume that x0 = 1/2 and λˆ = 3.78. In this case, it is
satisfied that
GM(1/2, 3.78) = {1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1 . . .} .
As a result, if we ask the decryption machine to decrypt (8, 0), then we obtain
{1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1}. Similarly, the decryption machine will return
{1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0} ,
when the input is (8, 8), and {1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1} when the input is (8, 16). In
other words, the decryption of the first ciphertext returns the first w bits of
GM(x0, λˆ), the decryption of the second ciphertext gives the second set of w
bits of GM(x0, λˆ), and so on.
2. Estimation of the control parameter from the reconstructed Gray code.
Once GM(x0, λˆ) is known, the control parameter can be estimated as λest
applying first the procedure explained in Fig. 3.7 (with λL = 3.5, λR = 4,
and xc = 1/2), and second the algorithm described in Fig. 3.8. In order to test
the precision in the recovering of the control parameter, some simulations have
been carried out. The parameter estimation errors for λˆ = 3.919740 are shown
in Fig. 3.10. Different values of x0 and M were considered, for a fixed length
of the subsequences of N = 100. Figure 3.10 spells out that the error in the
estimation of λˆ decreases as M increases. Nevertheless, there exists an under-
lying error that it is impossible to overcome increasing M . Indeed, the exact
value of λˆ can be only recovered if the orbit generated from x0 using λˆ includes
xc, which it is satisfied theoretically but not when working with finite precision
arithmetics. Anyhow, the proposed method allows to obtain an estimation λest
of λˆ which implies a considerable narrowing of the key space, and which can be
further improved through a trial and error strategy, i.e., a brute force attack on
the value of the control parameter in a drastically reduced key-space.
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Figure 3.10: Parameter estimation error for λˆ = 3.919740, different values of x0 and
M . The length of the symbolic subsequences is N = 100. The error is calculated as
|λest − λˆ|. Logarithmic scales are used for both the X- and Y- axes.
3. Estimation of the initial condition from the reconstructed Gray code and the
estimated control parameter.
When considering the security of a cryptosystem, a partial knowledge of the
key must not lead to the determination of the rest of the key [Alvarez06b,
Rule 7]. Therefore, even if we were not able to estimate the value of λˆ and
obtain the exact value through a brute-force attack, the recovery of x0 based
on the knowledge of the other subkey λˆ would represent a very important flaw
of the cryptosystem under study. This being the case, the algorithm described
in Fig. 3.9 can be used to estimate the value of x0 from GM(x0, λˆ) and λˆ.
The results are shown in Fig. 3.11. For all analyzed situations, a number of
bits greater than 80 implies an estimation error below 10−15. Since all the
simulations were performed using double precision, this means that the exact
recovery of the initial condition is possible.
3.6 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter it has been shown that it is possible to get an estimation of the
control parameter and the initial condition of a unimodal map from a given symbolic
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Figure 3.11: Initial condition estimation errors for different values of M and (a)
λˆ = 3.950102, x0 = 0.119372; (b) λˆ = 3.950102, x0 = 0.738197; (c) λˆ = 3.791937, x0 =
0.119372; (d) λˆ = 3.791937, x0 = 0.738197. The minimum estimation error is bounded
by the machine precision. Logarithmic scale is used for the Y- axis.
sequence. Moreover, if the control parameter of the unimodal map is known, then
it is possible to perfectly recover the value of the initial condition. The possibility
of performing such estimation (or recovering in the case of the initial condition) in-
forms about serious problems related to cryptography. Indeed, if a unimodal map is
used as base of a cryptosystem, then the encryption architecture must guarantee that
there does not exist a meaningful leakage of the symbolic sequences of the underly-
ing chaotic map. If it is possible to infer or build up symbolic sequences from the
ciphertext, then an attacker could perform some kind of attack to derive a symbolic
sequence large enough to get a good approximation of either the control parameter,
or the initial condition, or both. This is the case of the cryptosystem analyzed in
[Arroyo09f]. In this cryptanalytical work we have shown that unimodal maps are not
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convenient for designing searching based digital chaotic ciphers. Indeed, if that en-
cryption arquitecture is used along with an unimodal map, then a chosen-ciphertext
attack can be performed to get the symbolic sequence corresponding to the secret
key, i.e., the pair of values given by the initial condition and the control parameter.
Once the symbolic sequence is obtained, the estimation of the secret key can be done
straightforwardly. Nevertheless, the estimation of the control parameter can only be
fulfilled if the maximum subsequence of a given symbolic sequence is obtained. For the
class of unimodal maps considered in this Chapter the maximum symbolic sequence
is obtained when the initial condition is the image of the critical point. Accordingly,
the value of the control parameter can be found by comparing the maximum symbolic
sequence to the symbolic sequences obtained from the image of the critical point and
the control parameter ranging in its definition interval. Therefore, the critical point
must be known and it can not be dependent on the control parameter. This is not the
case of the skew tent map, whose critical point is equal to the control parameter being
the image of the critical point constant. This situation is studied in the next Chapter,
and an estimation method is proposed based on the concept of order patterns.
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Chapter 4
Order patterns of unimodal maps
4.1 Introduction
Orbits of chaotic maps can be further transformed and analysed to bring to light the
underlying and basic order, i.e., we can continue “twisting the lion’s tail”. According
to Sharkovsky Theorem [Brin03, p. 162], order and dynamics are intertwined in one-
dimensional intervals. It is therefore not surprising that the study of the ordinal
structure of deterministic time series gives valuable information on the underlying
dynamical system [Keller03; Keller04; Keller05; Keller07; Bandt05; Bandt07]. In the
case of one-dimensional dynamical systems, that study can be performed by means of
of their order patterns [Amigó06]. Indeed, order patterns allow to distinguish chaos
from white noise [Amigó07c], and can provide useful information on the parameter
or parameters controlling the dynamic of chaotic systems. The main goal of this
Chapter is to estimate the control parameter of unimodal maps by means of their
order patterns alone, even when the exact values of their orbits are not accessible but
only the corresponding Gray codes.
Possible applications include the cryptanalysis of chaotic stream ciphers, which
is a topic currently under investigation. More generally, real time series (like expe-
rimental observations or numerical simulations) are always coarse-grained versions
of the actual values, on account of the finite precision of observational devices and
computer arithmetic. This being the case, this Chapter touches upon a basic and
difficult problem, if in a simplified setting.
This Chapter is based on the research work that we have carried out in [Arroyo09a;
Arroyo09b], and is organized as follows. In Sec. 4.2, the concept of order pattern is
introduced, and its dependence on the control parameter is analyzed for the logistic
and the skew tent maps. How the order patterns of unimodal maps are obtained using
Gray codes is explained in Sec. 4.3; in Sec. 4.4 it is explained how to use order patterns
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to estimate the control parameter of unimodal maps with critical point depending on
the control parameter. The results presented in this Chapter are summarized in
Sec. 4.5, where some final comments are also included.
Table 4.1: Order patterns of length four.
# Order pattern # Order pattern # Order pattern # Order pattern
0 [0, 1, 2, 3] 1 [0, 1, 3, 2] 2 [0, 3, 1, 2] 3 [3, 0, 1, 2]
4 [3, 0, 2, 1] 5 [0, 3, 2, 1] 6 [0, 2, 3, 1] 7 [0, 2, 1, 3]
8 [2, 0, 1, 3] 9 [2, 0, 3, 1] 10 [2, 3, 0, 1] 11 [3, 2, 0, 1]
12 [3, 2, 1, 0] 13 [2, 3, 1, 0] 14 [2, 1, 3, 0] 15 [2, 1, 0, 3]
16 [1, 2, 0, 3] 17 [1, 2, 3, 0] 18 [1, 3, 2, 0] 19 [3, 1, 2, 0]
20 [3, 1, 0, 2] 21 [1, 3, 0, 2] 22 [1, 0, 3, 2] 23 [1, 0, 2, 3]
4.2 Order patterns
For a given map defined as in Eq. (2.1), orbits γ+fλ(x0) are calculated for any initial
condition x0 ∈ U according to Eq. (2.2). Orbits are used to define order ν-patterns
(or order patterns of length ν), which are permutations of the elements {0, 1, ..., ν−1},
ν ≥ 2. We write pi = [pi0, pi1, . . . , piν−1] for the permutation pi0 7→ 0, ..., piν−1 7→ ν − 1.
Definition 4.2.1 (Order pattern). The point x ∈ U is said to define (or realize) the
order ν-pattern pi = pi(x) = [pi0, pi1, . . . , piν−1] if
fpi0(x) < fpi1(x) < . . . < fpiν−1(x). (4.1)
Alternatively, x is said to be of type pi. The set of all possible order patterns of length
ν is denoted by Sν.
For further reference, it is convenient to assign an integer number to each order
pattern. This can be made, for instance, by means of the Trotter-Johnson algorithm
[Kreher98]. The order patterns of length 4 along with their “ordering numbers”, are
shown in Table 4.1.
As emphasized in [Amigó08b], there always exist order ν-patterns with sufficiently
large ν that are not realized in any orbit of f ∈ F . These order patterns are called
forbidden patterns, whereas the rest of order patterns are called allowed patterns. In
general, if fλ is a family of self-maps of the closed interval U ⊂ R parameterized by
λ ∈ Λ ⊂ R (as it occurs for fλ ∈ F1,F2), and the set Ppi is defined as
Ppi = {x ∈ U : x is of type pi} , (4.2)
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where pi ∈ Sν , then Ppi depends on fλ and, consequently, on λ. Moreover, it is
assumed that fλ is ergodic for Λ ⊂ R so that the orbits of fλ can be used to build
up statistics independently from the value of the initial condition. Remember that
fλ : U → U is said to be ergodic with respect to the invariant measure µ if the only
invariant sets are the empty set and the full state space U , except possibly for a µ-null
set. According to Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem [Walters82, p. 34], if fλ is ergodic with
respect to the invariant measure µ, then the orbit of x ∈ U visits the set Ppi with
relative frequency µ (Ppi), for almost all x with respect to µ. As a result, it is possible
to study the dependence of Ppi on λ by counting and normalizing the occurrences of
pi in sliding windows of width ν along γ+fλ(x), x being a “typical” initial condition.
Being the scope the family of maps given by Definition 1.3.3, in the following two
subsections this study is done experimentally with the logistic map (as representative
of F1) and with the skew tent map (as representative of F2). Since we are primarily
interested in the relation between the probabilities µ(Ppi) (or relative frequencies) of
order patterns pi ∈ Sν and the control parameter λ of the map considered, we will
refer to it as the λ-distribution function (in short: λ-DF) of pi, since they are related
to the probability distribution functions (we fix pi instead of fixing λ).
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Figure 4.1: f (k)λ (x) for k = 0, 1, 2, 3 and the corresponding order patterns of length 4
for the logistic map when λ = 4.
87
4.2.1 Order patterns for the logistic map
The logistic map, defined in Eq. (1.9), belongs to F1. The logistic map with λ = 4
was studied in [Amigó07c; Amigó08b] from the ordinal point of view. In Fig. 4.1 the
allowed order 4-patterns for the logistic map with λ = 4 are shown. For this value of
the control parameter there exist twelve allowed order patterns.
However, the main goal of this Chapter is to analyze the relationship between
the control parameter of maps in F1 or F2, and their order patterns, what calls for
the distributions of allowed patterns for different values of λ. Figure 4.2 depicts
the relative frequencies of each order 4-pattern for λ ∈ [3.7, 4], the patterns being
labeled as in Table 4.1. To be more specific, for every λ, a sufficiently long orbit was
Figure 4.2: Relative frequency of the order patterns realized by the logistic map when
ν = 4 and λ ∈ [3.7, 4].
generated, the occurrences of the different order patterns were counted using a sliding
window of width 4, and finally the counts obtained were normalized by the number of
windows. These results are estimates of the probabilities for the corresponding order
patterns to occur. Let us point out that, since the physical invariant measure of the
logistic map is only known for λ = 4, numerical estimation of those probabilities is
the most we can hope for. More importantly for us, we conclude from Fig. 4.2 that
it is very difficult to infer the value of λ ∈ [3.7, 4] from the λ-DF of order patterns of
length 4.
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4.2.2 Order patterns for the skew tent map
The skew tent map, given by Eq. (1.11), belongs to the subclass F2, comprised of
those maps of F parameterized by the critical point. Furthermore, for the skew tent
map fλ, the maximum value fλ(xc) = fλ(λ) = 1 is independent from λ (see Fig. 1.9).
The allowed order 4-patterns for the skew tent map are shown in Fig. 4.3 for λ = 0.3,
and in Fig. 4.4 for λ = 0.7.
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Figure 4.3: The first four iterations of f(x) and the corresponding order patterns of
length 4 for the skew tent map with λ = 0.3, i.e., f (k)0.3 (x) for k = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Contrarily to the logistic map, the skew tent map does possess a known ergodic
invariant measure for all λ ∈ (0, 1), namely, the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] (see
[Billings01]). Hence, if Ppi is given by Eq. (4.2) with U = [0, 1], the relative frequency
of the order pattern pi in a typical orbit of the skew tent map, coincides with the
Lebesgue measure of Ppi, which can be determined analytically. The easiest case
corresponds to the order pattern pi = [0, 1, . . . , ν − 1], since then Ppi is an open
interval whose left endpoint is 0 and whose right endpoint is the leftmost intersection
between f ν−1λ and f
ν−2
λ . The relative frequencies of the order patterns of length 4,
numbered according to Table 4.1, are depicted in Fig. 4.5. In particular, the length
of the interval P[0,1,2,3] = (0, φ4(λ)) is determined by the first intersection between
f
(2)
λ (x) and f
(3)
λ (x):
φ4(λ) =
λ2
2− λ. (4.3)
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Figure 4.4: The first four iterations of f(x) and the corresponding order patterns of
length 4 for the skew tent map with λ = 0.7, i.e., f (k)0.7 (x) for k = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Therefore, the λ-DF of pi = [0, 1, 2, 3] (pattern #0) is given by φ4(λ); see Fig. 4.6(a)
for the graphical representation of φ4(λ). The fact that the function φ4(λ) is bijective
entails the possibility of estimating λ via the relative frequency of the order pattern
[0, 1, 2, 3].
Figure 4.5: Relative frequencies of the order patterns of length ν = 4 realized by the
skew tent map.
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Figure 4.6: Order pattern frequency for the skew tent map and ν = 4 (a) order
pattern #0; (b) order pattern #1; (c) order pattern #2; (d) order pattern #3.
Up to this point it has been assumed that the orbits of the various maps considered,
were accessible. From a more practical point of view, it is also relevant to know
whether order patterns can be still determined using less information about the orbits.
This is the case, for instance, when dealing with the symbolic dynamic associated to
a generating partition of the state space. In particular, the orbits of maps of F can be
transformed into binary sequences by the procedure described in Chapter 3. In the
next section it is explained how to build order patterns from those binary sequences.
4.3 Gray codes and order patterns for unimodal maps
In this section the analysis focuses on the parametric unimodal maps of the subclasses
F1 or F2. In section 4.2 it has been explained the dependence of the order patterns
allowed for those maps with respect to the control parameter. Specifically, it has been
estimated the probabilities of order 4-patterns by their relative frequencies in orbits
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of the logistic map (Fig. 4.2) and of the skewed tent map (see Fig. 4.5) with different
parameter settings. The next goal is to reproduce the same dependencies not from
the exact values of the orbit point (“sharp orbit”), but from the binary sequence built
as explained in Chapter 3 (“coarse-grained orbit”). Accordingly, the definition domain
U of f ∈ F splits in 2M+1 subintervals when Gray codes of length M are considered.
We show next that the order patterns of f can also be obtained comparing Gray
codes obtained from its orbits.
Let GM(f, x) = g0g1 . . . gM−1, gi ∈ {0, 1}, be the Gray code of length M of x ∈ U .
Since the Gray codes, together with the points x ∈ U , are linearly ordered and, as we
saw, their order relations are equivalent, we can expect to obtain useful information
about the order patterns realized by the sharp orbit γ+f (x) from the order patterns
realized by the coarse-grained orbit GM(f, x), M ≥ 2. The procedure is as follows.
1. Divide the Gray code of length M , GM(f, x), into M − N + 1 Gray codes of
length N < M using a sliding window of length N . Thus, the first Gray code
derived from GM(f, x) is G0 = g0g1 . . . gN−1 = GN(f, x), the second Gray code
is G1 = g1g2 . . . gN = GN(f, f(x)), . . . , and the (M − N + 1)-th Gray code is
GM−N = gM−NgM−N+1 . . . gM−1 = GN(f, f
M−N(x)).
2. For i = 0, 1, ...,M − N − ν + 1, build groups of ν consecutive Gray codes
GiGi+1 . . . Gi+ν−1. The i-th group defines then the order ν-pattern pi = pi(i) =
[pi0, pi1, . . . , piν−1] if
Gi+pi0 < Gi+pi1 < . . . < Gi+piν−1.
The order patterns derived using Gray codes need not have, in general, similar
λ-DFs to those derived from the sharp orbits. Indeed, order patterns defined by
Gray codes of length N are built upon the comparison of subintervals I(N)j ⊂ U (see
Sect. 3.3), rather than comparing points of I. The width of the intervals I(N)j decreases
as the length N of the sliding window increases in such a way that when N → ∞,
each one of those intervals converges to a single real number. As a result, the error
in the calculation of the order patterns from Gray codes is expected to reduce as N
increases. In the context of finite-precision computation, the minimum value of N
necessary to get a reliable approximation of the λ-DF of an order pattern is related
to the precision of the arithmetic used. Again, this quantization error decreases as
N increases and, consequently, a large value of N may be necessary to assure a
good approximation of the λ-DF. Another source of divergences between λ-DFs and
their numerical estimation via finite-length Gray codes are non-ergodicity or even
poor ergodicity. As a matter of fact, remember that the estimation of the probability
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µ(Ppi) by the relative frequency of pi ∈ Sν in finite orbits of a µ-preserving map, hinges
on the ergodic theorem. If, furthermore, the convergence of relative frequencies to
probabilities in the orbits of an ergodic map with respect to µ, is very slow, a good
estimation would require exceedingly long sequences —this is what we mean by “poor
ergodicity”. These errors are shown in Figs. 4.7 and 4.8 for the logistic and the skew
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Figure 4.7: Error rate for the pattern assignment based on Gray codes with respect
to the one based on the orbit of the logistic map. The length of order patterns is
ν = 4, the length of the considered Gray codes is N = 100 and the number of samples
is 10104.
tent maps, respectively, with pi = [0, 1, 2, 3], M = 10104, and N = 100. In the first
case, the value of λ lies within the period-3 window of the logistic map. In the second
case, poor ergodicity is expected for values of λ close to 0 and 1. The asymmetry in
the error distribution is due to the fact that for λ ' 1, the tent map looks like the
identity in most of U = [0, 1], hence P[0,1,2,3] covers most of U . This makes [0, 1, 2, 3]
to be the most frequent order 4-pattern even when its frequency is calculated using
Gray codes. Comparison of Figs. 4.6 and 4.9 illustrates the accuracy of the Gray
code-based method for the first four order 4-patterns (see Table 3.1) of the skew tent
map.
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Figure 4.8: Error rate for the pattern assignment based on Gray codes with respect
to the one based on the orbit of the skew tent map. The length of order patterns is
ν = 4, the length of the considered Gray codes is N = 100 and the number of samples
is 10104.
4.4 Estimation of the control parameter for unimodal
maps with critical point depending on the con-
trol parameter
The main characteristic of the maps in F2 is that the control parameter λ determines
the value of the critical point. Furthermore, from the discussion above, it is expected
that the relation between the control parameter and the allowed order patterns of the
corresponding dynamic is specially simple for the pattern pi = [0, 1, ..., ν−1]. Clearly,
if the λ-DF of this pattern is 1-to-1, then λ can be pinpointed from that distribution
function; otherwise, the possible values of λ can be reduced to a few candidates, which
can also be acceptable in applications such as cryptanalysis. In turn, λ-DFs can be
approximated via Gray codes, without previous knowledge of the critical point of the
map. The bottom line is that the control parameter of a map in F2 can be estimated
from their coarse-grained orbits (in form of Gray codes). The specifics depend on the
map.
In more general terms, let fλ ∈ F2 and suppose that each fλ is ergodic for λ ∈ Λ
with the same invariant measure µ. Furthermore, assume that fλ(a) = a, and x <
fλ(x) on a maximal interval (a, c) ⊂ (a, xc). We claim that the interval
Iλν = (a, c)∩f−1λ (a, c) ∩ . . . ∩ f−(ν−1)λ (a, c), (4.4)
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Figure 4.9: Relative frequency of order patterns of the skew tent map using Gray
codes, when ν = 4, N = 100 and the sequences are 10104-bit long: (a) order pattern
#0; (b) order pattern #1; (c) order pattern #2; (d) order pattern #3.
coincides with P[0,1,...,ν−1]. Indeed, if x ∈ Iλν , then f i(x) ∈ (a, c) for 0 ≤ i ≤ ν− 1, and
x < fλ(x) =⇒ fλ(x) < f 2λ(x) =⇒ ... =⇒ f ν−2λ (x) < f ν−1λ (x).
Hence, Iλν ⊂ P [0,1,...,ν−1]. Conversely, if x ∈ P[0,1,...,ν−1], i.e.,
x < fλ(x) < f
2
λ(x) < ... < f
ν−1
λ (x),
then f i(x) ∈ (a, c) for 0 ≤ i ≤ ν − 1. Thus, P[0,1,...,ν−1] ⊂ Iλν . This proves
P[0,1,...,ν−1] = I
λ
ν .
Because of ergodicity, the relative frequency at which a typical trajectory visits Iλν
is µ(Iλν ). If µ(I
λ
ν ) happens different for each interval I
λ
ν , then µ(I
λ
ν ) can be used
to determine or estimate the control parameter λ. In this case, the frequency of
the order pattern [0, 1, ..., ν − 1] in an orbit γ+fλ(x) is just the number of times that
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f i+jλ (x) ∈ (a, c) for i ∈ N ∪ 0 and j = 0, 1, . . . , ν − 1. As an example, consider the
skew tent map again. For this map, the interval P[0,1,...,ν−1], i.e., the set of points
x ∈ [0, 1] of type [0, 1, . . . , ν − 1], is determined by the leftmost intersection of the
iterates f ν−2λ and f
ν−1
λ , where
fnλ (x) =
{
x/λn, if 0 ≤ x ≤ λn
(λn−1 − x)/λn−1(1− λ), if λn ≤ x ≤ λn−1 (4.5)
Hence P[0,1,...,ν−1] = [0, φν(λ)], with
φν(λ) =
λν−2
2− λ. (4.6)
Since this function is 1-to-1 in the interval 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 for ν ≥ 2, with φ2(0) = 1/2,
φν≥3(0) = 0, and φν≥2(1) = 1, it allows to estimate λ by estimating φν(λ) —the
length of P[0,1,...,ν−1]. Now, from the equation
d
dλ
φν(λ) =
λν−3
(2− λ)2 [2(ν − 2)− (ν − 3)λ] =
{
0, if λ = 0
ν − 1, if λ = 1 (4.7)
it follows that φν(λ) is a ∪-convex function on 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 for ν ≥ 2, that converges
to 0 on 0 ≤ λ < 1 as ν → ∞. Therefore, the higher ν the worse φν(λ) discrimi-
nates different values of λ. Consequently, ν = 3, 4 are the best choices for a quality
estimation of λ.
On the other hand, the ergodicity of the skew tent map permits to estimate the
length of P[0,1,...,ν−1] by estimating the relative frequency of the pi = [0, 1, . . . , ν−1] in
a typical sharp orbit of the map —or, as we intent, in a typical coarse-grained orbit.
In the latter case, the choice for the parameter N , the width of the sliding window
down the Gray codes (Sec. 4.3), must be also analyzed. The minimum value of N to
get a good reconstruction of the λ-DF of the order patterns, Nmin, depends on the
precision of the arithmetic used, but it also depends on the Lyapunov exponent of
the map. If floating point double-precision arithmetic is implemented, then Nmin can
be determined as function of λ by comparing pairs of symbolic sequences generated
from the same initial condition, with control parameters λ1 and λ2 such that |λ2−λ1|
equals the spacing of floating point numbers. Figure 4.10 shows the dependence of
Nmin with respect to λ.
Summing up, the estimation of the control parameter λ ∈ (0, 1) of the skew tent
map fλ, Eq. (1.11), can be done by counting and normalizing the occurrences of
the order pattern [0, 1, ..., ν − 1], ideally for ν = 3 or 4, in a statistically significant
sample of orbit segments of fλ. This follows from the following properties: (i) fλ
is ergodic for all λ, and (ii) the fλ-invariant measure of P[0,1,...,ν−1] (in this case, the
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Figure 4.10: Minimum width of the sliding window necessary for the reconstruction
of the PDF of the order patterns from the symbolic sequences of the skew tent map.
length of the interval P[0,1,...,ν−1]) depends bijectively on λ. In a practical context
though, finite precision machines are used, and this entails, in general, numerical
degradation, meaning that the computed orbits, whether of chaotic or non-chaotic
maps, depart from the real ones. In the case of a very long orbit of a chaotic map, the
deviation of the numerical simulation (locally measured by the Lyapunov exponent
of the map) will be severe; in such cases, it is preferable to have many shorter orbits
instead. Even worse, all orbits computed with finite precision are eventually periodic.
This distortion of the dynamics, due to finite numerical precision and dependence on
initial conditions, implies the general impossibility of obtaining orbits and invariant
measures in an exact way. As a matter of fact, all this carries over to symbolic
dynamics.
To verify this issue in the case of coarse-grained orbits, a sample of Gray codes
of the skew tent map, each one with the same length but with a different initial
condition, was generated for every value of λ. The underlying sharp orbits were
computed with double precision floating point arithmetic. From this sample of Gray
codes, the corresponding λ-DFs of the order patterns of length ν = 4 were obtained.
The λ-DF of the order pattern [0, 1, 2, 3] (#0 for short) was calculated as the mean
value of the λ-DFs obtained from the various initial conditions. This average value
is compared to the exact λ-DF, φ4(λ) = λ2/(2 − λ), in Fig. 4.11, along with the
corresponding standard deviation.
Fig. 4.11 spells out that, in the context of finite precision computation, the perfect
recovery of the control parameter value using the λ-DF of order pattern #0, is not
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Figure 4.11: Average deviation and standard deviation in the estimation of the PDF
of the order pattern #0 for the skew tent map with respect to λ2/(2− λ).
feasible in general if one can only resort to Gray codes. However, it is possible to locate
λ up to an uncertainty interval. The width of this interval can be upper bounded
by the standard deviation of the λ-DF of the order pattern #0 since, according to
Fig. 4.11, it is bigger than the average error in the estimation of φ4(λ) for every value
of λ . Therefore, the estimation of the control parameter comprises two stages:
1. An estimation of λ is performed by dividing the given Gray code, {gi}M−1i=0 ,
gi ∈ {0, 1}, into a large enough set of disjoint subsequences of length N  4,
say, {gk·N+i}N−1i=0 for k = 0, 1, . . . , K = bM −Nc − 1. For each such binary
subsequence, a value of φ4(λ) is then computed as the relative frequency of the
order pattern [0, 1, 2, 3] using, of course, the Gray ordering (Sec. 3.3). Let x¯
be the mean value of the resulting values of φ4(λ). From φ4(λ) = λ2/(2 − λ),
Eq. (4.3), it follows that the control parameter is estimated as
λˆ = φ−14 (x¯) =
−x¯+√x¯2 + 8x¯
2
. (4.8)
2. If σ is the standard deviation of the φ4(λ) sampling, then there exists a high
probability that λ is in the interval
(φ−14 (x¯− σ), φ−14 (x¯+ σ)). (4.9)
The specifics of this procedure refers to the skew tent map, but the general strategy
is the same, once a bijective λ-DF of an order pattern is exactly known.
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Figure 4.12: Mean error value in the estimation of the control parameter of the skew
tent map.
In order to establish the accuracy of the procedure, some numerical simulations
with the skew tent map were done. For every value of the control parameter, a group of
100 different initial conditions were used in the generation of the corresponding Gray
codes. For each of these binary sequences, the control parameter λ was estimated as
just explained. The mean error of the estimation is shown in Fig. 4.12. The average
error lies always above 10−4, and can only be reduced by the implementation of the
procedure with extended-precision arithmetic libraries.
To prove this claim, the case of the symmetric tent map, i.e., the skew tent map
for λ = 1/2, will be considered next. For the symmetric tent map the arithmetic is
exact. Indeed, if 0.x0x1...xM , xi ∈ {0, 1}, is the expansion to base 2 of x ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
x =
M∑
n=0
xn
2n+1
, (4.10)
(numbers with finite binary expansions are called dyadic rationals), then the action
of the symmetric tent map amounts to a zero-bit dependent left shift, to wit:
f1/2(0.x0x1...xn...xM−1xM ) =
{
0.x1x2 . . . xn+1 . . . xM0, if x0 = 0
0.x∗1x
∗
2 . . . x
∗
n+1 . . . x
∗
M0, if x0 = 1
(4.11)
where x∗n = 1−xn. Therefore, if x ∈ [0, 1] is represented withM bits and xM = 1, the
orbit of x collapses to 0 afterM iterations of f1/2, soM can be considered the effective
length of the orbits to be used in an estimation of λ = 1/2. For ν = 3, the relative
frequency of the order pattern #0 ([0, 1, 2] in this case) was determined for a large
set of random initial conditions x and increasing orbit lengths M . The convergence
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in average of this relative frequency to φ3(1/2) = 1/3 (see Eq. (4.6)) as M increases,
is confirmed by Fig. 4.13. At the same time, the variance of the estimation steadily
reduces with M , as shown in Fig. 4.14. In other words, a higher precision of the
arithmetic used in orbit generation and greater samples for the subsequent control
parameter estimation, clearly improves the results. We conclude that the inaccuracies
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Figure 4.13: Dependency of the error in the estimation of the rate of occurrences of
the order pattern #0 with respect to the length of the orbits.
exposed above in our method to recover the control parameter of maps of F2, based
on the order patterns of their coarse-grained orbits (specifically, in form of Gray
codes), are due to the shortcomings of finite precision arithmetic and finite statistical
sampling, but are not inherent to the method —as proved with the symmetric tent
map.
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Figure 4.14: Variance of the error in the estimation of the rate of occurrences of the
order pattern #0 with respect to the length of the orbits.
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4.5 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter it was shown how to rebuild the λ-DFs of order patterns of unimodal
maps from Gray codes, the scope being the estimation of the parameter λ. It has
been analyzed the λ-DFs of the order patterns of two unimodal parametric maps:
the logistic map (as representative of the subclass F1) and the skew tent map (as
representative of the subclass F2). In the case of the logistic map, it turns out that
this technique can hardly deliver, on account of the complex and many-to-one relation
between λ and those λ-DFs. On the contrary, this relationship is simple, one-to-one,
and analytically known for pi = [0, 1, ..., ν − 1] in the case of the skew tent map.
The method described improves previous proposals for parameter estimation from
symbolic sequences of unimodal maps in that a knowledge of the critical point value
is not needed. The most important consequence of this Chapter is that symbolic
sequences of unimodal maps cannot be used as keystreams of stream ciphers. Indeed,
the work described in [Wu04] along with our method, pinpoints a critical vulnerability
in encryption systems such as the one introduced in [Kurian08]. However, the method
demands high computational precision and large amounts of data. In this regard, it
is advisable the use of extended-precision libraries for good estimations. In the ideal
case of arbitrarily high precision, the estimated value of the control parameter is
arbitrarily close to the real one.
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Chapter 5
Design rules: lessons learned from the
cryptanalysis of digital chaos-based
cryptosystems
5.1 Introduction
The core of digital chaos-based cryptography is the selection of a good chaotic map
for a given encryption scheme. Actually, the presence of chaos does not guarantee the
security of an encryption algorithm [Kocarev01a]. A good digital cryptosystem based
on chaos should not be just the concomitance of a chaotic map and an encryption
architecture, but the result of their synergical association. Indeed, the quality of
a chaotic map for cryptography must be evaluated not just with considerations on
its dynamic properties, but also with considerations on the needs of the sustaining
encryption architecture. In other words, from a general point of view it is not possible
to design chaotic cryptosystems satisfying the chaotic-system-free property [Li03, p.
30] and, as a result, the selection of a certain encryption scheme demands the selection
of a group of chaotic maps satisfying a certain set of dynamical properties. Finally,
digital chaos-based cryptography is implemented on computers and thus the problem
derived from finite-precision computation must be evaluated and conveniently handled
during the design stage. This Chapter illustrates the problems with three elements
involved in the design of digital chaos-based cryptosystems, i.e., the selection of a
chaotic map (Sec. 5.2), the selection of an encryption architecture (Sec. 5.3) and the
implementation of the encryption system (Sec. 5.4). Although it is impossible to
guarantee the total security of a cryptosystem, in Sec. 5.5 a minimum set of rules is
established to avoid the problems explained in this Chapter. Finally, in Sec. 5.6 the
adequacy of the set of rules is illustrated by evaluating some recent proposals in the
field of digital chaos-based cryptography.
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5.2 Problems with the selection of the chaotic sys-
tem
Problem 1. Definition of the key leading to non-chaotic behavior. In some
chaos-based cryptosystems the control parameters of the underlying chaotic systems
are determined by the secret key. If the link between the secret key and the control
parameters is not established carefully, then it is possible that the underlying chaotic
system evolves in an non-chaotic way, which further erodes the confusion and diffusion
properties required by the resulting cryptosystem.
The chaotic systems used as base of cryptosystems are defined in a parametric
way such that their dynamics depends on one or several control parameters. More-
over, those chaotic systems are dynamical systems which show a chaotic behavior for
certain values of the associated control parameters. Therefore, the design of a cryp-
tosystem based on any of those dynamical systems must be done by guaranteeing
the use of the set of values for the control parameters leading to chaos. Otherwise,
the underlying dynamical system associated to the cryptosystem (or encryption sys-
tem) evolves non-chaotically, which implies the reduction of the level of entropy in
the ciphertext (i.e., the output of the cryptosystem) and of the influence on the ci-
phertext of a change in the plaintext (i.e., the input of the cryptosystem). This
problem is specially relevant when the design of the cryptosystem is based on a dy-
namical system with chaotic behavior only for a set of disjoint intervals of values of
the control parameters. This is the case of the logistic map and the Hénon map,
which have been used in [Pisarchik06; Ling07; Wang08c] and in [Chee06] respec-
tively without a thoroughly analysis of their dynamics, as we have pinpointed in
[Arroyo08d; Arroyo09g; Arroyo09f; Arroyo08b]. As a conclusion, it is highly advisa-
ble to use dynamical systems with chaotic behavior for all the values of the control
parameter(s). That is, robust chaotic systems [Banerjee98] should be used instead of
nonrobust ones.
Problem 2. Nonuniform probability distribution function. In some chaos-
based encryption architectures the confusion and/or diffusion properties depend on
the probability distribution function of the orbits derived from the selected chaotic
systems. If that distribution is not uniform and independent of the values of control
parameters, then the quality of the diffusion process is reduced.
The iteration of a chaotic map can be used to generate pseudo-random sequences
to encrypt the plaintext. The encryption procedure could be performed by different
ways, but all of them demand the equiprobability of all the states contained in the
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pseudo-random sequences. If this requirement is not satisfied, then the conditional
entropy of the ciphertext with respect to the plaintext may be large enough to leak
information about relationships between the output and the input of the target cryp-
tosystem (see the entropy attack in [Alvarez03b]). This effect is specially significant
for image encryption, as pointed out recently by [Li07a]. As a remedy, chaotic maps
with a uniform probability distribution function should be selected as base of this
kind of cryptosystems, being the family of piecewise linear chaotic maps [Li05b] a
good option.
Problem 3. Return map reconstruction. The ciphertext of some cryptosystems
makes it possible to reconstruct a return map of the underlying chaotic system. If
such a return map is meaningful, then an attacker may be able to infer the values of
the control parameters that govern the evolution of the chaotic system.
The most direct way to estimate the control parameters from a chaotic orbit is to
plot xn+1 versus xn, which is actually the chaotic map itself. If this representation
shows a simple function between xn+1 and xn, then it could be possible to infer
the control parameter. In [Skrobek08] a chosen-ciphertext attack is used to build a
discretized version of the logistic map which further leads to the estimation of the
control parameter. One solution against this kind of attack is to shuﬄe/truncate the
chaotic orbit before using it for encryption, which randomizes the plot of the return
map.
Problem 4. Degradation of the efficiency of digital chaos-based cryptosys-
tems based on continuous-time chaotic systems. In digital chaos-based crypto-
graphy the encryption procedure is performed in discrete time. Therefore, if the under-
lying chaotic system is defined in continuous time, then it is necessary to apply some
numerical method to obtain the chaotic orbits. The application of these numerical
methods increases the time to compute the orbits, and thus the encryption time.
The structural complexity of a chaotic system is a critical element when evalua-
ting its suitability for cryptographic applications. With this bottom line in Sec. 1.3.3
we emphasized that structural complexity can be minimized by selecting chaotic sys-
tems defined in discrete time. Indeed, in discrete time chaos can be achieved for phase
space of dimension 1, whereas it has to be at least of dimension 3 when considering
continuous time. Furthermore, the rule of evolution of continuous-time chaotic sys-
tems requires to solve a system of differential equations [Hirsch74, p. 160]. From
a general point of view, the solution of those differential equations cannot be ac-
complished analytically, and thus numerical methods must be applied. Numerical
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methods for the resolution of differential equations are high time consuming. As a
result, for a given encryption architecture with underlying chaotic system defined in
continuous-time, the encryption time is greater than the encryption time obtained
when the chosen dynamical system is a chaotic map. For the sake of argument, let
us consider our cryptanalytical work [Arroyo09h] on the chaos-based cryptosystem
proposed in [Gao08a]. These cryptosystems are intended to encrypt images through
the concatenation of a shuﬄing and masking procedures. The shuﬄing procedure is
based on the iteration of the logistic map, whereas masking is built upon the itera-
tion of two continuous-time chaotic systems: Lorenz’ [Lorenz63] and Chen’s systems
[Chen99]. The Lorenz system is given by
dx1
dt
= αx1 + αx2,
dx2
dt
= −x1x3 + βx1 − x2,
dx3
dt
= x1x2 − ρx3, (5.1)
where α, β, and ρ are control parameters. The Lorenz system is chaotic for α = 10,
β = 28, and ρ = 8/3. On the other hand, the Chen system is defined as
dx1
dt
= η(x2 − x1),
dx2
dt
= (σ − η)x1 − x1x3 + σx2,
dx3
dt
= x1x2 − δx3, (5.2)
being chaotic for η = 35, σ = 28, and δ = 3. Because the chaotic iterations of
Lorenz’ and Chen’s systems involve complicated numerical differential functions, the
encryption speed is expected to be very slow compared with other traditional ciphers.
To asses this fact, we derived a modified encryption scheme from the original one by
replacing the Lorenz and Chen systems with the logistic map, and then compared the
encryption speeds of the two cryptosystems. Both cryptosystems were implemented
using MATLAB on a PC with a 1.6 GHz processor and 512 MB of RAM. For images
of size 256×256, the typical encryption time for the original cryptosystem in [Gao08a]
was around 5.8 s, while the modified cryptosystem based on the logistic map required
on average around 1.2 s to encrypt an image. The experiments have clearly shown that
using continuous chaotic systems can drastically reduce the encryption speed. Since
there are also no other obvious merits in using continuous chaotic systems rather than
a simple discrete-time chaotic map, the use of Lorenz’ and Chen’ systems in the image
encryption scheme under study is unnecessary. Instead, these continuous-time chaotic
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systems can be replaced by a simpler discrete-time chaotic map without compromising
the security. This statement is a general rule when designing encryption procedures
working in discrete time.
Problem 5. Part of the key should not leak the rest of the key. In some
cryptosystems the secret key is composed of different subkeys. If the knowledge of
some subkeys allow the recovery of the rest of the key, then a partial key recovery
attack can be performed. Therefore, the design of a cryptosystem must guarantee that
the different subkeys composing the secret key are uncorrelated.
In the context of a secure and robust encryption system it is assumed that the
partial knowledge of the key does not reveal information about the rest of the key
and, as a result, the cryptosystem performance is not harmed [Alvarez06b, Rule 7].
However, in the scenario drawn by [Chee06], partial knowledge of the key can be used
to obtain the rest of the key (Case study 2.2.1). Next we show how a known-plaintext
attack can be employed to reconstruct Eq. (2.12), Eq. (2.13), and v0 (initial condition
of the underlying Hénon map defined in Eq. (2.7)) when Eq. (2.11) is known. Given
two plaintexts {p1,k}N−1k=0 , {p2,k}N−1k=0 , then
u1,1 = 1− ψ(p1,0) · µ1(v0) · u20 + v0, (5.3)
u2,1 = 1− ψ(p2,0) · µ1(v0) · u20 + v0, (5.4)
and
u1,k+1 = 1− ψ(p1,k) · µ1(vk) · u21,k + vk, (5.5)
u2,k+1 = 1− ψ(p2,k) · µ1(vk) · u22,k + vk, (5.6)
vk = µ2(vk−1) · uk−1, (5.7)
where k ≥ 1. Subtracting Eq. (5.3) from Eq. (5.4), one obtains:
u2,1 − u1,1 = ψ(p1,0) · µ1(v0) · u20 − ψ(p2,0) · µ1(v0) · u20
= (ψ(p1,0)− ψ(p2,0)) · µ1(v0) · u20. (5.8)
In the following discussion, it is shown how to recover the secret key, assuming that
ψ(x) is known.
From Eq. (5.8), one has
r1 =
u2,1 − u1,1
ψ(p1,0)− ψ(p2,0) . (5.9)
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Because the encryption is generally carried out in floating point operation, the quan-
tization error is very small is most cases so it can just be ignored. As a result,
r1 = µ1(v0) · u20, which implies that v0 = u1,1 − 1 + ψ(p1,0) · r1, and µ1(v0) = r1u20 .
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Figure 5.1: Recovered and original functions for the PRSK mechanism when they are
designed as in [Chee06] (a) µ1(v) for v0 = 0.9402036; (b) image zoom for µ1(v) and
v0 = 0.9402036; (c) µ1(v) for v0 = −0.5123493 ; and (d) image zoom for µ1(v) and
v0 = −0.5123493.
Subtracting Eq. (5.5) from Eq. (5.6):
µ˜1(vk) =
u2,k+1 − u1,k+1
ψ(p1,k) · u21,k − ψ(p2,k) · u22,k
. (5.10)
From Eq. (5.7):
µ˜2(vk−1) =
u1,k+1 − 1 + ψ(p1,k) · µ˜1(vk) · u21,k
uk−1
. (5.11)
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As mentioned above, by ignoring the quantization error, we have µ˜1(vk) = µ1(vk) and
µ˜2(vk−1) = µ2(vk−1).
It is possible to reconstruct µ1(vk) and µ2(vk) repeating this procedure for k =
1, . . . , N .
In order to prove the proposed known-plaintext attack, 10000 points for µ1(vk) and
µ2(vk) were calculated for u0 = 0.4, v0 = 0.9402036 and u0 = 0.4, v0 = −0.5123493.
In Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2 it is shown how it was possible to infer µ1(vk), µ2(vk) shape.
This is due to the fact that the first component of the Hénon map employed in the
encryption process is sent through the communication channel without applying any
masking transformation. However, there exists an underlying quantization error in
the recovering method due to the fact that all the mathematical operations are done in
finite precision. It was verified that ∆(µ1) = |µ˜1−µ1| ∼ 10−6 and ∆(µ2) = |µ˜2−µ2| ∼
10−7. Therefore, the exact µ1 and µ2 reconstruction demands an exhaustive search.
On the other hand, Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2 also show that during the encryption process
µ1(vk) and µ2(vk) do not go through all the possible values of the functions referred
by Eqs. (2.12) and (2.13). In other words, it was verified that, during the encryption
process, vk never goes through all the possible input values for both functions. This
is the reason why µ1(v) and µ2(v) can not be totally recovered, which has no impact
on the efficiency of the cryptanalysis.
5.3 Problems with the encryption architecture
Problem 6. Bad definition of the ciphertexts. A bad definition of the cipher-
text derived from a chaos-based cryptosystem could allow the estimation of the initial
condition(s) and/or the control parameter(s) of the underlying chaotic system. This
problem is present in some chaos-based cryptosystems whose ciphertext is given by
fragments of orbits, sampled versions of the orbits, or discretized versions of the or-
bits of the underlying chaotic systems.
A m-dimensional discrete-time chaotic map is defined by the rule of evolution
xn+1 = fλ(xn),
and, as a result, the ciphertext can not be the orbits of the map since it may allow
the estimation of λ from m+ 1 or a bit more consecutive units of ciphertext. This is
the case of the cryptosystem proposed in [Ling07], and which we have cryptanalyzed
in [Arroyo09g].
Case study 5.3.1 ([Arroyo09g]). Cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem described in
[Ling07]
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Figure 5.2: Recovered and original functions for the PRSK mechanism when they are
designed as in [Chee06] (a) µ2(v) for v0 = 0.9402036; (b) image zoom for µ2(v) and
v0 = 0.9402036; (c) µ2(v) for v0 = −0.5123493 ; and (d) image zoom for µ2(v) and
v0 = −0.5123493.
In [Ling07] the encryption procedure is carried out by decomposing the input
plaintext signal into two different subbands and masking each of them with a pseudo-
random number sequence generated by iterating the chaotic logistic map. The de-
composition of the input plaintext signal xn is driven by
tn = K
∑
∀j
xjh2n−j , (5.12)
t′n = K
′
∑
∀j
xjh
′
2n−j. (5.13)
Then, the masking stage generates the ciphertext signal (vn, v′n) according to the
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following equations:
vn = tn + α(t
′
n), (5.14)
v′n = t
′
n − α′(vn), (5.15)
where α(u) = u+ sn (α′(u) = u+ s′n) and sn (s
′
n) is the state variable of the logistic
map (Eq. (1.9)).
The secret key of the cryptosystem is composed of the initial conditions and the
control parameters of the two logistic maps involved, i.e., s0, s′1, λ and λ
′.
In a known-plaintext attack the cryptanalyst possesses a plaintext signal {xn} and
its corresponding encrypted subband signals {vn} and {v′n}. Because {hn}, {h′n}, K
and K ′ are public, we can get {tn} and {t′n} from {xn}. Then we can get the values
of {sn} and {s′n} as follows:
sn = vn − tn − t′n, (5.16)
s′n = t
′
n − vn − v′n. (5.17)
For n = 0, the values of the subkeys s0 and s′0 have been obtained. Furthermore,
we can obtain the control parameters by just doing the following operations:
λ =
sn+1
sn(1− sn) ,
λ′ =
s′n+1
s′n(1− s′n)
.
Consequently, the orbits of chaotic maps cannot be employed directly as keystreams.
Furthermore, if the invariant set of the chaotic map has a size dependent on the con-
trol parameters, even sampled versions of the orbits may allow the estimation of the
control parameters through a ciphertext-only attack. As explained in Sec. 2.3 (Case
study 2.3.1), we have analyzed this situation in [Arroyo08d], being the case study the
cryptosystem defined in [Pisarchik06]. Finally, the theory of symbolic dynamics could
reveal the weakness of a cryptosystem if the ciphertext allows to get the symbolic se-
quences of a chaotic map. In Sec. 3.5 (Case study 3.5.1) we have shown through
a chosen-ciphertext attack how to derive the symbolic sequence of the logistic map
driving the encryption procedure defined in [Wang08c]; once we have the symbolic
sequence, we can infer the values of the control parameter and initial condition of
the underlying logistic map according to the theory of applied symbolic dynamics
described in Chapter 3.
Problem 7. Efficiency of the cryptosystem depending on the value of the
key. If the encryption and decryption times depend on the key or a subkey, then a
timing attack can be performed to estimate the (sub)key.
111
Some encryption architectures perform the transformation of the plaintext into
the ciphertext through several encryption rounds. Additionally, in each encryption
round a chaotic map is iterated n times. Since the encryption and decryption times
have to be constant and independent of the value of the key, it is not a good practice
to select the number of encryption rounds and n as part of the key. Otherwise, a
timing attack [Kocher96; Brumley03] based on the analysis of the encryption and
decryption time can be used for the partial estimation of the secret key, which is a
serious security flaw. Let us exemplified a timing attack by recalling the cryptosystem
proposed in [Pisarchik06]. As it has been shown in Sec. 2.3, in every encryption
round of the cryptosystem under consideration, Step 3 is carried out through the n
iterations of Eq. (1.9), where n is a subkey. This means that, for a certain number
of encryption rounds (i.e., a certain value of j) and a certain value of the control
parameter λ, the encryption speed decreases as n increases. Similarly, because the
encryption/decryption procedure is composed of j repeated cycles, the encryption
speed will also become slower if the value of j increases. To be more precise, for a
given plain-image, we can expect the existence of the following bi-linear relationship
between the encryption/decryption time (EDT) and the values of n and j:
EDT (n, j) ≈ (c× n + d0)× j + d1, (5.18)
where c corresponds to the common operations consumed on each chaotic iteration,
d0 to the operations performed in each cycle excluding those about chaotic iterations,
and d1 to those operations performed on the initialization process and the postpro-
cessing after all the j cycles are completed. In addition, because λ is just the control
parameter of the chaotic map, it is expected that EDT will be independent of its
value.
With the aim of verifying this hypothesis, some experiments have been made
under the following scenario. An image with random pixel values of size 256 × 256
was encrypted for different values of λ, n and j. The encryption time corresponding
to each key is shown in Fig. 5.3, from which one can see that Eq. (5.18) is verified.
The above experimental results ensure the feasibility of a timing attack to a subkey
of the cryptosystem under study: by observing the encryption time, it is possible to
estimate the value of n if j is known and vice versa. Without loss of generality,
assuming an attacker Eve knows the value of n, but not that of j, let us demonstrate
how the timing attack can be performed in practice. In this case, the relationship
between EDT and the value of j can be simplified as EDT (n, j) = cn× j+ dn, where
cn = c×n and dn = d0×j+d1. Then, if Eve gets a temporary access to the encryption
(or decryption) machine, she can carry out a real timing attack in the following steps:
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1. She observes the whole process of encryption (or decryption) to get the encryp-
tion (or decryption) time tj and also the size of the ciphertext (i.e., the size of
the plaintext).
2. By choosing two keys with different values of j, she encrypts1 a plaintext (or
decrypts a ciphertext) of the same size and gets t1 and t2.
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Figure 5.3: Encryption time for images of size 256× 256 and different values of the
number of iterations n and the number of encryption rounds.
3. She derives the values of cn and dn by substituting t1 and t2 into EDT (n, j) =
cn × j + dn.
4. She estimates the value of j to be jˆ = round((tj − dn)/cn).
5. She verifies the estimated value jˆ by using it to decrypt the observed ciphertext.
If the recovered plaintext is something meaningful, the attack stops; otherwise,
she turns to search the correct value of j in a small neighborhood of jˆ until a
meaningful plaintext is obtained.
1Please note that this can be done on her own computer, as long as she has the encryp-
tion/decryption software installed.
113
As a result of the previous analysis, the number of encryption rounds and the
number of iterations of the map should be public parameters of the chaos-based
cryptosystem instead of part of the key.
Problem 8. Faulty derivation of the parameters of the chaotic system from
the key. In some chaos-based cryptosystems the key is used to derive the values of the
parameters necessary to iterate a chaotic system and finally encrypt the information.
If this mapping implies a reduction of the key space, i.e., that it is only used a subset
of the possible values of those parameters, then a brute-force attack on the values of
the parameter could be much less demanding than the one on the secret key.
One important step in the design of a chaos-based cryptosystem is to decide what
the key is. One possibility is to use the control parameters and the initial conditions of
the underlying chaotic systems as the secret key or as part of the secret key. Another
option is to establish the values of the control parameters and the initial conditions
of the maps from the secret key through a certain function. In this sense, it must be
assured that the image set of that function is the whole set of possible values of the
control parameters and the initial conditions. Otherwise, a brute-force attack can be
performed on the reduced space of control parameters and initial condition values with
a lower computational cost than the one on the key space. A cryptosystem with this
problem was introduced in [Pareek03] and was later cryptanalyzed in [Alvarez03a].
Problem 9. Encryption procedure equivalent to a map only dependent on
the key. If the transformation of the plaintext into the ciphertext is determined by a
procedure equivalent to a map only dependent on the key, then known/chosen-plaintext
attacks may be performed to reconstruct the transformation procedure.
In some encryption schemes the transformation of the plaintext into the ciphertext
is led either by a procedure derived using only the key, or by a sampling process on
a sequence of values generated using only the key. In those situations, it could be
possible to estimate either the key or to make up some function somehow equivalent
to the encryption procedure. For example, if the encryption procedure consists of
searching plaintexts in pseudo-random sequences generated by iterating a chaotic
map, since the pseudo-random sequence remains unchanged unless the key is modified,
then it is possible to reconstruct the pseudo-random sequence through a chosen-
plaintext attack (see [Alvarez04f; Alvarez04g]). This problem also exists in those
schemes where the encryption procedure consists of a permutation-only stage which
is fixed unless the control parameters and initial conditions change, i.e., unless the
the secret key is updated. In order to clarify this matter, let us consider again the
cryptosystem defined in [Gao08a].
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Case study 5.3.2 ([Arroyo09h]). Cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem defined in [Gao08a]
As mentioned above, the cryptosystem under consideration consists of two stages:
a shuﬄing stage and a masking stage. Assuming that the size of the plain-image I is
M × N and the cipher-image is I′, the encryption scheme proposed in [Gao08a] can
be described by the following two procedures.
• Shuﬄing procedure
In this procedure, the plain-image I is permuted to form an intermediate image
I
∗ according to a total shuﬄing matrix P∗, which is derived by pseudo-randomly
permuting the rows and columns of the original position matrix P = [(i, j)].
The pseudo-random row and column permutations are generated by iterating
the logistic map (Eq. 1.9) with λ = 4 from a given initial condition x0.
• Masking procedure
In this procedure, the intermediate image I∗ is further masked by a keystream
{B(i)}MNi=1 as follows: ∀i = 1 ∼MN , I ′(i) = I∗(i)⊕B(i)⊕ I ′(i−1), where I(i),
I ′(i) denote the i-th pixels of I∗ and I′ (counted from left to right and from top
to bottom), respectively, and I ′(0) = 128.
The keystream {B(i)}MNi=1 is generated by iterating Lorenz’ [Lorenz63] and Chen’s
[Chen99] systems and doing some postprocessing on all the variables of state. When
a variation of stream cipher is created, as in the case under study, obtaining the
keystream is totally equivalent to obtaining the key whenever different plain-images
are encrypted using the same key. Upon this hint, in [Arroyo09h] we have carried
out a chosen-plaintext attack to recover both the keystream and the shuﬄing matrix
of the cryptosystem described in [Gao08a]. Let us choose a plain-image I1 such that
∀i, j = 1 ∼ MN , I1(i) = I1(j) = θ. In this case, the shuﬄing part does not work,
so we have I∗1 = I1. Then, we can recover the keystream as follows: ∀i = 1 ∼ MN ,
B(i) = I1(i) ⊕ I ′1(i) ⊕ I ′1(i − 1). After removing the masking part, we can try to
recover the shuﬄing matrix. According to the general cryptanalysis on permutation-
only ciphers in [Li08], only dlog256(MN)e chosen plain-images are needed to recover
the shuﬄing matrix P∗. In total we need dlog256(MN)e + 1 chosen plain-images to
perform this chosen-plaintext attack.
As a conclusion, the encryption function that transforms a unit of plaintext into
a unit of ciphertext should depend on the key and on the whole plaintext.
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of the low sensitivity to the change of the plain-image: (a) the
first plain-image I0; (b) the second plain-image I1 (only the center pixel is different
from I0); (c) the differential cipher-image I
′
0 ⊕ I′1.
Problem 10. Low sensitivity to the change of plaintext. In some encryp-
tion architectures plaintexts with slightest differences are associated to very similar
ciphertexts, which is a clear violation of the diffusion property.
This problem is specially relevant when considering the encryption of images.
This being the case, the encryption scheme must guarantee that two images differing
in just one pixel determine two totally different cipher-images. This requirement
is not satisfied if encryption is performed through just one encryption round, as it
occurs with the cryptosystem proposed in [Gao08a] (Case study 5.3.2). For that
cryptosystem, given two plain-images I0 and I1 with only one pixel difference at the
position (i, j), the difference will be permuted to a new position (i∗, j∗) according to
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the shuﬄing matrix P∗. Then, because all plain-pixels before (i∗, j∗) are identical
for the two plain-images, the ciphertexts will also be identical. This shows the low
sensitivity of the image encryption scheme to changes in the plain-image. Figure 5.4
gives an example of this problem. It can be seen how the differential cipher-image
is equal to zero for any pixel before (i∗, j∗) and equal to a constant value after that
position.
5.4 Implementation problems
Problem 11. Non-invertible encryption procedure. The iteration of the chaotic
systems sustaining chaos-based cryptosystems implies working with real numbers. Since
the implementation of chaos-based cryptosystems is done with finite precision arith-
metic, round-off operations could lead to a non-invertible encryption procedure.
One critical point when working with dynamical systems and the analysis of their
dynamics is the selection of a right simulation framework. Indeed, the computer-
based analysis of dynamical systems could lead to some conclusions different from
those expected from theory. This divergence also influences and conditions chaos-
based cryptosystems. Thus, if the characteristics and problems of finite-precision
are not handled properly, then it is possible that the orbits generated as base of
encryption procedure can not be regenerated exactly during the decryption stage and,
consequently, the original plaintext can not be recovered even when the key is known.
This problem is not only relevant for fixed-point arithmetic but also for floating-
point one. Indeed, the round-off quantization errors could lead to the occurrence of
a non-invertible function for encryption and, as a result, the decryption process will
be impossible. The cryptosystems introduced in [Pisarchik06; Chee06] are examples
of the consequences of not handling conveniently the limitations of finite precision
arithmetics, as we have pinpointed in [Arroyo08d; Arroyo08b]. To clarify the problem
under consideration, let us recall the scope depicted in [Pisarchik06], whose goal is
to encrypt images (Case study 2.3.1). The cryptosystem described in [Pisarchik06]
generates a ciphertext consisting of a number of real values. Encryption is performed
through j encryption rounds, being {xic(r)}Ji=1 (c = R, G and B, r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , j − 1})
the output in the r-th encryption round corresponding to color component c of the
i-th pixel of the image of length J =M ×N . All the operations to encrypt an image
in [Pisarchik06] are performed using floating-point arithmetic. From Sec. 2.3 we know
that xic(r) = xn+x
i
c(r−1), where xn is the resulting value of iterating the logistic map
n times from x0, according to Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (1.9). Hence, if during the decryption
process we want to recover xic(r − 1) (the original value of the i-th element in the
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last round), we have to iterate n times the logistic map from x0 to get xn and, after
that, to substract this value from xic(r). However, the resulting value of this previous
operation might not match the actual value of xic(r−1), due to the wobbling precision
problem that exists when dealing with floating-point operations [Higham61, p. 39].
This wobbling precision problem also causes the resulting guessed value of xic(r − 1)
to depend on the cryptosystem implementation. Therefore, if an image is encrypted
on one platform and decrypted on another, and the implementations of floating-
point arithmetics on both platforms are not compatible with each other, then the
decrypted image might not match the original one. In [Pisarchik06] the cryptosystem
was implemented using Microsoft Visual C# .NET 2005 and no comment was given
about the wobbling precision problem in the decryption process. However, we have
experimentally verified that this problem indeed exists when the cryptosystem is
implemented using MATLAB on a PC with a 3 GHz processor and 2 GB of RAM.
A very useful measure of the performance of the decryption procedure is the Mean
Square Error or MSE. For P and P ′ being a plain image and the decrypted image
respectively, the MSE for the color component c is defined as
MSEc =
m∑
i=1
(P ic − P ′ic)2/J, (5.19)
where c ∈ {R,G,B}, J = M × N is the number of pixels of the images considered
and the sequences {P ic}Ji=1 and {P ′c}Ji=1 are the result of scanning P and P ′ in the
raster order. Consequently, for a well designed encryption/decryption scheme the
MSE should be 0 for each color component. Unfortunately, for the cryptosystem
under study, the values of MSE for all three color components are generally not equal
to 0 due to the wobbling precision problem associated to the floating-point arithmetic.
In order to evaluate the underlying decryption error of the cryptosystem defined in
[Pisarchik06], a 512 × 512 plain-image “Lena”, as shown in Fig. 2.8, was encrypted
and decrypted using the same key (n, j, λ) = (30, 1, 3.9). The results showed that the
three MSEs obtained for the red, green and blue components of the decrypted image
with respect to the original one were 6.49, 0.018, 0.057, respectively. For another key
(n, j, λ) = (30, 3, 3.9), the obtained MSEs were 206.96, 123.45, 58.65, respectively.
Figure 5.5 shows the decrypted image and the error image when the cryptosystem
was implemented in MATLAB using a third key (n, j, λ) = (5, 2, 3.9).
Problem 12. Dynamical degradation. The implementation of chaotic systems
in finite precision in digital computers leads often to dynamical properties completely
different from the theoretical and expected ones. If this deviation is not considered
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Figure 5.5: Simulations with MATLAB (a) Ciphertext of the plain-image “Lena”
(visualized as a pseudo-image by using Eq. (2.18)) (b) Recovered image of “Lena”
using the same key (c) The error image between the original and the recovered “Lena”.
during the design of chaos-based cryptosystems, it could imply a reduction of the
performance and even a compromise of the security of the resulting cryptosystem.
This problem is closely related to the previous one, although the point of interest
moves to degradation of dynamical properties of the implemented chaotic system with
respect to the theoretical model. Consequently, the design of an encryption scheme
using a chaotic system must be done by considering its practical implementation (not
only the theoretical model). In [Alvarez06a] some consequences of the dynamical
degradation of a chaotic map are shown in the context of cryptography, whereas in
[Li05b] one can find a thorough analysis of the dynamical degradation of a specific
chaotic map and some ways to overcome this problem.
Problem 13. Lack of details in the description. According to Kerckhoffs’ prin-
ciple, the security of a cryptosystem can not be based on the secrecy of its encryption
and decryption procedures. Furthermore, the key of any cryptosystem has to be easy
to establish and to exchange, and the key space must be defined in an explicit and
clear way.
The consecution of security through obscurity is something to avoid when design-
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ing an encryption scheme. All the operations involved in the encryption/decryption
procedures must be verbosely explained, and the secret key must be clearly specified
along with an exact estimation of the size of the key space. The security of the cryp-
tosystem must be only related to the difficulty of guessing the key, and it can not
depend on the lack of knowledge about the inner operating of the encryption and de-
cryption procedures. Moreover, this lack of details implies a lack of security because
without a careful investigation of the whole cryptography community many security
holes might not be able to be distinguished by the designers themselves. In Sec. 3.2 we
have analyzed the loss of chaoticity in the cryptosystem defined in [Chee06]. Indeed,
in that cryptosystem part of the key is given by a set of functions changing the values
of the control parameters of a Hénon map as the plaintext is encrypted. The authors
of [Chee06] do not define explicitly and rigorously those functions, which could result
in a security flaw, as we have shown in [Arroyo08b] for the set of functions given by
Eqs. (2.11)-(2.13). Another example of the kind of problem under consideration can
be found in some encryption schemes built upon continuous-time chaotic systems.
Certainly, when working with this type of chaotic systems it is necessary to use nu-
merical methods to compute the chaotic orbits. The decryption procedure requires
to generate the same chaotic orbits as in the encryption stage and, consequently, its
computation must be done using the same numerical method and the same time step.
Moreover, the influence of both the numerical method and the time step on the per-
formance of the cryptosystem must be thoroughly evaluated. Let us take up again
the cryptosystem defined in [Gao08a] (Case study 5.3.2). The masking stage of that
cryptosystem is driven by a keystream derived from the orbits of Lorenz’ and Chen’s
systems. In [Gao08a], the authors did not say anything about the time step τ of
iterating the Lorenz and Chen systems. However, the randomness of the keystream is
tightly dependent on the value of the time step. As an extreme example, if τ = 10−20,
we will get a keystream of identical elements (according to the algorithm described
in Sec. 2.3 of [Gao08a]).
5.5 Design rules
According to the above problems, we proceed with the concretion and systematiza-
tion of the guidelines to observe when designing a chaos-based digital cryptosystem.
These guidelines, that can be interpreted as the extension of the set of rules pro-
vided in [Alvarez06b], are the main conclusion of the work in [Alvarez07b; Arroyo08a;
Arroyo09f; Arroyo08b; Arroyo09g; Arroyo08d; Arroyo09h; Arroyo08c; Arroyo09d;
Rhouma09; Arroyo09e], i.e., the result of the practical application of the framework
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described in Chapters 2-4 of this Thesis.
Rule 1. Exhaustive and rigorous definition of the chaotic encryption and
decryption algorithms.
The design of any encryption system must be guided by Kerckhoffs’ principles,
and thus the consecution of security through obscurity must be totally discarded.
The designed cryptosystem must be easily reproducible, in order to make easy its im-
plementation, use and further analysis. Indeed, assuring the security of an encryption
procedure is a quite complex and non-closed problem, so the more people involved
in the analysis, the more complete the security assessment is. Regarding specifically
chaos-based cryptosystems, the encryption/decryption algorithms must assure con-
trol parameters determining the chaotic behavior of the selected maps. In addition,
the final cryptosystems must be evaluated by means of the classical cryptanalytic
framework (Sec. 1.2.2). It must be guaranteed that an attacker cannot get enough
information about the underlying chaotic orbits, and thus she cannot carry out an
estimation of control parameters and/or initial condition.
Rule 2. Avoid degradation of chaoticity by an exhaustive and rigorous
definition of the key and the key space.
In chaos-based cryptography is mandatory to specify clear and carefully the re-
lationship between the secret key and the parameters determining the temporal evo-
lution of the underlying chaotic maps, i.e., the control parameters and the initial
conditions. In some cryptosystems either the control parameters or the initial con-
ditions or both are part of the secret key, whereas in others they are just design
parameters and, consequently, publicly known. Another possibility is that the secret
key determines the values of the control parameters and initial conditions. In all
situations it must assure that the underlying dynamical systems involved in the con-
sidered chaos-based cryptosystem evolves as required, i.e., in a chaotic way. In other
words, the values of the control parameters used during encryption and decryption
must determine positive values of the largest component of the LE. Furthermore, since
the determination of LE entails some inaccuracies [Pastor97], it is highly advisable to
analyze the chaoticity of orbits using auxiliary tools as the entropy measures referred
in Sections 2.4, 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. Finally, either LE or the different entropy measures
can bring to light a somehow one-to-one relationship between the rate of divergence
of orbits and the control parameters. In this case, if a chaos-based cryptosystem
allows an estimation of the rate of divergence, then it could be possible to estimate
the control parameters, which represents a vulnerability of the cryptosytem being the
control parameters part or determined by the secret key.
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Rule 3. Selection of chaotic maps with high sensitivity to control parameter
mismatch.
The size of the key space of any cryptosystem must be large enough to avoid the
feasibility of a brute-force attack. This is a common requirement of all encryption
systems, and it has to be fulfilled in accordance with the computational capacity of
any possible attacker. As it is pinpointed in [Alvarez06a, Rule 15], today’s computer
speed requires a key space of size larger than 2100. As indicated by the previous rule,
in digital chaos-based cryptography the specification of the key space is mainly guided
by the calculation of the LE. Consequently, the resolution in the computation of the
LE is a measure of the maximum number of possible keys, and thus an approximation
of the size of the key space. To get a number of keys larger than 2100 ≈ 1030, the
resolution must be 10−30. However, with that resolution, thousands of keys would
become equivalent, unless there is a strong sensitivity to parameter mismatch. It
implies that the concretion of the key space must be accompanied of an exhaustive
analysis of the orbits generated for each value of the control parameters. Indeed,
it must be tested that the orbits are different enough to assure that the encryption
procedure possesses confusion and diffusion properties. Useful tools in this regarding
are the statistical distance (see Sec. 2.6) and the MRE (see Sec. 2.5.2).
Rule 4. The selected chaotic map should not allow total characterization
of its dynamics from a partial knowledge of this dynamics.
The total characterization of the dynamics of a chaotic map requires the knowledge
of the initial condition and the control parameters. When considering a chaos-based
cryptosystem, it could be possible for an attacker to guess either the initial condition
or some the control parameters. Upon the guessed information, the attacker could
use some of the general attack strategies (Sec. 1.2.2) to get some additional infor-
mation about the orbits of the underlying chaotic map. For some chaotic maps, this
additional information and the guessed information drive to the estimation of the
rest of parameters describing the dynamics of the map. For example, if the chaotic
map selected for an encryption architecture is an unimodal map, and the encryption
architecture allows to infer the symbolic sequences of the map through some attack,
then the knowledge of the control parameter allows to recover the initial condition.
Rule 5. Analysis of the performance of chaotic orbits as source of entropy.
From the point of view of cryptography, the appealing of chaos is mainly motivated
by its random-like behavior. Actually, “the battle” of any cryptographer is to look for
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sources of indetermination that can be further used to conceal the information. The
design of a cryptosystem is the specification of a series of transformation procedures
based on sources of indetermination and applied on the source of information. In
chaos-based cryptography, all or some of the transformation procedures use chaos as
source of indetermination. Since the security of the whole cryptosystem lies on the
efficiency of each transformation procedure, the entropy must be evaluated. Again,
the assessment must be done using the tools described in Sections 2.4, 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
Furthermore, this assessment can also be refined by considering every transformation
procedure as a Pseudo Random Number Generator(PRNG). Upon this consideration,
evaluation can be fulfilled using the battery of statistical tests of the National In-
stitute of Standard & Technology (NIST) [NIST01]. Nevertheless, if chaos is used as
base of a chaos-based stream cipher, then it is also necessary to analyze the possibility
of reconstructing the symbolic dynamics in order to verify the feasibility of estimation
for the control parameter(s) and initial conditions as it is done in Chapters 3 and 4.
Rule 6. Selection of chaotic maps guaranteing avalanche effect.
This rule is equivalent to the diffusion property, and it is intended to make the
relationship between the key (or the plaintext) and the ciphertext as complex as
possible. The goal is to erase any possible pattern or redundancy in the ciphertext,
and thus to avoid inference of the secret key from the ciphertext. In the context
of chaos-based cryptography, diffusion is connected to the local rate of divergence
of orbits. As a result, chaotic maps with high values of LE must be selected. It
is also possible to use chaotic maps with small LE if the encryption of each unit
of plaintext is performed iterating several times the chaotic map. Nevertheless, it
implies a reduction of the efficiency of the cryptosystem, and thus it is preferable to
discretize the key space to guarantee the avalanche effect, i.e., the result of encrypting
a plaintext with two slightly different keys must produce totally different ciphertexts.
The tools for verification of the avalanche effect are the same used in the assessment
of parameter mismatch, i.e., the statistical distance and the MRE. The discretization
of the key space implies a reduction of its size, which could result in a degradation of
the protection against brute-force attacks. A possible solution to this problem is to
discretise the orbits of the chaotic maps instead of the key space. As we have shown
in Sec. 3.2 for the skew tent map, this strategy determines an increasing of the LE
and, consequently, of diffusion.
Rule 7. Chaotic maps with flat histograms and width of the phase space
not depending on the control parameters must be used.
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If this requirement is satisfied, then the chaotic cryptosystem possesses the confu-
sion property. If the underlying dynamical system evolves, as expected, chaotically,
then it possesses the ergodic property and thus orbits are statistically independent
of the control parameters and initial conditions. As a result, the ciphertext should
be statistically undistinguishable from the output of a truly random function, and
should be statistically the same for all the keys.
Rule 8. The ciphertext space must be defined in such a way that the recons-
truction of the dynamics of the underlying chaotic maps is not possible.
Ciphertexts of chaos-based cryptosystems must not leak information about the
symbolic dynamics, the return map or any other shortcut to reconstruct the dynamics
of the underlying chaotic maps.
Rule 9. The secret key of a chaos-based cryptosystem must not include the
number of iterations of the underlying chaotic maps.
If it is necessary to perform encryption through several rounds and several itera-
tions of the underlying chaotic maps, then the number of encryption rounds and the
number of iterations must be publicly known. They can not be considered as part
of the secret key, since a mere analysis of the encryption/decryption time allows an
estimation of those values.
Rule 10. Resistance to classical attacks.
The cryptanalysis of chaos-based cryptosystems combined techniques from the
theory of dynamical systems and from the cryptanalysis of conventional cryptography.
In this concern, it must be verified the robustness of the cryptosystem against known-
plaintext, chosen-plaintext, known-ciphertext, and chosen-ciphertext attacks. Spe-
cialized attacks must also be evaluated [Stamp07]. For digital chaos-based block ci-
phers resistance to differential [Szczepanski05] and linear cryptanalysis [Jakimoski01b]
must be proved.
Rule 11. Resistance to application-specific attacks.
The encryption of information with special features must be defined carefully
in order to avoid the leaking of such features in the ciphertext. This is the case of
digital images and videos. In digital images (videos) there exists an strong correlation
between different pixels (transform coefficients), which can used to develop some
effective correlation-based attacks.
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5.6 Evaluation of some chaos-based encryption pro-
posals
In this Thesis the process conducting to the above design rules is of negative nature.
Indeed, we have analyzed a significative set of recent proposals in the field of chaos-
based cryptography, we have established their main problems, and finally we have
proposed a group of strategies to elude those problems. In other words, we have
established what is insecure and, accordingly, we have recommended strategies to
avoid it. As a consequence of the procedure carried out, one can think that chaos-
based cryptography is intrinsically insecure. Indeed, all case studies proposed in this
Thesis show security problems, but no “secure” chaos-based cryptosystem has been
introduced. Therefore, the next step is to show some chaos-based cryptosystems that
can be considered “secure”. Before proceeding with the description of those “good”
cryptosystems, it is necessary to establish what we mean by “secure” cryptosystem.
In the context described along this Thesis, a secure cryptosystem is one that does not
have any of the security flaws that we have pinpointed, i.e., one that satisfies a set of
relevant rules among the group of rules given in the previous section; the subset of
relevant rules is determined by the type of encryption architecture. Once the setting
has been clarified, let us examine the level of “security” of the next three groups of
chaos-based cryptosystems:
• Searching-based chaotic ciphers. This kind of chaotic cryptosystems has been
explained and analyzed in Case study 3.5.1. Recalling, this type of cryptosys-
tems split the phase space into a set of disjoint intervals. The number of disjoint
intervals is given by the size of the alphabet of plaintexts, and each character
of the alphabet is assigned to one interval of the phase space. Encryption is
performed by iterating the underlying chaotic map and recording the number
of iterations to land into the interval associated to each unit of plaintext. The
most important part in the design of this class of cryptosystems is to find a
chaotic map with a uniform probability distribution function. As a matter
of fact, the main problem of the searching-based cryptosystems proposed in
[Baptista98; Wang08c] is that they have been designed without considering
Rule 7. In both cryptosystems the logistic map is conducting encryption, which
erodes security. Therefore, logistic map must be replaced by other chaotic map
with uniform probability distribution function. A possible candidate is the
skew tent map (see Sec. 2.3). However, the selection of the skew tent map
does not prevent from a chosen-ciphertext attack as the one described in Case
study 3.5.1. Certainly, a chosen-ciphertext attack allows to get the symbolic
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sequences of the skew tent map, which further enables to obtain an estimation
of the control parameter from either the ratio between 0-bits and 1-bits, or the
PDF of the order pattern #0 (Sec. 4.4). As a result, the skew tent map must
also be discarded. The skew tent map is a piecewise linear map. Piecewise
linear maps are defined by splitting the phase space into a set of M disjoint
intervals. In each of those intervals the map is defined by a linear function.
PieceWise Linear Chaotic Maps (PWLCM) possess a uniform probability dis-
tribution function, and a LE increasing as M does [Li03, Chapter 3]. Another
important aspect of PWLCMs is that their computational complexity is low,
which is very convenient for chaos-based cryptography. As a result, searching-
based chaotic ciphers should be implemented using a PWLCM with M > 2.
Nevertheless, the ciphertext of searching-based cryptosystems still leaks infor-
mation about the dynamics of the PWLCMs. More specifically, even if the
original logistic map is replaced by a PWLCM, its return map can be recon-
structed using a chosen-ciphertext attack as it is done in [Skrobek08]. As a
matter of fact, [Baptista98] violates Rule 8, and some additional improvement
must be incorporated. A possible solution can be achieved by using the en-
cryption architecture defined in [Huang05], but replacing the logistic map by
a PWLCM. In this last encryption architecture, the plaintext is encrypted bit
by bit, and each interval is assigned randomly to a 0-bit or a 1-bit instead of a
character of the alphabet of plaintexts. Consequently, the number of iterations
to encrypt a unit of plaintext is drastically reduced, and the dynamics of the
underlying chaotic map cannot be reconstructed through a chosen-plaintext at-
tack. Therefore, the cryptosystem [Huang05] with a PWLCM overcomes the
problems of the previous searching based chaotic cipher, and simultaneously
improves the efficiency of the encryption procedure.
• Chaos-based cryptosystems for image encryption. Image encryption is some-
how different from text encryption due to some inherent features of images,
such as bulk data capacity and high correlation among pixels. Therefore, digi-
tal chaotic ciphers like those in [Baptista98; Alvarez99] and traditional crypto-
graphic techniques such as DES, IDEA and RSA [Menezes97; Stinson95] are no
longer suitable for practical image encryption, especially for real-time communi-
cation scenarios. So far, many chaos-based image cryptosystems have been pro-
posed [Chen04; Guan05; Pareek06b; Kwok07; Rhouma07; Wong08; Wang08d].
The major core of these encryption systems consists of one or several chaotic
maps serving the purpose of either just encrypting the image or shuﬄing the
126
image and subsequently encrypting the resulting shuﬄed image. In [Wang08d]
different chaotic maps are employed for image encryption. The plain-image is
first permuted and later transformed through a keystream generated from the
iteration of the logistic map. With respect to the second stage, the control
parameter of the logistic map is part of the secret key. In [Wang08d] there
is not a thoroughly definition of key space involving the control parameter of
the logistic map. Indeed, the authors of [Wang08d] allow to use any value of
the control parameter inside the interval [3.9, 4], but it is well known that the
bifurcation diagram of the logistic map has a dense set of periodic windows in
that interval [Arroyo08a](see Fig. 5.6).
(a) (b)
Figure 5.6: Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map showing periodic windows: (a)
λ ∈ [3.9, 4]; (b) λ ∈ [3.95, 3.9523]
Therefore, the cryptosystem proposed in [Wang08d] does not satisfy Rule 2.
Nevertheless, the encryption architecture defined in [Wang08d] is a good ref-
erence to design new image encryption schemes based on chaos. Indeed, it
is based on the concatenation of permutation and substitutions, which is the
paradigm of conventional block ciphers [Menezes97]. A careful examination of
the scheme given in [Wang08d] allows to conclude that it is secure against di-
fferential attacks. Furthermore, in [Wang08d] encryption is performed through
several rounds. In each round the keystream is modified according to the plain-
text, which represents an improvement of previous proposals of the authors
[Chen04; Mao04]. As a result, Rule 10 is fulfilled by the cryptosystem defined
in [Wang08d], being the selection of the logistic map the main problem of this
cryptosystem.
• Block ciphers with dynamical S-Boxes from chaos. In this scenario chaotic maps
are used to define the S-Boxes of conventional block ciphers [Menezes97]. S-
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boxes are the elements implementing the non-linear transformation of the plain-
text, and they are created either randomly or algorithmically. In [Kocarev01b;
Jakimoski01b; Masuda06] the S-Boxes are generated by iterating and discretiz-
ing chaotic maps. The rules concerning this kind of cryptosystems are Rule 10
and Rule 2. Indeed, it has been verified that the resulting cryptosystems are
vulnerable against the typical attacks on conventional block ciphers. In this
sense, the authors of [Kocarev01b; Jakimoski01b] verify that the S-boxes ob-
tained through the iteration and discretization of the selected chaotic maps
resist the differential and linear cryptanalysis. Furthermore, the dynamical sys-
tems involved in the generation of the S-boxes are always working in chaotic
regime (Rule 2), which finally confirms that the designed cryptosystems can be
considered secure.
5.7 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter we have explained the main security problems in digital chaos-based
cryptography. We have focused the attention on the problems derived from an inap-
propriate selection of the underlying chaotic maps, but we have also discussed some
problems derived from the encryption architectures and the cryptosystem’s imple-
mentation. A group of designing rules has been proposed as a methodology to avoid
the previous underlined problems. Finally, the suitability of the design rules has been
exemplified through the evaluation of different recent chaos-based cryptosystems. As
a result of that analysis, we can conclude that the security of a chaos-based cryptosys-
tem is preserved by using the encryption architectures of conventional cryptography,
being chaos the origin of the non-linearities demanded by those encryption architec-
tures. This is the main lesson learned from the analysis of chaotic cryptosystems.
There is no need to invent a new paradigm, since conventional cryptography em-
bodies all the methodologies and rules to design a good cryptosystem. Therefore,
the first step when designing a chaos-based cryptosystem is to fully understand the
concepts and standards used by cryptographers. As a matter of fact, only from a
complete comprehension of the cryptographic corpus it is feasible to extract from
chaos all its potential as support of encryption procedures. Nevertheless, to extract
that potentiality it is necessary to know thoroughly the dynamics of chaos. Sum-
ming up, the cryptographic corpus highlights what cryptography expects from chaos,
whereas the theory of chaotic systems reveals how chaos can be articulated to satisfy
the cryptographic expectations.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and future work
6.1 Conclusions of this Thesis
The invention of writing was the dawn of the information revolution. This great tech-
nological advance allowed to overcome the barriers of time and distance when sharing
ideas and news. Nevertheless, it entailed a serious problem when the intention was
to share information with an specific reader or receiver. To assure selective reading,
different strategies were invented to transform the written information into a gibber-
ish. This transformation was dependent on an external parameter named (secret) key,
which was known only by the ones writing the information and those allowed to read
it. This was the beginning of cryptography. Simultaneously, different strategies were
conceived to elude the security of the transformation procedures and, consequently,
recover the original information without knowing the secret key. Originally informa-
tion was hidden by either simple permutations or substitutions of written characters.
Nevertheless, those operations were very easy to overcome for an illegitimate reader,
and more complex encryption methodologies had to be designed. Upon the scene
depicted by the set of the different encryption proposals, in 1949 Shannon defined the
basics of the theory of perfect secrecy. According to Shannon, the perfect concealing
of information requires the interleaving of good procedures of confusion and diffusion
of information. Modern symmetric ciphers (or secret key ciphers) are based on those
principles. Conventionally, number theory and abstract algebra are the foundation
of the methodologies implementing confusion and diffusion of information. However,
since 1990’s many researchers have worked on developing confusion and diffusion by
means of chaotic systems. Apparently the characteristics of chaotic dynamics can be
connected to the requirements of cryptography and, consequently, chaotic cryptosys-
tems can be designed following the standards of conventional cryptography.
Along this Thesis the goal has been to emphasize the possibility of accomplishing
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the needs of cryptography through the virtues of chaos. If the foundations of conven-
tional cryptography arises from number theory, chaos-based cryptography is based on
the possibility of conforming non-linear transformations of the plaintext using chaotic
orbits. From this point of view, the security of chaos-based encryption procedures
is very related to the possibility of reconstructing those orbits from known informa-
tion. In this sense, our strategy has been to clarify the contexts where it is possible
to get the control parameters and initial condition that originate a certain chaotic
orbit. When attacking a cryptosystem, we explore if it is possible to circumvent the
concealing of information according to four different scenarios:
• Only the output of the cryptosystem is known.
• Some outputs and inputs of the cryptosystem are known.
• We can select some inputs of the cryptosystem and calculate the corresponding
outputs.
• We can choose some output of the cryptosystem and determine the correspon-
ding inputs.
Regarding chaos-based cryptography, the vulnerability of a cryptosystem is proven
if it is possible to connect some or several of the above scenarios with the contexts
allowing the estimation from chaotic orbits of initial condition and/or control para-
meters. Strictly speaking, it is not enough to show the impossibility of such linking to
conclude the cryptographic quality of a chaos-based encryption proposal. As a matter
of fact, it is also required to examine thoroughly the inner aspects of the encryption
architecture. In this sense, the encryption architecture might include elements from
chaos theory, but also from other fields as number theory. In this Thesis we have
assumed that those other fields are analyzed by means of the general methodologies
of conventional cryptography and, consequently, we have focused the work on the
specificity of the design of chaotic cryptosystems, i.e., the evaluation of chaotic orbits
as bearers of strategies to diffuse and confuse information.
The potentiality of chaotic orbits as procedures of diffusion of information is given
by the local divergence of chaos. As we have settled in Chapter 2, the local divergence
of chaotic systems is measured by means of the Lyapunov exponent or LE. Chaotic
maps involved in chaos-based cryptosystems must have positive maximum LE, and we
have shown the consequences of a neglect of this respect through the analysis of the
cryptosystem described in [Chee06] (Case study 2.2.1 and the corresponding crypta-
nalytical work in [Arroyo08b]). On the other hand, the achievement of confusion
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through chaotic orbits is not so “easy” to clarify as diffusion. Certainly, confusion
is related to the level of uncertainty associated to chaotic orbits, but also is very
dependent on the feasibility of modeling such uncertainty by means of chaotic dyna-
mics. The level of uncertainty of a source of information is computed by measures
of entropy. In this Thesis we have proposed different measures of entropy, in order
to better clarify how chaotic orbits can be manipulated to conceal information. This
being the case, entropy has been calculated through generating partitions (Shannon’s,
Tsallis’, and n-gram conditional entropy), but also by means of a characterization of
chaos in the time-frequency domain (Wavelet Entropy and MultiResolution Entropy).
Of course, the higher measure of entropy, the better performance from the perspective
of confusion property. Nevertheless, some measures of entropy highlight a one-to-one
or few-to-one relation with respect to the control parameters, which could repre-
sent a security problem for some chaos-based cryptosystems. Therefore, it is highly
advisable to use measures of entropy as guide during the design of a chaos-based
cryptosystem, since they can be very helpful when deciding how to build up cipher-
texts from chaotic orbits. Moreover, it is very interesting the information obtained
from the assessment of the statistical complexity of chaotic orbits. The skeleton of
chaos is a dense set of unstable periodic orbits or UPOs, and some chaotic maps are
associated to an entropy that increases as the number of UPOs does. Therefore,
it is very convenient to handle this kind of relationship and, consequently, we have
proposed to quantify the statistical complexity of chaotic orbits, through Jensen’s
divergence, and the statistical distance between orbits by means of Wootters’ dis-
tance; in this sense, it is very meaningful the study we have performed about the
potentiality of unimodal maps as base of stream ciphers, according to the encryption
scheme described in [Kurian08] (Case study 2.6.1 with corresponding cryptanalytical
work in [Arroyo09c]). In this analysis we show that the statistical distance between
keystreams generated from very different values of the control parameter is large,
whereas the one between keystreams generated from close values of the control para-
meter is small. Moreover, the statistical distance decreases as the difference between
the control parameters does. Consequently, Wootters’ distance can be used to get an
estimation of the control parameter of the chaotic maps involved in the cryptosystem
defined in [Kurian08].
Entropy is not the only indicator to confirm confusion property. Confusion also
demands chaotic orbits with an “neutral” statistical behavior with respect to control
parameters and initial condition. Indeed, if the histograms of chaotic orbits leak in-
formation about the control parameters, then in some contexts it could be possible
for an attacker to infer them. An example of such type of contexts is depicted when
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cryptanalyzing [Pisarchik06] (Case study 2.3.1 and the corresponding cryptanalytical
work in [Arroyo08d]). The study of this cryptosystem has allowed us to highlight the
importance of defining rigorously the ciphertexts of chaos-based cryptosytems. In
this regard, also our cryptanalytical works [Arroyo09g; Arroyo09f] on the cryptosys-
tems proposed in [Ling07; Wang08c] have been very useful (Case study 5.3.1 and
Case study 3.5.1). Accordingly, security problems could arise if the ciphertext is con-
formed from chaotic orbits straightforwardly, but also if it is given by coarse-grained
versions of the orbits. In this sense, we have studied the symbolic dynamics and order
patterns of unimodal maps (Chapters 3-4). It is well known the relationship between
the symbolic sequences of unimodal maps and the associated control parameter. In
[Arroyo09a] we point out that the probability distribution of the order patterns of
unimodal maps is also related to the control parameter. Accordingly, we have shown
how both symbolic dynamics and order patterns can be used to estimate the con-
trol parameter and/or the initial condition from the symbolic sequences of unimodal
maps, which confirms them as very helpful for the design and analysis of chaos-based
cryptosystems. Since unimodal maps have been broadly used in the context of chaos-
based cryptography, the proposed estimation methods reveal a very serious security
problem. Furthermore, the methodology employed in the concretion of the estimation
methods can be very useful as a paradigm to either analyze other chaotic maps, and
conclude the adequacy of a chaotic map to encryption architectures whose security
depends on its symbolic dynamics.
The work described in this Thesis is not a mere list of mathematical tools, it also
embodies a series of case studies, being the result of our activity in the cryptanalysis of
chaos-based cryptosystems [Arroyo08b; Arroyo09g; Arroyo09h; Arroyo09f; Arroyo09f;
Arroyo09c]. These studies have been used to illustrate some of the mathematical tools
proposed in this Thesis, but also to detect the main problems in chaos-based cryp-
tosystems. Those problems are basically derived from a selection of chaotic maps not
taking into account their dynamical properties. The key space and the performance
of any chaos-based cryptosystem are very dependent on the “quality” of the chaotic
maps selected as “heart” of the encryption procedure. In order to guarantee a correct
selection of chaotic maps, we have made explicit a set of design rules in Chapter 5. In
this regard, the main goal has been to point out that chaos-based cryptography is not
a methodology apart from conventional cryptography, but a branch in cryptography
that, roughly speaking, uses chaos instead of number theory as source of entropy.
The paradigm that any designer of chaos-based cryptosystems must respect is given
by the recommendations of conventional cryptography, plus the set of mathematical
tools and critical contexts defined along this Thesis.
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As it has been pinpointed at the beginning of this Section, chaos is introduced
in cryptography to define new strategies of confusion and diffusion of information.
The main contribution of this Thesis has been the concretion of a set of procedures
to test if chaotic dynamics do really lead to those confusion and diffusion properties.
Furthermore, those procedures are of practical nature, since they allow to confirm
what cryptography expects and demands from cryptography in a practical environ-
ment, i.e, when working with finite precision arithmetics. Indeed, in a finite precision
context the dynamical properties of chaos are eroded, which could further implies
a degradation of the accomplishment of the needs of cryptography. This being the
case, the battery of mathematical indicators defined along this Thesis must be used
to assess the distance between the “factual” chaotic behavior and the requirements of
cryptography. In a practical environment chaos cannot be assumed without previous
evaluation, but also it cannot be assumed that chaos embodies confusion and diffusion
properties without prior examination.
6.2 Contributions of this Thesis
In this Thesis we have described a series of mathematical tools to establish the link
between the characteristics of chaotic systems and the confusion and diffusion pro-
perties of encryption schemes. The association between diffusion and the Lyapunov
exponent is well known in the context of chaos-based cryptography, but the procedures
to assess confusion are not so well known. To fulfill this need, we have introduced the
following set of mathematical tools:
1. Measures of entropy. The potentiality of chaotic orbits as mechanisms bearing
the encryption of information depends on the level of entropy of such orbits.
This level of entropy depends on the dynamics of chaotic systems, but also on
how encryption architectures transform chaotic orbits to conceal information.
Therefore, we must use as many measures of entropy as possible. In this Thesis
we have proposed to measure entropy using not only Shannon’s measure, but
also non-extensive measures as the one proposed by Tsallis. We have also shown
how useful the n-gram conditional entropy is to decide the size of the units of
plaintext. Certainly, the n-gram conditional entropy decreases as n (here as-
sumed as the size of the units of plaintext) increases, which could seem negative
for encryption. Nevertheless, small values of n could lead to a n-gram condi-
tional entropy being a bijective function with respect to a control parameter, as
we have shown for the case of the logistic map and the skew tent map. More-
over, for a given value of n, it is possible to discern the intervals of the control
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parameters space where the n-gram conditional entropy is a bijective function
of a control parameter. Since our goal is to elude any critical context allowing
the estimation of control parameters, those regions of the control parameters
space should be avoided. As a result, the n-gram conditional entropy is also a
useful indicator when defining the key space of chaos-based cryptosystems.
2. Time-frequency analysis of chaotic orbits. We have shown that the Wavelet
Transform is another important tool when designing and analyzing digital chaos-
based cryptosystems. Certainly, the Wavelet Transform allows to define di-
fferent measures of entropy, as the Wavelet Entropy and the MultiResolution
Entropy, without knowing the generating partition of chaotic maps. Moreover,
we have pinpointed that the MultiResolution Entropy enables the detection of
changes in the control parameters, which reveals a critical context for those en-
cryption architectures where the control parameters of the underlying chaotic
maps change as encryption is performed.
3. Statistical complexity. For some chaotic maps the entropy of the associated
orbits is very related to the density of the underlying Unstable Periodic Or-
bits or UPOs. As a consequence, an increase of the entropy informs about an
increase of the number of UPOs. The tool to measure this relationship is the
statistical complexity. In this Thesis we have used the statistical complexity
defined using Jensen’s measure of divergence and some measure of entropy. We
have shown that the statistical complexity of the logistic map is a one-to-one
function with respect to the control parameter, when the control parameter is
selected to have chaotic behavior. Therefore, the statistical complexity is an-
other very important tool when examining the adequacy of a chaotic map for a
given encryption architecture. If the statistical complexity of the chaotic map
can be measured manipulating somehow the encryption architecture, then the
statistical complexity should not be a bijective function of a control parameter
(supposing that the chaotic map has more than one control parameter).
4. Statistical distances. As we have shown in this Thesis, the analysis of the
histograms of chaotic orbits is very useful when assessing the cryptographic
quality of a chaotic map. If the shape of the histograms changes as some
control parameter does, then a given value of the control parameter could be
estimated through the statistical distance between the histogram associated to
the given value of the control parameter, and the histograms generated from a
set of candidates values for the control parameter. In this Thesis we have used
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the statistical distance defined by Wootters, and we have shown its virtues as
a tool for the cryptanalysis of keystreams derived from the iteration of chaotic
maps.
5. Application of Gray codes to the estimation of the control parameter and initial
condition of unimodal maps. In this Thesis we have shown that the Theory of
Symbolic Dynamics reveals a critical context to handle when designing chaos-
based cryptosystems. In this regard, we have shown that symbolic sequences of
unimodal maps can be interpreted as Gray codes. Furthermore, any Gray code
can be transformed into a number called Gray Ordering Number or GON . The
GON defines a few-to-one relationship with respect to the control parameter.
We have shown how to use that relationship to estimate the control parameter
from a given symbolic sequence, when working with unimodal maps. Moreover,
if the control parameter of a unimodal map is known, the initial condition as-
sociated to a Gray code can be inferred without error. Although our analysis
has been focused on unimodal maps, it depicts a critical context when consi-
dering encryption architectures leaking the symbolic sequences of the underlying
chaotic maps. For those encryption architectures it must be guaranteed that it
is not possible to build up a one-to-one (or a few-to-one) relationship between
the symbolic sequences of the selected chaotic map and any of the associated
control parameters.
6. Application of order patterns to the estimation of the control parameter of
unimodal maps. The knowledge of the critical point of unimodal maps is a re-
quirement to perform the estimation method based on the GON . Nevertheless,
we have shown that it is possible to perform such estimation using the probabi-
lity distribution function of the order patterns of unimodal maps. As a matter
of fact, if the relative frequency of an order pattern in a chaotic orbit provides
a one-to-one or a few-to-one relationship with respect to the control parameter,
then the control parameter can be estimated. Hence, the study of order patterns
of a chaotic map depicts another critical context to consider when designing a
digital chaos-based cryptosystem.
The concretion of the mathematical framework described in this Thesis is the re-
sult of a thorough analysis of a meaningful set of digital chaos-based cryptosystems.
This analysis has been specially performed for the following digital chaos-based cryp-
tosystems:
7. In 2006, Chee et al. proposed a chaotic cryptosystem based on the Hénon
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map. In this Thesis we have emphasized the lack of a description about the key
space of this cryptosystem, and we have also indicated the difficulty of finding
new keys when working with the Hénon map. Finally we have shown that it
is possible to break the cryptosystem when the keys are not selected properly
using a known-plaintext attack and assuming a partial knowledge of the key.
8. The security of the image encryption scheme proposed by Gao et al. in 2008 has
been analyzed in detail. It has been shown that the equivalent secret key can
be recovered in a chosen-plaintext attack with only dlog256(MN)e + 1 chosen
plain-images, being M and N the width and the height of the plain-images
respectively. In addition, some other defects have also been distinguished in the
scheme under study. Among those defects, it is necessary to emphasize the one
concerning the encryption speed, since it informs about the non-convenience of
continuous-time chaotic systems for implementing fast encryption procedures.
9. In this Thesis we have analyzed the security properties of the cryptosystem
proposed by Ling et al. in 2007. We have shown that there exists a great
number of weak keys derived from the fact that the logistic map is not always
chaotic. In addition, the cryptosystem is very weak against a known-plaintext
attack in the sense that the secret key can be totally recovered using a very
short plaintext.
10. In 2006, Pisarchik et al. proposed encryption scheme based on the logistic map.
We have emphasized some problems concerning the key space definition and the
implementation of the cryptosystem using floating-point operations. We have
also shown how it is possible to reduce considerably the key space through a
ciphertext-only attack. Moreover, a timing attack allows the estimation of part
of the key due to the existent relationship between this part of the key and the
encryption/decryption time.
11. In 2008, Wang et al. defined a cryptosystem based on the ergodicity property
of the logistic map. A chosen-ciphertext attack has been described, which can
recover the secret key of the cryptosystem by exploiting the theory of symbolic
dynamics.
12. In 2008, Kurian et al. defined a stream cipher whose keystream is basically a
symbolic sequence of the (one-parameter) logistic map or of the skew tent map.
We have shown that the Wootters’ statistical distance can be used to discern
between the keystreams of the logistic map and those corresponding to the skew
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tent map. Once the underlying chaotic map is identified, the control parame-
ter and the initial condition can be estimated using the Theory of Symbolic
Dynamics and the analysis of the probability distribution functions of order
patterns. From a a general point of view, the results of this cryptanalysis hint
to the fact that symbolic sequences of unimodal maps are insecure when used
as keystreams.
As a result of our cryptanalytical work and the mathematical framework we have
defined along this Thesis, it is possible to conclude a set of recommendations to design
a “good” digital chaos-based cryptosystem:
13. Definition of a set of rules for the design of digital chaos-based cryptosystems.
When designing a digital chaos-based cryptosystem it must be guaranteed that
it is not possible to apply successfully any of the cryptanalysis tools and pro-
cedures explained along this Thesis. Furthermore, the security of the final
cryptosystem cannot be guaranteed unless it is also examined using the tools
and procedures of conventional cryptography. Indeed, we must not forget that
chaos-based cryptography is a branch of cryptography that uses chaotic systems
as sources of entropy and, consequently, it must respect the same standards and
requirements that conventional cryptography does.
6.3 Future work
The main points to investigate, as an extension of the research work covered by this
Thesis, are:
• Theory of discrete chaos. The final concretion of the framework defined in
this paper requires a further investigation of the theory of discrete chaos. In this
regard the work will be focused on improving and enlarging the tools described
in this Thesis according to the theory introduced in [Kocarev06; Amigó07;
Amigó07b; Amigo07a; Amigó08a].
• Application of the theory of symbolic dynamics and order patterns
of unimodal maps to other maps. In this Thesis symbolic dynamics and
order patterns have been applied to the study of a class of unimodal maps. A
broader scope can and must be depicted using the work in [Hansen92; Daw03;
Keller03; Keller05; Keller07; Bandt05; Pethel06; Bandt07; Wang08b] and the
theory explained in [Hao98; Lind95; Kitchens97].
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• Study of the applicability of chaotic dynamics to public-key crypto-
graphy In this Thesis only symmetric encryption schemes have been consid-
ered. Nevertheless, it is also possible to design public key encryption strategies
using chaotic systems [Kocarev03; Bergamo05; Kocarev05; Schmitz08]. Some
of the proposals in the field of chaos-based public key cryptography are based
on the Mandelbrot set [Alia07; Alia08], and thus future work will be focused
on studing those proposals by means of our work about the inner structure
of unimodal maps [Pastor06; Pastor07a; Alvarez07a; Pastor07b; Pastor07c;
Pastor07d; Alvarez07b; Pastor08; Romera08; Arroyo09a].
• Study of other sources of chaos and their application to cryptography.
Recently optical systems have been used as sources of entropy to encrypt infor-
mation [Argyris05], although not many proposals are secure [Udaltsov03]. Fu-
ture work will be focused on the analysis of the scheme proposed in [Fernandez08b;
Fernandez08a] in order to verify its application to generate chaotic signals for
encryption of information. Another topic to further investigate is arithmetic
coding. In [Nagaraj08; Nagaraj09; Li09] it is shown that arithmetic coding
can be studied by means of the theory of dynamical systems. Moreover, it is
shown how to use arithmetic coding to generate robust chaos, which further
contributes to generate PRNG with very long periods.
• Cryptanalysis of known digital chaotic ciphers. Cryptanalysis is funda-
mental for the progress and improvement of cryptography. Since our work is
focused on promoting a better understanding of the interaction between chaos
and cryptography, we must apply to the analysis of new cryptosystems the theo-
retical conclusions resulting from the different areas of research in chaos. Indeed,
every single progress in the theory of discrete chaos, symbolic dynamics, order
patterns or the analysis of chaotic time-series is not useful for cryptography if
it can not be applied to the analysis of chaos-based cryptosystems.
• Analysis of conventional encryption schemes by means of the theory
of dynamical systems. Another important topic to examine is the possibility
of applying the tools that we have described in this Thesis to conventional
encryption schemes. Certainly, the theory of dynamical systems can be helpful
when analyzing the properties of conventional block [Kocarev04; Ruggiero04]
and stream ciphers [Millérioux08]. Tools like the Lyapunov exponent, or the
different measures of entropy proposed in this Thesis could be useful to study
conventional cryptosystems. In other words, in this Thesis we have worked on
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discerning how close the virtues of chaos are to the needs of cryptography, and
future work will be on establishing the relation between the permutations and
non-linearities of conventional ciphers, and chaotic behavior.
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